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ABSTRACT
This research considers how neighbourhood-based governance entities are located in 
broader networks of governance, by undertaking an international comparative 
investigation in two cities (Baltimore, Maryland in the US and Bristol in England). It 
uses an empirically-grounded approach to ascertain the function of such governance 
forms according to the way they are structured and operate. It assesses the 
governance context, focused at the urban level, within which these entities are 
located, considering the key actors and their relative power and the focus on deprived 
neighbourhoods versus broader strategies. This leads to consideration of how these 
strategies and actors shape the functions of neighbourhood governance and the 
implications in terms of the relative power vested at the neighbourhood level. The 
research demonstrates the localist and privatist nature of Baltimore’s urban 
governance context, and the centrist and managerial nature of Bristol’s. Within both 
networks a policy subsystem is evident with regard to neighbourhood approaches, but 
it is the broader governance network which determines the state and market 
imperatives pursued. In Baltimore and latterly in Bristol, tackling deprivation is a 
subservient agenda to the predominant imperative of growth. This highlights the 
importance of the two cities’ shared neo-liberal context despite their different 
governmental systems. In Baltimore, neighbourhoods do not gain resource from the 
city-level governance network if they lack the assets this network seeks. The function 
of neighbourhood governance which results is self-help, as long as neighbourhoods 
have the capacity to do so. In Bristol, neighbourhood governance is steered by central 
government via its funding regimes and policy approaches. Changes in these have 
^heralded a shift from the targeting of deprived areas via area-based initiativesrto 
seeking to link deprived neighbourhoods to the benefits of broader growth. 
Neighbourhood governance entities are being steered to adopt self-help strategies, 
irrespective of their capacity to do so.
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PREFACE
My interest in neighbourhood governance stems from my previous professional 
experiences. I was regeneration manager for a local authority, where I was 
responsible for area-based government programmes and worked with neighbourhood 
stakeholders. I was thus very aware of the effects of government policies at 
neighbourhood level and wondered how and why such initiatives were formulated. I 
then went to study urban social policy in the US, where I learnt about varied 
neighbourhood initiatives and became more aware of how England has tended to look 
across the Atlantic for policy ideas. On my return I went into central government.
The ‘double devolution’ agenda was at its height, and I was interested in the political 
motivations lying behind the resurgence of the neighbourhood as a spatial scale for 
policy focus and action while an understanding of the realities of neighbourhood- 
based efforts was lacking. How is neighbourhood governance being used, by whom 
and why? How do the realities compare to the policy rhetoric? Overall, what is on 
offer to neighbourhoods?
These experiences, combined with the opportunity that a PhD provided to draw from 
and reflect upon these, resulted in this comparative research into how neighbourhood 
governance is being used in the US and England.
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION
This research seeks to further understanding regarding how, why and by whom 
neighbourhood governance is used in England and the US. These are important 
questions given that emphasis on the neighbourhood as a spatial scale for 
intervention, and forms of neighbourhood governance associated with this, have been 
evident in the US and England as part of efforts to tackle deprivation for the past forty 
years. Most recently the English emphasis on the neighbourhood forms a crucial part 
of policy debates regarding ‘new localism’, ‘double devolution’, and changing 
approaches to regeneration.
Despite a broad literature of relevance to the field, there is general agreement that 
significant gaps in research and understanding remain, with a “paucity of well- 
designed, sceptical investigations” (Klijn & Skelcher, 2007). Questions remain about 
the underlying purposes and priorities of such governance, which can be interpreted
as part of a devolutionary, empowerment strategy, as a way of co-opting
« ____
communities, or as a discharge strategy passing responsibility to them. This research,
drawing on theories of network governance, aims to further understanding of the
political co-ordination of governance and the realities of the use of the neighbourhood
as a spatial scale for policy focus and action. It seeks to ground the various
interpretations of the use of neighbourhood governance, looking beyond the espoused
objectives. Neighbourhood governance initiatives tend to be accompanied by a
flourish of policy rhetoric which makes claims regarding their ability to increase
citizen participation and revitalise local democracy, to make service delivery more
responsive, and to alleviate deprivation.
A unique aspect of the research is that it provides an international comparison of the 
use of such governance forms, enabling consideration of what is distinctive and what 
is similar, and how this relates to expectations of a managerial and centrist England 
and a privatist and localist US. This comparison is innovative and justified not only 
given the longstanding history of policy transfer between the two countries 
(particularly from the US to England), but given the potential of international
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comparative research to enhance understanding of urban change and urban 
policymaking.
To consider the role of neighbourhood governance by locating it within the multi­
level, multi-actor governance context within which it operates, the research first 
attempts to ascertain the role of neighbourhood governance entities. This is informed 
by a series of accounts contained in the literature which can be divided into two broad 
groups. The first interprets neighbourhood governance as a practical endeavour (to 
improve democracy and services), and places emphasis on building the capacity of 
communities to help themselves. The second set of accounts interprets such efforts as 
a tokenistic way of dealing with deprived neighbourhoods without addressing the 
need for systemic reform, or as a way to enable dominant interests to realise their 
priorities. This range of accounts informed development of a framework of ‘ideal- 
type’ characteristics against which the structure and operations of neighbourhood 
governance bodies could be assessed to improve understanding of their role.
All of these interpretations emphasise the inherently political nature of such
rjT
endeavours. Therefore,'the research considers how the context of neighbourhood 
governance entities affects their role. Using a framework of expected characteristics 
for urban governance developed from the key literature, the network governance 
context is assessed in terms of its focus on deprived neighbourhoods versus broader 
strategies, and its key actors, such as central/ federal and local/ city government and 
non-governmental stakeholders, and their relative dominance. This enables 
consideration of how these strategies and actors shape the role of neighbourhood 
governance, and the implications of this in terms of the relative power of governance 
at the neighbourhood level within its broader governance context.
In sum, the research places the same phenomenon (defined specifically as 
neighbourhood-based initiative governance) in two different city/ national contexts to 
enable a comparison of how its role is affected by these contexts. It seeks to clarify 
the basis of the differences between these two contexts for neighbourhood governance 
and to consider how this is manifested in the way in which neighbourhood 
governance is used.
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Overall, the research found that in both cities studied (Baltimore, Maryland in the US 
and Bristol in England) deprived neighbourhoods receive varying attention. The 
ability of neighbourhood entities to improve their areas relates to the context in which 
they are located and their ability to draw resource and power from this context. This 
is determined to a large extent by the attitudes of the actors in this context to deprived 
neighbourhoods in general, to the specific neighbourhood in particular, and to the 
entity concerned.
Baltimore's national context, particularly since significant federal disengagement 
from concerns with urban deprivation in the 1980s, has meant that any approaches to 
neighbourhoods are formulated by key actors at the city-level in light of the city’s 
severe lack of resource. If they are able to, neighbourhood governance entities tend to 
‘go it alone’. Entities that do have ‘assets’, such as the presence of a committed 
institution, fare better in their efforts to help themselves. In Bristol, central 
government plays a much more significant role in determining neighbourhood-level 
efforts, including the creation of neighbourhood governance entities. These efforts 
are framed by changing policies and approaches. Neighbourhood entities need to 
‘buy in’ to these approaches to gain access to resource and limited influence.
The chapters which follow explain the research’s approach and findings in much 
greater detail:
Chapter 2 explains the rise of the neighbourhood as a spatial scale for intervention, 
and the associated rise of neighbourhood governance. It presents the key governance. 
literature which has informed the research’s approach, and sets out the theoretical 
framework which underpins it, with clarification of the research’s central 
propositions. Finally the chapter explains the research’s contribution to the field and 
sets out the research’s aims in detail.
Chapter 3 clarifies the nature of the evidence sought and how this relates to the 
research questions. It explains development of the theoretical framework and how 
this was applied in the empirical work and analysis. It sets out the comparative 
international case study approach used, how the functions of neighbourhood 
governance entities are ascertained according to the way they are structured and
3
operate, and how the urban governance context of these entities is assessed.
Following detail about the research’s empirical phase, it explains how the data were 
analysed and validated.
Chapter 4 serves to ‘set the scene’ in both cities, enabling a detailed contextual 
understanding to assist in locating neighbourhood governance in its broader 
governance context. It does this by considering the cities’ respective post-war 
national policy contexts. It then sets out each city’s neighbourhood-relevant history 
and the city/ local government’s changing orientation to neighbourhoods. It 
subsequently explores the policies developed at both city and higher levels of 
government and governance which frame neighbourhood approaches.
Chapters 5 and 6 present analysis of the detailed findings from the empirical work in 
both cities. Each chapter first considers the roles revealed by the study of two 
neighbourhood governance entities in the city. The chapters then consider the city’s 
urban governance system. Finally the implications of the governance network’s 
strategies and actions are considered in terms of the relative power of the 
neighbourhood level within its governance context.
Chapter 7 concludes by considering the value of the research approach used by 
assessing and contrasting the findings in both cities. It then reflects on the literature 
in light of these, and presents some key themes which are indicative of future policy 
direction. It ends with the identification of possible future lines of enquiry.
4
Chapter'2r 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Introduction
This chapter explains the rise of the neighbourhood as a spatial scale for intervention, 
and the associated rise of neighbourhood-based initiative governance. The key 
governance literature which has informed the research’s approach is then presented, 
which addresses the broader governance context for neighbourhood-based governance 
and the relative dominance of different actors within it, including government. The 
chapter then sets out the theoretical framework which underpins the empirical 
research, including different interpretations of the functions of these initiatives. 
Finally the research’s central propositions are clarified.
The research’s overall aim is to use an empirically-grounded approach to consider 
how neighbourhood-based governance entities are located in broader networks of 
governance. A key tenet underpinning the research is that governance is inherently 
political given its concern with the “interplay of stakeholders in seeking to exercise 
power over each other to further their own interests” (Bovaird and Loffler, 2002: 16). 
To understand the function of neighbourhood-based initiative governance it is 
necessary to both assess its structure and operations, and to locate it within its broader 
multi-level governance context. Here ‘function’ refers to the actual role played by 
neighbourhood-based initiative governance rather than to such bodies’ stated remit or 
the rhetoric of their existence. The actual function of such entities indicates the 
position of the neighbourhood within its multi-level governance context and the 
power relations between institutions of governance and government at different 
spatial scales.
Following clarification of the research’s two principal units of study, neighbourhood- 
based initiative governance entities and their urban governance context, the chapter 
sets out the range of principal interpretations used to explain the function of such 
bodies. A typology of characteristics which could be expected for such bodies 
according to these interpretations is then presented. This heuristic framework
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provides a basis against which the structure and operations of the case study entities 
analysed in the empirical work are assessed. To understand the context in which 
neighbourhood-based governance operates and how this affects its functions, the 
forms of urban governance which could be expected in the UK and US within which 
such initiatives operate are then considered, as well as the relative dominance of 
governance network members. The functions of neighbourhood-based governance 
likely to arise are then posited given the state and market imperatives associated with 
these urban governance forms. Finally the chapter explains the research’s 
contribution to the field, and sets out the research’s aims in detail.
The research explores the balance in power between the urban and neighbourhood 
levels within multi-level governance systems, or the ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ 
forces on the neighbourhood as a level of governance, and what this implies about the 
use of neighbourhood-based governance. It reflects Whitehead's (2003: 13) 
contention that “the dialectics of horizontal and vertical political co-ordination should 
be a central consideration in contemporary work on political and economic devolution 
in Britain and other countries”. _
2.2 The Rise of Neighbourhood and Neighbourhood-Based Governance
Neighbourhoods and neighbourhood-based governance have been features of urban 
policy and academic discourse in the US and UK since the 1960s. The prominence of 
neighbourhood-based governance can be related to the fact that it fulfils many of what 
Cochrane (2007: 24) identifies as the main features of urban policy developed in the 
US in the 1960s (which have been subsequently adopted in the UK). These include a 
commitment to co-ordination; a belief that communities should take responsibility for 
their own ‘well-being’; a conviction that existing public service structures are 
bureaucratic and self-serving; and a belief that current local electoral structures are 
unrepresentative and exclusionary (Cochrane, 2007).
Neighbourhood-based governance is underpinned by the assumption that the relative 
proximity of interaction between citizens, service providers and decision-makers 
possible at the neighbourhood level enables improved participation, greater 
responsiveness, and enhanced democracy (as identified by Dahl and Tufte, 1973).
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The overall aim ofrneighbourhood-based governance initiatives is generally stated as 
being to enhance the ‘well-being’ of neighbourhood residents, via service provision 
more tailored to their needs and priorities, and increased participation and engagement 
in the local political process.
In the context o f a “re-scaling of governance arenas”, urban areas down to “the micro­
scale. .. [of] deprived neighbourhoods” are gaining more importance as levels of 
governance (Hohn and Neuer, 2006). This “rescaling” is seen as locating “the 
appropriate administrative scale at which to formulate and implement... policies” 
(Gordon and Buck, 2005: 13). Neighbourhoods have become recognised as a valid 
scale at which governance can operate and where the “practice of empowerment” 
(Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008: 53) can be undertaken. This reflects increased 
recognition of the neighbourhood “as an important setting for many of the processes 
which supposedly shape social identity and life chances” (Forrest and Kearns, 2001: 
2125). Recognition of the value of the neighbourhood as a spatial scale for policy 
intervention is particularly evident in attempts to tackle deprivation.
The growing focus on neighbourhoods in Europe is seen as closely related to a 
concern with social exclusion and recognition that it is taking distinct spatial forms 
(Atkinson and Carmichael, 2007). In England, the principal means for identifying 
areas of deprivation is the government-defined Indices of Deprivation, and the 
communities of these areas are often referred to as ‘socially excluded’. In the US, the 
principal way of identifying areas of deprivation (or ‘distressed communities’) is the 
concentration of poverty (Katz, 2004: 6). The notion of social exclusion is not used 
explicitly but is indirectly expressed by Wilson (1987) in describing jobless 
neighbourhoods that are isolated from wealth, mainstream institutions, and social 
networks that provide mobility and status attainment opportunities. The resultant 
‘area effects’ literature concludes that neighbourhoods of concentrated poverty have a 
negative effect on the health and life opportunities of low-income families (see for 
example, Ellen and Turner, 1997). This literature in turn influenced British research 
(for example, Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001) and policies regarding area-based 
initiatives. The literature explains that the neighbourhood setting can have negative 
consequences, such as the creation of communities with high levels of social disorder; 
or positive consequences, providing the social networks which give a basis for
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improvement (as discussed in terms of social capital by Putnam, 1993 and Halpem, 
1999).
This has led to a belief generally shared amongst policy and academic communities of 
the value of basing interventions on “guided community-led approaches” (Robson et 
al., 2000: 25-26). It should be noted that the notions of neighbourhood-based and 
community-based initiatives tend to be used interchangeably. This is because as 
Cochrane (2007: 48) explains, “in urban policy practice a community is generally 
simply understood to incorporate those who live in a particular locality”. Thus while 
communities can be ‘of interest’ or ‘of place’, in this context the latter meaning 
predominates.
The technical and political response has been to institute a range of ‘place and people- 
based’ regeneration or ‘community building’ initiatives in deprived neighbourhoods. 
These tend to have been instituted and supported (or ‘sponsored’) by government in 
the UK, and by government, philanthropic foundations and the nationally-operating 
non-profit intermediaries in the US (these are defined in chapter 4). The initiatives 
are envisaged as tackling what have been characterised as complex, inter-related 
problems that are spatially concentrated. This in turn reflects a belief that 
neighbourhood renewal should be a holistic and integrated process that attempts to 
comprehensively address the needs and circumstances of residents (White et al., 2006: 
260).
Approaches that make use of neighbourhood-based decision-making processes have 
led to the creation of initiative governance entities which form a key unit of study for 
this research. The ‘sponsors’ of the initiatives may seek to create a new body, or may 
identify an existing organisation that can perform this role for the initiative (Chaskin 
and Peters, 2000: 2). The entities incorporate a diverse range of stakeholders 
(Bovaird and Loffler, 2002), including residents, and the public, private, voluntary, 
non-profit and community sectors, enabling what has been termed “descriptive 
representation” to incorporate diverse participation in a formal decision-making 
process (Chaskin and Peters, 2000: 18). This composition is seen as vital to enabling 
citizen participation along with professionals in planning and implementation 
(Chaskin, 2005: 408). However, these different stakeholders have different interests
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in “what neighbourhoods mean for a variety of purposes” (Fraser; 2004: 438). This 
raises questions about which stakeholder interests predominate.
However, a key stakeholder is (local and federal/ central) government, which 
supervises and checks the autonomy of neighbourhood-based entities. In the federal 
US, Chaskin and Garg’s (1997: 642) case study selection reveals a spectrum of (local) 
government involvement with neighbourhood-based governance bodies, from those 
that are government-sponsored, to government having no explicit, direct involvement. 
However, in the absence of government, foundations or non-profit intermediaries do 
tend to be a sponsor, and such bodies operate in a context in which local government 
plays a formative role. In the UK, central and local government is a more consistent 
and obvious presence in the processes and structures of neighbourhood-based 
governance. This is explored further in chapter 4.
The relative power vested in neighbourhood-based governance is a function of the 
extent to which higher levels of governance and government have delegated their 
powers and responsibilities to the neighbourhood-based governance entity (Pratchett, 
2004: 362). Even if higher-level authorities are keen, the most extreme conceptual 
form of neighbourhood-based governance - community independence or self- 
determination (as depicted in the film “Passport to Pimlico ”) - cannot be expected to 
occur in actuality (Somerville, 2005b). At base, neighbourhoods cannot expect to 
enjoy high levels of autonomy due to their size. Neighbourhood-based governance 
needs to be integrated vertically into wider economic, social and political governance 
structures, or multi-level governance, to enable delivery of community priorities, to 
whatever extent, while taking responsibilities to the wider community into account 
(Fagotto and Fung: 2006: 653). This indicates that neighbourhood-based governance 
initiatives are likely to seek to strengthen neighbourhoods by linking ‘top down’ 
support (expressed via the resources and remit provided by their sponsors) with 
‘bottom up’ mechanisms (enabled by initiative governance structures, such as 
procedures that enable community participation) (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 641).
This raises questions about the balance between these ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ 
forces in terms of the relative power of the neighbourhood level in its multi-level 
governance context.
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23  Government and Governance Context
The governance literature informs consideration of the broader context for 
neighbourhood-based governance and the relative dominance of actors within it, 
including government.
Whereas ‘government’ can be defined as the activity of the formal governmental 
system, involving statutory relationships and the exercise of powers and duties by 
formally elected or appointed bodies (Stewart, 2003: 76), ‘governance’ is a much 
looser, contested and malleable notion. It is used as a process-orientated conception 
which captures institutional change, and to describe the structures (institutional 
arrangements) which result. The term tends not to be as widely used in the US 
academic literature. However, Pierre and Peters (2000: 7) explain that while the 
European debate on governance has been more dynamic, governance is just as 
common in the US as in the UK. In the US, the term ‘governance’ has traditionally 
been used to describe political authority (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 23). But there is 
increasing recognition of governance in terms of both the structures and processes 
(reflecting the European literature) that define relations between ‘society’ (including 
the private and community sectors) and the state (Chaskin, 2003: 162).
Overall, governance is associated with a network, rather than a market or hierarchical 
mode of co-ordination of political and economic activity, to “overcome the limitations 
of anarchic market exchange and top-down planning in an increasingly complex and 
global world” (Jessop, 2003: 101-102). The rise of network governance is seen as 
reflecting the need for networked forms of co-ordination as political power has 
increasingly fragmented (Davies, 2009). The empirical and normative stance is that 
there has been (and should be) a move from government to governance. Government 
should “steer” rather than “row”, a sentiment initially expressed in the US by Osborne 
and Gaebler, 1992, and expressed in the UK in terms of the development of a “centrist 
urban policy with space for local initiative” (Cochrane, 2007: 40). This has resulted 
in governance structures which comprise the institutions of social co-ordination and 
guidance in society (Kooiman, 1993; Rhodes, 1996). Along with government, these 
structures incorporate a range of interests drawn from the private sector and civil
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society (Whitehead, 2003) ta  negotiate, formulate and implement policy. Such 
network governance forms tend to be informal rather than formally constituted.
This proliferation of actors in the policy process has led to debates about the declining 
power of government, or the “hollowing out of the state” (Rhodes, 1994, 1996). The 
concept of metagovemance, or “the governance of governance” (Jessop, 2004), is 
potentially useful in terms of considering government’s degree of dominance over 
governance. It is also a rather woolly notion which requires more analysis and 
research. There remains ambiguity in the metagovemance literature regarding the 
role of the state and its relative power in the multi-actor structures and processes of 
governance. At one extreme is the notion of governance “in the shadow of 
hierarchical authority”(Scharpf, 1994: 41); at the other is the notion that the state 
becomes, at best, “first among equals” in a “pluralistic guidance system” (Jessop 
2004). This is explored further in section 2.5.5 below.
In turn, some of the governance literature emphasises that the shift from government 
to governance should be seen in political terms as an expression of the changes in the 
state’s form and function resulting from neo-liberalism, rather than as an empirical 
process (Geddes, 2006; Whitehead, 2003). Governance, especially in the European 
literature, is associated with Harvey’s (1989) description of a transformation from the 
“managerialism” of a bureaucratised, hierarchical state to the “entrepreneurialism”, or 
neo-liberal orientation, more suited to the economic pressures of globalisation. The 
empirically evident rise of the “competitive city” in the US and UK supports the rise 
of a neo-liberal orientation at the urban level, where the explicit focus of policy is on 
capitalist production (Cochrane, 2007: 13).
The literature’s focus on the relationship between government and the “new 
institutional spaces” (Cochrane, 2007: 61) of governance raises important questions 
about government’s role in urban- and neighbourhood-level governance systems.
Such analyses emphasise the importance and complexity of the institutional 
arrangements “within, between and around particular organisations” which are part of 
the shift between government and governance (Geddes, 2006). At the urban level, 
further consideration is needed of the “structuration” (Giddens, 1984) between urban 
governance structures and the “external structuring processes” (op cit) of political and
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economic fbrces^-This is also a function of the extent to which at the urban level, 
diverse actors can create the collective capacity to act and whether the forms of 
governance which result are episodic or can become embedded (Healey, 2006). This 
capacity is influenced by the extent to which the urban governance form has built 
intellectual, social and political capital (Amin and Thrift, 1995; Cars et al., 2002 and 
Healey, 1998), which is partially path dependent (as shown by Putnam's 1993 study of 
social capital in Italy).
There are also unanswered questions regarding where power lies amongst an urban 
governance form’s cross-sectoral members, in terms of which members dominate 
deliberations and how this is expressed in terms of what is prioritised. This may 
affect the extent to which urban governance forms include and enable a focus on 
ameliorating neighbourhood deprivation as expressed in the ability of different 
members to influence policy-making and practice with regard to deprived 
neighbourhoods, such as the use of initiative governance. This is what Goetz and 
Sidney (1997) would describe as a “policy subsystem” (of the urban governance 
form). A subsystem is a bounded policy domain largely controlled by a network of 
actors who share understanding regarding policy problems (such as neighbourhood 
deprivation) and promote and attempt to institutionalise solutions to these (op cit).
Considering governance in this way enables a richer and less prescriptive analysis 
than would be achieved by ascribing a purely neo-liberal content to the objectives 
sought by urban governance for the urban area as a whole and its constituent 
neighbourhoods. Some (such as Hohn and Neuer, 2006; and Keil, 2006) talk of a 
“double-tracked politics” or “two-speed city”. Here competitive and growth- 
orientated politics in accordance with a (neo-liberal) entrepreneurial urban 
development policy are associated with the urban level, as formulated by its network 
governance structure. Partnership planning and control processes combining the state 
and civil society are associated with the (disadvantaged) sub-urban level, as reflected 
in the tendency of neighbourhood-based governance initiatives to be focused on 
deprived areas. Such approaches may be championed by a policy subsystem of the 
urban governance structure. This ‘twin-track’ notion is in line with Jessop’s (2002: 
464) contention that neo-liberal strategies are likely to dominate at the national and 
city-wide level. But what he describes as “neo-communitarian” strategies, or
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‘‘arrangements to encourage neighbourhood solutions” and “revalorise neighbourhood 
support mechanisms as a means of tackling social exclusion” are described at the 
deprived neighbourhood level, “even in the most neo-liberal cases” (Jessop, 2002: 
464). Such initiatives which attempt to tackle social problems are justified as a 
necessary step in enabling economic competitiveness, providing the “non-market 
conditions of economic growth” (Mayer, 2003: 111) and enabling such initiatives in a 
neo-liberal context. This highlights the power relations between the urban and 
neighbourhood levels within governance systems and tensions between competing 
imperatives at different spatial scales.
Jessop (2002) points out that the state retains the right to open, close, and change 
governance arrangements in terms of political advantage. This raises questions about 
where this political advantage lies on the continuum between the extremes of a neo­
liberal, pro-capital position, which may be focused at the urban level, or a new localist 
ideal of local determination, which may be manifested at the neighbourhood level. 
This ‘twin-track’ notion of different approaches at the urban and neighbourhood 
levels suggests the need for greater critical interrogation of the key institutions and 
their strategies at both of these spatial scales and tensions between the two.
2.4 Defining the units of study
There are two levels at which analysis is conducted in this research -  neighbourhood- 
based initiative governance, and the urban governance context for such entities. 
Definitions of these units of study are set out below. But to consider neighbourhood- 
based governance it is first necessary to consider meanings o f ‘neighbourhood’.
2.4.1. Neighbourhood
Neighbourhoods can be defined on different but linked scales (drawing from Kearns 
and Parkinson, 2001: 2104; and Power, 2004: 2). Firstly, the “home area” of the 
home and immediate neighbours, (seen as enabling “psycho-social benefits” via 
familiarity and community); secondly, the “neighbourhood environment” or locality 
(such as a housing estate), that provides residential activities, social status and a basis 
for service provision, shops and schools; and thirdly, the urban district or region, that
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provides broader social and economic opportunities, via employment connections, 
leisure services and social networks.
Power (2004: 2) states that “a neighbourhood is a delineated area within physical 
boundaries where people identify their home and where they live out and organise 
their private lives”. This definition sees a neighbourhood as “socially constructed” 
(Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008: 56). Such discussions point to the need to 
accommodate the pre-existence of neighbourhoods founded upon “place-orientated 
social processes” (Kearns and Parkinson, 2001: 2107) into the identification of the 
area to be subject to neighbourhood-based governance. While Galster (2001: 2112) 
highlights the dilemmas of “spatially bounding” neighbourhoods, he also suggests 
that residents “perceive clusters of neighbourhood attributes... across roughly 
congruent spaces” (op cit: 2114) which indicates the possibility of such a mode of 
definition.
However, neighbourhood-based governance initiatives, the focus of this research, are 
subject to the priorities of initiative sponsors. This leads to tensions between defining 
the neighbourhood in terms of citizens’ self-identification, or in terms of the 
administrative boundaries associated with service delivery, which may be regarded as 
more technically and managerially efficient. The ‘locality’ scale of neighbourhood 
described above tends to be the scale to which neighbourhood-based governance 
initiatives are applied, which reflects the neighbourhood level’s role as a significant 
locus for service provision (Power, 2004; Chaskin and Garg, 1997). Practical 
considerations for neighbourhood definition are evident in the US, where initiatives 
such as the Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program have 
‘neighbourhoods’ of between 1,000 to 4,000 households, while “small, natural 
neighbourhoods” of between 2,000 to 5,000 residents were cited as a factor in the 
success of participatory governance structures in a review of initiatives in five cities 
(Berry et al., 1993). In the UK, this ‘practical’ scale also coincides most closely with 
the ward as a political administrative unit. Indeed, a “recognisable urban 
neighbourhood for social and management purposes is rarely more than 5,000 
households (the size of a large ward)” (Power, 2004: 2).
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This demonstrates that defining the neighbourhood area for the purposes of 
neighbourhood-based initiative governance is regarded as an inherently political (as 
well as practical in terms of service delivery) undertaking. Martin et al. (2003: 116) 
identify a key aspect of the politics of urban governance as to “temporarily fix the 
limits of governable urban space for certain political purposes”. As Fraser (2004: 
438) states, “neighbourhood space and identity are shaped by the agendas of a broader 
set of stakeholders”. The definition of the areas to be subject to neighbourhood-based 
governance will stem from the political, technical and managerial considerations of 
sponsors and their notions of convenience as well as from citizens’ identification.
For the purposes of this research, the bounded area (‘neighbourhood’) covered by the 
initiatives under consideration needs to be accepted (as indeed do the definitions of 
‘deprivation’ used which are also inherently political and tend to be set by 
government). But this suggests the need to be reflective about how and by whom 
neighbourhood boundaries are defined.
2.4.2. Neighbourhood-based initiative governance
The first unit of study can be described as ‘neighbourhood-based initiative 
governance’. Paralleling the broader governance literature, this can be defined as a 
structure that enhances the degree of decision-making authority vested in the 
neighbourhood. It can also be defined as a process by which neighbourhood residents 
are involved in making decisions about what is to be done in their neighbourhood 
(Somerville, 2005b: 2). Taken together, neighbourhood-based governance comprises 
the neighbourhood-level structures and processes used to “guide civic participation, 
planning, decision-making, co-ordination, and implementation of activities within the 
neighbourhood, to represent neighbourhood interests to actors beyond it, and to 
identify and organise accountability and responsibility for action undertaken” 
(Chaskin, 2003: 162).
Crucially in this research, neighbourhood-based initiative governance structures are 
defined as formally constituted neighbourhood-based governance entities in deprived 
neighbourhoods in which agents outside the neighbourhood (such as government, and 
particularly in the US, philanthropic foundations and non-profit intermediaries) have 
played a catalytic role as ‘sponsors’ of the initiative. Chaskin and Peters (2000: 8)
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define “initiative governance” ^ ^neighbourhood-based mechanisms developed to 
guide planning and implementation for particular social change initiatives”. These 
formally constituted neighbourhood-based governance entities are able to undertake 
formal and accountable decision-making (Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999: 59) and 
perform neighbourhood-based governance functions and processes. Such bodies 
endeavour to be comprehensive, in terms of the issues addressed and in terms of 
trying to represent all groups within the neighbourhood.
This form of neighbourhood-based governance does not include processes that may 
be undertaken by other bodies that function or deliver services within the 
neighbourhood and lack a neighbourhood-based decision-making remit. It also 
excludes consideration of activities which are purely ‘self-help’ in nature, informal 
governance structures, such as residents’ associations, and activities in prosperous 
communities.
2.43. Urban governance context
The other level at which analysis is conducted is the broader context, at urban level, 
within which such neighbourhood-based entities are established and operate. In 
addition to local/ city government, this “multi-level, multi-actor” (Lowndes and 
Sullivan, 2008: 53) context comprises a mix of other public, private and third sector 
and non-profit institutions which operate at multi-neighbourhood and urban-wide 
levels (Martin, 2004; Chaskin, 2003; and Pierre and Peters, 2000). This can be 
thought of as ‘neighbourhood governance’ in the sense of how such neighbourhood- 
based efforts are governed at the urban level. However, this governance system in 
turn is affected by its broader regional, national and indeed (especially in the case of 
the European context for the UK) supra-national context (Bache, 1999; Sullivan, 
2001; Geddes, 2006; Healey, 2006). This establishes that the governance context can 
be “institutionally thick” (Amin and Thrift, 1995) but also raises questions about the 
potentially congested (Skelcher, 2000) landscape in which neighbourhood bodies may 
be operating. This has implications in terms of the ability to engender co-ordination 
and co-operation amongst different actors at different scales.
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2.5 Interpretations of the function of neighbourhood-based governance
To consider how neighbourhood-based governance is located in broader networks of 
governance, it is both necessary to ascertain its function and to consider how the 
broader multi-level governance context in which it operates shapes this. ‘Function’ 
refers to the actual role played by these entities, rather than to their stated remit or the 
initial intent behind their establishment. It is ascertained via an assessment of how the 
bodies are structured and how they operate.
The literature provides a series of alternative accounts of the functions of 
neighbourhood-based initiative governance. The five principal explanations are set 
out below at a conceptual level (an explanation of the establishment of the relevant 
literatures to identify and define these accounts is included in chapter 3). Some are 
supported by a greater amount of empirical work than others. In reality, arrangements 
are likely to comprise elements of these different accounts and the literature cited 
cannot always be discretely allocated. The reason for undertaking this review is to 
provide a framework to enable a systematic approach for the empirical research. 
However, it is not intended to overly constrain it or be prescriptive.
Each interpretation of the function of neighbourhood-based governance is value-laden 
and ideological, reflecting the variety of approaches taken, and accordingly 
differences in how the empirical state of affairs is interpreted and in the criteria used 
to make judgements regarding it. The most significant division in these 
interpretations is between the first three, which interpret the function of 
neighbourhood-based governance as a practical endeavour, to an extent in accord with 
the policy rhetoric, and the latter two, which locate neighbourhood-based governance 
in its broader context, interpreting such efforts as symptomatic of the political 
environment (drawing from a neo-liberal critique). However, all of the interpretations 
have implications regarding the relative power of governance at the neighbourhood 
level within its multi-level governance context. The interpretations thus also indicate 
the state and market imperatives which inform the priorities and approaches of the 
governance system within which neighbourhood-based governance is embedded.
17
Generally, the function of neighbourhood-based initiative governance is stated^m- 
being to improve democracy (increase the level of decision-making vested in 
neighbourhood) and to improve services (tailor service provision to neighbourhood 
needs and priorities), with the overall aim of improving the community’s ‘well- 
being’. Chaskin and Garg (1997: 633) describe the “twin rationale” of democracy 
(“local rights”) and competence (“local knowledge and power”). Johnson and 
Osborne (2003: 147) describe the “co-ordination of local services*, and their co- 
govemance with the local community”. Combined, these interpretations reflect the 
perceived importance of neighbourhoods as “units of identity and action” (Chaskin 
and Abunimah, 1999: 60). They reflect an attempt, via the establishment of 
neighbourhood-based governance entities, “to build on neighbourhood strengths and 
participation while simultaneously attempting to make government more responsive 
to these entities” (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 641). Value is placed on local knowledge 
and the enhanced legitimacy associated with a wider sense of ownership. This draws 
from the communitarian view that the development of governance arrangements 
requires consideration of citizens’ rights and responsibilities, with the state’s role 
conceptualised as developing devolved and responsive governing and service delivery 
structures and processes (Lepine et al., 2007: 10).
However, in this research, the dual elements of the ‘twin rationale’ are considered 
separately. They tend to be conflated due to the conception that democracy is a 
means as well as an end. Meaningful and sustainable community involvement is 
sought not only due to its perceived intrinsic value but to enable more responsive 
service delivery. Considering the elements separately enables consideration of how 
much the focus for neighbourhood-based governance is on aspirations of democracy 
rather than on improving services, ideally revealing any imbalance in emphasis 
between the two.
2.5.1. Democratisation and devolution
Democracy and devolution are regarded in the literature as essential ingredients for 
neighbourhood-based governance as well as an outcome that provides a reason for its 
inception. This interpretation is founded on the perceived intrinsic value of the 
devolution of authority to the local level (Chaskin, 2003). It is also founded on the 
ethical view of the fundamental right and responsibilities of citizens to have some
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control over policies that will affect them, regarded in the US as *  ‘‘basic tenet of 
democracy” (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 634). In the UK in particular, policy rhetoric 
places much emphasis on the value of neighbourhood governance to revitalise local 
democracy, or what Lowndes and Sullivan (2008: 57) term “the civic rationale”. The 
use of partnership forms of governance is seen as having intrinsic social value given 
their perceived role in the creation of a vibrant civil society, the provision of a more 
pluralistic and democratic process of policymaking, and in tackling social exclusion 
by achieving community cohesion (Geddes, 2006; Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008). 
However, “the theoretical underpinnings of politicians’ commitment [to community 
involvement]... remain somewhat ambiguous” (Foley and Martin, 2000: 484). In the 
US such emphasis in the stated purposes of neighbourhood-based initiatives is less 
evident, though it could be suggested that this is because the conception is so widely 
held that it goes unstated.
The democratic advantages of neighbourhood-based governance posited in theory are 
that given such entities’ closeness to residents, their decisions are more likely to be 
representative of and responsive to residents’ needs and aspirations (Somerville, 
2005a). It is also asserted that these bodies can be more easily held to account, 
because resident representatives who are accessible to other residents participate in 
decision-making (Somerville, 2005b). Governance is perceived as contributing to 
democracy (Fung and Wright, 2001). Klijn and Skelcher (2007: 587) term this 
perceived relationship the “complementarity conjecture”, where governance enables 
greater participation in the policy process and sensitivity in programme 
implementation, with participatory democracy complementing representative 
democracy.
The neighbourhood is thus regarded as a “unit of identity” (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 
636) for residents. It is seen as the level at which more accessible, responsive and 
accountable decision-making is possible as it is the level at which citizens can most 
easily access governance and understand the issues at stake (what Jessop, 2005, would 
term the “lifeworld” of civic society). Citizens have incentives to engage because it is 
at the neighbourhood level that they consume many of the most important public 
services. In the US, Berry et al. (1993) describe the neighbourhood level as that at 
which residents encounter the most tangible consequences of public decisions and
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have the motivation and knowledge to get engaged. In Europe, Cars et al. (2001: 4) 
see it is the level at which “welfare state arrangements become concrete for citizens”, 
and citizens experience the issues most likely to mobilise them.
The neighbourhood is perceived as the foundation for other levels of governance 
(Docherty et al., 2001). It is assumed that participatory governance structures will 
operate as de Tocquevillian ‘schools of democracy’, with the increased participation 
and new form of accountability enabled by them in turn leading to greater awareness 
of and interest in policymaking and increasing turnout in local elections (Pratchett, 
2004). Kathi and Cooper (2005: 559) add an instrumental argument for the US, 
viewing some level of participation as necessary to “maintain stability in a political 
community”. This presents neighbourhood-based governance entities as a potential 
counterbalance to power at the local (in the US generally municipal) level (along the 
lines of the ‘urban regimes* identified in the US, such as by Stone, 1989). In the UK 
context, Somerville (2005a: 127) similarly sees the potential for sub-local 
neighbourhood-based governance structures to counter the reproduction of what he 
terms the UK’s “steering centralism” at the local level.
However, much of the literature of relevance lacks consideration of the extent to 
which realisation of the democratic function of neighbourhood-based governance is 
bounded by its context. As explained above, neighbourhood-based governance bodies 
cannot be the single decision-making authority for that territory but are nested within 
a system of multi-level governance (Somerville, 2005b). Some decisions, for 
example about public good provision, need to be taken at a higher geographical scale, 
albeit ideally informed by priorities set at lower levels. Neighbourhoods could 
conceivably have considerable power, but in a bounded range of core areas dictated 
by subsidiarity, the principle which states that matters ought to be handled by the 
lowest competent authority (Carley, 2000: 290). From a practical perspective, 
governance can also be said to require government to ensure that governance does not 
serve the private interests of a few powerful players or become too parochial (Hohn 
and Neuer, 2006: 297).
The benefits predicted in theory as set out above do not appear to be clearly evident in 
practice, as indicated by a review of empirical work summarised below. This
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suggests the need to explore whether the ostensible purpose of democratic renewal 
and empowerment ascribed to many neighbourhood-based initiatives plays out in 
reality. Overall, the empirical work reviewed suggests a managerialist rather than 
democratic emphasis to governance, where communities “become substitute 
managers rather than empowered citizens” (Sullivan, 2001: 34).
Research points to the problems faced by structures in the UK and US in delivering 
democratic outcomes, in particular given the difficulties of establishing legitimate and 
accountable community representation (Skelcher, 2007; Chaskin, 2003). Concerns 
are expressed that such initiatives shift power to self-appointed community 
representatives (Foley and Martin, 2000: 487) or that leaders may adopt parochial 
viewpoints (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008: 68). Broader problems of accountability 
are also identified, which may be direct to partners in or sponsors of the initiative but 
remote from citizens. In the UK, Skelcher (2000: 13) identifies the frequent 
concentration of power with one agency and a variability in the “downwards 
accountability relationships” to the local community, which may be negated by the 
development of performance-orientated “upwards” accountability to the ‘sponsor’ of 
the initiative. This is interpreted by Klijn and Skelcher (2007: 597) as implying a 
paradox as those who institute citizen engagement via governance structures may at 
the same time be reluctant for it to inform their own decision-making.
Geddes (2006) has assessed the democratic legitimacy of New Deal for Communities 
(NDC) partnerships in the UK (which are explained in chapter 4). He too found that 
partnerships can “appear to open up new approaches to legitimacy” (2006: 76) 
[emphasis added]. But he concludes that such partnerships are actually “more likely 
to undermine democracy and accountability” (op cit: 76). He justifies this by 
explaining that the lack of experience of many resident board members, in the context 
of the powerful control exercised by government, contributes to a “naive localism”, 
with a narrow focus on public services (op cit: 87). He states that the structures and 
processes of the partnerships “incorporate [local residents] within the apparatus of the 
state at least as much... as they open up the state to citizens” (op cit: 89). Taylor 
(2003) in turn found in a case study of a neighbourhood renewal partnership that 
community representatives can be exposed to accusations of being unrepresentative 
by their partnership colleagues, or of having been “captured by the state” (Foley and
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Martin, 2000: 486). This fits with the notion that accountability in the UK remains 
largely functional and upwards to central government (Sullivan, 2004: 198), explored 
in section 2.5.5 below.
2.5.2. Competence and Co-ordination
This is a second, but often closely related, account of the function of neighbourhood- 
based initiative governance. ‘Competence’ refers to the notion that residents’ 
knowledge can inform and improve service delivery. This interpretation takes an 
instrumental line, seeing neighbourhoods as an effective and efficient level for service 
delivery and as a level at which citizens can hold services to account Service users 
are not conceptualised as “the clamourous public” or “demanding consumers” but as 
experts whose knowledge and experience can make an important contribution to 
policy and practice (Newman et al., 2004: 221). The focus on ‘local knowledge’ 
stems from the belief that local people understand the needs, opportunities, priorities 
and dynamics at work in their neighbourhood in ways that professional non-residents 
may not (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 634). Involving citizens in planning and 
implementing practices that affect them is seen as promoting better (as in more 
connected, co-ordinated and responsive) policies and programmes tailored to their 
needs and priorities (op cit: 633). This interpretation also has an ethical basis, in that 
if public policies are set to satisfy societal values, then service deliverers should 
involve citizens in the planning and delivery of services (Kathi and Cooper, 2005: 
562).
Such involvement is seen as instrumental at the neighbourhood level as it is the level 
that is the point of provision for many goods and services. The neighbourhood is 
seen, as Berger and Neuhaus (1977) suggest, as a “mediating institution” operating 
between individuals and the larger society, with neighbourhood-based governance 
entities providing mechanisms to guide planning and promote the co-ordination and 
delivery of services (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 635).
The ‘co-ordination’ element of the interpretation reflects the fact that a commitment 
to co-ordination in policy and practice has remained a key feature of urban policy in 
the US and UK since the 1960s (Cochrane, 2007), which is explored in chapter 4. 
Neighbourhood-based governance is often perceived as offering the best opportunity
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for ‘joining up’ action, linking residents and service decisions (Lowndes and SuHivan, 
2008), as well as providing opportunities for the co-production of public goods. The 
neighbourhood is regarded as the “unit of action” (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 636) and 
the locus for programmes and funding streams. Neighbourhood governance is 
presented as offering an opportunity to co-ordinate action between public service 
providers and the private and voluntary sectors to address local priorities (Foley and 
Martin, 2000: 482). The argument is that a range of stakeholders enables access to a 
range of expertise, experience and resources within and outside the neighbourhood, 
helping to “break down categorical thinking” and combine professional approaches 
with “grassroots intent” (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 648). This argument has been used 
in the policy literature to underpin development of such approaches.
In the UK, the rhetoric of urban policy has combined the identification of areas for 
targeted attention with the search for co-ordination (Cochrane, 2007: 32). Here the 
co-ordination interpretation draws from the pragmatic view that centralised 
approaches to service provision have failed, and that engaging core mainstream 
service providers within neighbourhood-based governance structures is the preferred 
mechanism for getting resources to deprived neighbourhoods and tailoring service 
delivery to their needs. However, it should be stressed that in the UK, central 
government remains the principal driver of such initiatives even as it pursues policies 
that encourage neighbourhood-based governance.
In the US, attempts at comprehensive area-based strategies with associated 
governance mechanisms date from the 1960s when they served to counter the 
perceived shortcomings of centralised responses to poverty. The devolution of 
decision-making and strategic action to the local level (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 637) 
was reinforced by the ‘federal retrenchment’ of the 1980s. However, the 
fragmentation of local government in the US is identified as a block to effective 
policy action, hindering co-ordination not only with other sectors but also within and 
across local government agencies (Wolman and Goldsmith, 1990).
It should be noted that the governance form most readily associated with the 
competence and co-ordination account is an urban-wide system of neighbourhood- 
based governance entities, or what Chaskin and Peters (2000: 8) describe as “public-
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sector approaches to structuring ongoing neighbourhood-local governmental 
relationships”. These initiatives are based on the assumption that the creation of 
collaborative institutions will enable neighbourhoods to define their own priorities 
and needs, leading to more responsive services (Kathi and Cooper, 2005). In the US, 
several cities have attempted to establish such urban-wide forms (as documented in 
Berry et al., 1993). Similar urban-wide approaches have been attempted in the UK 
(some are detailed in Bums et al., 1994). Such efforts contrast with the initiative 
governance structures targeted at particular deprived neighbourhoods which form the 
focus of this research. But competence and co-ordination are readily cited in much of 
the literature as a justification for such deprived neighbourhood-based governance 
entities.
Such approaches emphasise not only community competence, in terms of residents’ 
knowledge and experience, but the competence of government to develop policies and 
practices which are responsive to the needs and priorities expressed by residents.
Here neighbourhood-based governance initiatives are interpreted as a way of 
enhancing government’s ability to adapt, being an example of “new ways of working 
which will enhance the learning capacity” (Hambleton, 2000: 931) of local 
government.
The benefits posited in theory regarding this account of the function of 
neighbourhood-based initiative governance are not clearly evident in practice as 
assessed in empirical research. This suggests that there is a need to examine whether 
the apparent purpose of competence and co-ordination ascribed to many 
neighbourhood-based initiatives in the policy and academic literatures actually occurs. 
The competence perspective relates to the notion that communities have tacit local 
knowledge that representatives may bring to policy debates (Foley and Martin, 2000: 
485). But such expectations of community may assume that communities are more 
willing to engage than they actually are. Residents may become frustrated if 
neighbourhood-based entities are unable to exert influence over all the issues in which 
residents seek a say (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008: 68). Even when the structure does 
seem to have influence, Purdue (2001) found that community leaders found it difficult 
to create a collaborative relationship with their statutory partners. He found that
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community leaders were expected to “trust their powerful partners without 
reciprocation” (op cit: 2222).
Realisation of the benefits of the competence perspective attributed to neighbourhood- 
based governance not only requires the capacity building of residents to get involved, 
but also fundamental changes on the part of service providers to engage with residents 
effectively and to put in place the processes that will make services responsive to 
residents’ priorities and needs. In his research on New Deal for Communities (NDC) 
partnerships in the UK, Geddes (2006) has considered their capacity and effectiveness 
to identify communities’ priorities and needs and work to provide them. He explains 
that the incentives vary for different sectoral actors and for some an NDC 
neighbourhood “is but one among many such areas” (op cit: 89). Service providers 
face the conflict between national objectives and targets and local priorities, as well as 
“bureaucratic resistance to organisational change and resource constraints” (op cit: 
90). This is reflected by the findings of Rich et al. (2001), who undertook a US 
nation-wide survey of collaboration between community-based organisations and 
municipal governments. A “thin” version of collaboration was reported, but thought 
unlikely to produce the “beneficial outcomes” suggested by collaboration’s 
proponents (op cit: 184).
In the context of the ‘twin rationale’ of democracy and competence, the literature 
reviewed suggests that initiatives have a greater emphasis on the competence element. 
Somerville (2005a: 124) interprets the shift towards neighbourhood-based governance 
as primarily involving emphasis on responsiveness rather than representativeness, 
indicating a focus on co-ordination to improve neighbourhood services rather than 
participatory democracy “giving real power to communities”.
2.53. Self-help
The third interpretation of the function of neighbourhood-based initiative governance 
is self-help, or neighbourhoods tackling their own problems. Though related, this 
interpretation is discrete from those of democracy and competence. It differs from the 
democracy perspective as devolution is founded on the notion of powers being 
devolved to the right level (the subsidiarity principle). Here, adaptation to external 
pressures (such as economic restructuring) is seen as the task of communities (of
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place, or neighbourhoods) themselves, and not necessarily as a responsibility of 
higher levels of government or governance. This notion also differs from the 
competence perspective, which focuses on collaboration between neighbourhood 
residents and service providers to enable improved and responsive services. Here, the 
emphasis is on “self-management and responsibilisation” (Cochrane, 2007: 52).
The notion of self-help has strong normative and cultural associations in the US, as 
evidenced by its rich heritage of community activism. In their review of US urban 
policy, Bamekov et al. (1989: 114) exemplify this notion by citing an espoused 
outcome of the withdrawal of federal funds in the 1980s as being to “stimulate 
community-self reliance and unleash a massive increase in voluntarism and private 
philanthropy”. Reduced federal assistance was rationalised on the basis of local 
control of policy decisions and implementation. This ‘federal retrenchment’ is cited 
as an important factor in assisting the shift from government to more privatist forms 
of governance, including the initiative governance forms which are the focus of this 
research.
Neighbourhood-based initiative governance, this research’s principal unit of study, is 
by definition not about communities ‘helping themselves’ in the absence of the 
involvement of actors (‘sponsors’) beyond the neighbourhood. However, sponsors do 
make use of this conception as a justification for initiative governance approaches, 
despite the implication that neighbourhoods should ‘go it alone’. This interpretation 
is expressed in initiative governance in terms of ‘building the capacity’ of 
communities which lack the skills or resources to be able to help themselves. It 
reflects Sen’s (1999) notion of the “change resources” of communities, seen as 
contributing to developing their resilience and capability for self-help. It also draws 
on the notion of social capital, which refers to “features of social organisation such as 
networks, norms and trust that facilitate co-ordination and co-operation for mutual 
benefit” (Putnam, 1993: 35). Sponsors state the intention that the initiative will equip 
the community with the ability and skills to be able to help themselves beyond the 
initiative lifetime, when sponsors are no longer directly involved.
Key determinants of whether this can be achieved relate to the extent to which such 
‘capacity’ can be generated by a “territorial collective actor” and whether this body
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can become “institutionally embedded” (Healey, 2006), or move beyond “initiative 
governance” (Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999). However, the ability of initiative 
governance entities to become ‘embedded’ is likely to be hampered given the time- 
limited nature of many of these approaches, especially in the UK. Such bodies’ 
capacity to help their communities is also a function of the extent of their power and 
resource to address the wider structural causes of decline. While asking particular 
deprived or excluded communities to “take responsibility for their own future and 
well-being” (Atkinson, 2003: 118) is appealing given its congruence with the notion 
of more participatory governance, notions of self-help are regarded as tokenistic by 
many commentators given such entities’ separation from broader processes, as 
explored in the next interpretation.
2.5.4. Tokenism
This fourth interpretation of neighbourhood-based initiative governance differs from 
the first three as it would not be cited by the sponsors of an initiative as a reason for 
its instigation. Rather, it is an interpretation of what such endeavours represent or 
amount to within their broader governance context. This, and the subsequent 
interpretation, comprise those which draw from a neo-liberal critique to interpret such 
efforts as symptomatic of their broader political environment. As such, they hark 
bark to the radical structural analysis of the UK’s Community Development Projects 
in the 1970s (explained in chapter 4).
The tokenism interpretation is related to the self-help perspective. However, rather 
than the ‘building local capacity’ ethos, this account perceives the creation of such 
entities as a tokenistic response to deprivation. It is summed up by Lepine et al.’s 
(2007: 13) term a “strategy of containment”, defined as managing poverty and 
inequality through programmes that are separate and distinct from the mainstream. 
Many perceive this differing treatment of deprived neighbourhoods as unjust, 
captured by the concern found in the US and UK literature that deprived 
neighbourhood-based governance entities may become “the institutional expressions 
of the ‘parallel lives’” of different communities (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008: 70). 
This perspective on the use of neighbourhood-based governance leads to 
identification of the ‘twin-track’ city (for example, Keil, 2006; Healey, 2006)
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* explored above, which highlights the potential tensions between the different 
strategies adopted at different spatial scales.
According to this perspective, neighbourhood-based governance obscures the need for 
systemic reform. Initiatives are seen as focusing on “palliative measures rather than 
on the underlying structural causes of deprivation” (Foley and Martin, 2000: 486), 
with the increased emphasis on deprived neighbourhood-level governance making 
such neighbourhoods “decoupled from the wider community” while “absolving the 
wider community of its responsibilities” (Taylor, 2003: 192). In the UK, Stoker 
(1998: 39) goes so far as to describe such governance initiatives as “the acceptable 
face of spending cuts”. In the US, Fraser et al. (2003: 421) echo this, seeing such 
initiatives as “calling upon neighbourhood residents to change their social and spatial 
situation without providing full access to the processes that contribute to 
neighbourhood change”. They state that the ‘community building* approach should 
be subject to greater criticism given its assumptions about the resultant benefits in 
terms of ameliorating poverty (op cit).
Hohn and Neuer (2006: 296) suggest that deprived neighbourhood-based approaches 
are “initiated at the government level within the framework of a discharge strategy 
[the function] and declared as an empowerment strategy [the rhetoricf\ This implies 
a tokenistic use of neighbourhood-based governance where initiatives are 
implemented out of political expediency. Such initiatives are perceived as not being 
linked to broader political, economic and social processes, and in the extreme form 
can be seen as leaving neighbourhoods to ‘sink or swim* based on their capacity for 
self-help. As Atkinson (2003: 118) terms it, “any failure will be their failure”.
This interpretation places the use of neighbourhood-based governance in deprived 
areas in the context of the neo-liberal restructuring of the economy, where the state is 
seen as agent, rather than regulator, of the market (Smith, 2002). Jessop (2002: 454- 
55) explains that neo-liberalism “tends to promote ‘community* as a compensatory 
mechanism for the inadequacies of the market mechanism”. Mayer (2003: 126) sees 
policy discourse as suggesting that “a judicious combination of mobilisation from 
below and capacity building from above can solve the problems of uneven 
development and marginalisation”. In the US, Fraser (2004: 454) argues that given
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the retrenchment of the state, “civil society is expected to play a larger role in 
neighbourhood governance and the provision of social welfare”. Levitas (2000: 194) 
goes even further, seeing the role of community as being “to mop up the ill-effects of 
the market and to provide the conditions for its continued operation”.
This demonstrates that neo-liberal and competitive ideologies are capable of co-opting 
approaches that seem to be in opposition to meet their objectives. The (neo-liberal) 
argument that deprivation undermines economic competitiveness is used to justify 
social policy interventions (such as area-based initiatives) in such areas (Fraser,
2004). Such co-option is reflected in the perception that Community Development 
Corporations (CDCs) in the US are able to “make neighbourhoods better in ways that 
are recognised by the market” (Walker, 2002: 8-9). Katz (2004: 26) in turn explicitly 
states that neighbourhood change should be market-driven rather than community- 
controlled. In the UK, the social and environmental dimensions of regeneration are 
often justified as a necessary step in encouraging economic regeneration and some 
perceive the “economic imperative” as underpinning the entire regeneration agenda 
(Jones and Evans, 2008: 57).
However, though neighbourhood-based governance in deprived areas may not be 
tackling the sources of structural inequality, the arguments in support of the previous 
self-help interpretation are recognised by some of those commentators who also 
critique the perceived tokenism of such approaches. Hohn and Neuer (2006:296) 
state that even if governance entities in deprived neighbourhoods are initiated as a 
“discharge strategy”, the resultant building of governance capacities may make it 
more difficult for government to subsequently continue to “hold all the strings”.
2.5.5. Steering
This final interpretation, along with the previous one, differs from the first three as it 
relates to perceptions of what such approaches represent within their broader political 
environment, rather than being a reason which would be cited by an initiative’s 
sponsor for its establishment.
The ‘steering’ interpretation of neighbourhood-based initiative governance perceives 
it as a political tool, providing “a powerful means through which dominant interests
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can achieve their goals” (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007r587). This perspective critiques 
the pluralist position taken by those who perceive governance as a way of increasing 
and broadening participation in policy deliberation. It emphasises governance’s 
managerial character rather than its democratic intent (or the competence rather than 
democracy element of the ‘twin rationale’). The apparent devolution of power to 
neighbourhoods is seen as a new form of control whereby the sponsors of 
neighbourhood-based governance initiatives seek to realise their priorities by 
‘steering’ the governance entity’s structure, processes and desired outcomes. The 
aims of the sponsors of initiative governance dominate, with entities being or 
becoming dependent on sponsor funding and being vulnerable to being ‘captured’, by 
having their core interests shifted in line with the sponsor’s priorities.
This interpretation locates neighbourhood-based governance entities in their context. 
From a ‘top-down’ perspective, sponsors provide the “institutional framework” 
(Lowndes and Wilson, 2003) within which such entities operate. From a ‘bottom up’ 
perspective, the question is the extent to which this context prescribes the 
neighbourhood-based governance body’s structure and operations. Jessop’s (2004) 
broad concept of metagovemance (‘the governance of governance’) is relevant here.
It leads to questions about the extent to which government seeks to control what 
powers go to what “institutionalised scale” and to enhance its capacity to realise 
political priorities or provide “direction to society” (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 4) by 
“steering” an array of actors and organisations (Somerville, 2005a: 118).
In the UK, neighbourhood-based initiative governance tends to be largely a central 
government policy-led endeavour and much analysis has focused on central 
government’s hand in the process (for example, Jessop, 2004 and Geddes, 2006). 
Some interpret this apparent decentralisation of power from government to 
neighbourhoods as a new form of centralisation (Hoggett, 1996; Taylor, 2003) to 
achieve government priorities and also enable central government to bypass local 
government (Skelcher, 2004: 40). Tension between “national prescription and local 
flexibility” is emphasised, and the actual extent of discretion and involvement on 
offer to local communities is typically questioned (Foley and Martin, 2000: 487).
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The empirical research does indicat^that neighbourhood-based governance is subject 
to ‘steering’ by central government. Key is that, as Skelcher et al. (2005) found, 
governance forms arise directly as a result of central government policy, largely in 
compliance with the measures necessary to obtain additional funding. Investigations 
of neighbourhood-based governance entities have led to the identification of 
metagovemance relationships in the mechanisms for their control and management 
(Whitehead, 2003 and Geddes, 2006). Klijn and Skelcher’s (2007: 600) research has 
found that the majority of governance structures studied are integrated into “vertical 
performance management systems that connect them to regulation by national 
government”. In addition to the constraints imposed by national targets and priorities, 
Geddes identifies “new institutional norms, incentives and sanctions” (2006: 91) 
designed by central government, concluding that partnerships “limit... local policy 
options to those consistent with New Labour’s neo-liberal policy agenda” (2006: 76). 
Similarly, Cochrane (2007: 39) describes the “controls and measures against which 
the newly ‘empowered’ must be evaluated”, whilst Taylor (2003) describes 
neighbourhood-based governance as a “new arena for social control” where “the rules 
of the game [are] still very much dictated by government” (2003: 190).
In the US, Martin (2004) highlights the “increasing privatism” of the “neighbourhood 
policy regime” (op cit: 394). National and local philanthropic foundations and non­
profit intermediaries as well as local, rather than federal, government are the sponsors 
of neighbourhood-based governance initiatives. This indicates the non-state nature of 
some of the dominant interests which may ‘steer’ such entities. Little research has 
been conducted in this regard, reflecting the lack of a metagovemance lens in US 
academic work. This is unsurprising given its decentralised federal governmental 
system, but there is scope for investigation of the extent to which sponsors of 
initiative governance steer the associated entities. One notable study is that conducted 
by Chaskin (2005), who assessed a four city-wide programme sponsored by the Ford 
Foundation. He identified tensions within the programme between the ideology of 
collective, consensual decision-making and pressure for efficient progress towards 
particular outcomes (op cit: 416). He emphasises that bureaucracy dominates the 
“organisational landscape” and that organisations shape their activities to meet the 
demands of funders (op cit: 410).
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The steering interpretation explicitly places neighbourhood-based initiative 
governance in the context of state forces. It is therefore further explored below when 
considering the urban network governance context for neighbourhood-based 
governance, as urban governance not only to an extent constitutes but in turn is 
affected by these forces.
2.6 Neighbourhood-based initiative governance entities: Expected 
Characteristics
In sum, a review of the literature has identified the following principal accounts of the 
function of neighbourhood-based governance initiatives:
•  Democracy - founded on the normative value of the devolution of authority to the 
local level and also the ethical view of the fundamental right and responsibilities 
of citizens to have some control over policies that will affect them.
•  Competence - the notion that residents’ knowledge can inform and improve 
service delivery, a practical line seeing neighbourhoods as an effective and 
efficient level for service delivery and as a level at which citizens can hold 
services to account, as well as a level at which service providers can co-ordinate 
action to address local priorities.
• Self-help - based on the notion that communities should take responsibility for 
their problems and expressed in initiative governance in terms of building the 
capacity of communities to help themselves.
• Tokenism - a ‘strategy of containment’ where deprived areas are subject to 
programmes separate and distinct from the mainstream, contributing to a ‘twin- 
track’ that obscures the need for systemic reform.
• Steering -  where sponsors (such as government or philanthropic foundations) of 
neighbourhood-based governance initiatives are dominant interests that seek to 
realise their priorities by ‘steering’ the governance structure’s processes and the 
outcomes that are sought.
The analyses reviewed above indicate that the function of neighbourhood-based 
initiative governance is related to the way an entity operates as well as the way it is 
structured. This realisation has informed design of the ‘revealed preference’ approach
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underpinning the empirical work, which is explained in chapter 3. A typology of 
characteristics of neighbourhood-based governance bodies’ structure and operations 
which could be expected if entities fulfilled the five (non-exclusive) accounts is set 
out in Table 2.1 below. This ‘ideal-type’ heuristic framework provides a basis against 
which the case study entities analysed in the empirical work were assessed to consider 
which combination of these accounts is most evident in their structuring and 
operations. It constitutes a “criteria-based instrument” (Mathur and Skelcher, 2007: 
229) to “expose contradictions between the ‘ideal’ and the practice” (op cit: 236).
To develop the typology, the ‘ideal-type’ characteristics associated with each function 
were derived, principally drawing from the key neighbourhood governance literature 
(as cited in Table 2.1). The characteristics without an associated citation derive from 
the researcher’s a priori reasoning as well as some iteration with the initial empirical 
findings, though the majority of the typology was developed during the research’s 
conceptual phase. Further explanation of the development of the typology is 
contained in chapter 3. It should be stressed here that the tokenism interpretation is 
distinctive. This account will only be evident in the entity’s operations in terms of its 
integration with broader strategies and networks, rather than in its structure, which is 
likely to share some of the characteristics associated with the other functions (though 
those associated with the self-help function are less likely to be evident).
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Table 2.1: Typology of Characteristics of Neighbourhood-based Governance Entities by Function
Structure Operations
■' 
i
D
em
oc
ra
cy
•  Majority resident representation on board 
(Somerville, 2005a; Chaskin, 2003)
•  Elected resident board representation by 
sub-area (Skelcher, 2006; Somerville 
2005a)
•  Resident quorum for decision-making
•  Resident representative-led board sub­
committees
• Board-determined funding allocation 
over devolved budgets (Fagotto and 
Fung, 2006; Bums et al., 1994)
• Initiated following resident consultation (Fung and 
Wright, 2001)
•  Broad resident engagement in identifying needs and 
priorities (surveys/ community planning processes)
(Bovaird and Loffler, 2002; Kathi and Cooper, 2005)
• Resident representatives’ voice heard on board 
(Chaskin and Peters, 2000; Chaskin 2003; Somerville, 
2005b)
• Consensus sought across constituent neighbourhoods
• Capacity building of residents (Fung and Wright,
2001; Newman et al., 2004; Sullivan, 2001)
•  Emphasis on activism/ advocacy in board deliberations 
(Chaskin andAbunimah, 1999; Chaskin, 2001, 2003)
C
om
pe
te
nc
e
•  Resident board representation 
(Somerville, 2005a)
•  Statutory service provider representation 
(possibly including council members) 
(White et al., 2006; Somerville, 2005a, 
2005b)
•  Non-profit/ third sector service provider 
board representation (Chaskin and 
Peters, 2000)
• Broad resident engagement in identifying needs and 
priorities (surveys/ community planning processes) 
(Chaskin and Garg, 1997; Martin and Pentel, 2002)
• Significant service provider involvement (eg senior 
representative board attendance) (Fagotto and Fung 
2006; Kathi and Cooper, 2005)
• Entity influences service providers/ service delivery 
(eg service agreements) (Fagotto and Fung, 2006; 
Chaskin and Garg, 1997; Chaskin 2003)
• Service providers responsive (eg service provision 
tailored to entity’s area/ sub-areas) (White et al., 2006; 
Sullivan, 2001)
• Monitoring and review of services and resident 
satisfaction (Bovaird and Loffler, 2002)
• Innovation evident (Bovaird and Loffler, 2002)
•
Se
lf-
he
lp
• Instigated by residents
• Majority resident representation on board 
(Somerville, 2005a)
•  Self-generated funding streams
• Open-ended timeframe
• Sponsor emphasis on capacity building of 
entity and residents (Chaskin and Garg, 
1997; Chaskin, 2001, 2003)
• Expectation of residents ‘doing their 
share’ (Fraser, 2004)
•  Devolved budgets (Chaskin, 2001)
• Entity able to determine/ alter its mission/ operations
• Emphasis on activism/ advocacy in board deliberations 
(Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999; Chaskin, 2001, 2003)
• Extensive resident volunteer engagement in delivering 
projects (Fraser, 2004)
• Able to develop, appraise and fund own projects 
(Bovaird and Loffler, 2002)
• Able to design and engage in supplemental service 
delivery (Chaskin, 2001; Somerville, 2005a)
• Asset base development (eg property portfolio)
• Development and maintenance of an income stream 
(eg social enterprise approaches)
• Resourced capacity building activities (Chaskin and 
Garg, 1997; Chaskin 2001, 2003)
• Entity able to continue in absence of sponsor
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Table 2.1: continued
Structure Operations
To
ke
ni
sm
Not applicable as the entity’s structure may 
share some o f the characteristics associated 
with the other functions.
This account would become evident in the 
entity’s operations.
• Entity’s responsibilities not resourced/ lack of ongoing 
support (Chaskin, 2003)
• Lack of engagement from statutory service providers/ 
government (Fagotto and Fung, 2006; Klijn and 
Skelcher, 2007; Chaskin, 2003; Geddes, 2006)
• Not a priority/ not linked to urban governance network/ 
plans (Lepine et al., 2007; Hohn andNeuer, 2006; 
Fraser et al., 2003; Atkinson, 2003)
St
ee
ri
ng
• Instigated by initiative sponsor (Skelcher 
et al., 2005)
•  Sponsor specifies structure (eg board 
membership, geographic area covered) 
(Lowndes and Wilson, 2003; Davies, 
2003)
•  Sponsor represented on board (Chaskin, 
2005)
•  Sponsor employs entity staff
•  Time-limited lifetime (Geddes, 2006)
•  Close monitoring against targets (White 
et al., 2006; Chaskin 2003, 2005; 
Skelcher, 2000; Newman et al., 2004; 
Geddes, 2006)
•  Sponsor determines entity operations (eg programme 
themes) (Geddes, 2006)
• Entity heavily reliant on sponsor funding (Martin, 
2004)
• Sponsor leads on implementation of projects (eg 
professional staff managing projects, co-ordinating 
themes) (Chaskin, 2005; Martin, 2004)
• Sponsor leads board deliberations (eg staff responsible 
for servicing meetings) (Chaskin, 2005; Martin, 2004)
• Emphasis on consensus in board deliberations
2.7 Urban governance context for neighbourhood-based governance
To consider how neighbourhood-based initiative governance is located in broader 
networks of governance, it is necessary not only to ascertain its functions in terms of 
entities’ structure and operations, but to consider how the broader multi-level 
governance context in which it operates shapes these functions. The research 
therefore sites such entities in their multi-level governance context, with a particular 
focus on the urban level given the methodology employed (explained in chapter 3).
This section draws from the literature to consider the forms of urban governance 
which could be expected in the UK and US within which neighbourhood-based 
governance entities are instigated, operate and are supported. It reflects on urban 
governance’s characteristics, such as the focus on deprived neighbourhoods versus 
broader strategies, its key actors such as central/ federal and local government and 
non-govemmental stakeholders, and their relative dominance. This is important as 
the characteristics of these urban governance forms, in terms of the actors involved
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and their relative power, will influence the state and market imperatives which are 
pursued, in turn influencing the functions of neighbourhood-based governance. 
Therefore, in light of the expected characteristics of urban governance forms 
identified in both countries from the literature, the associated functions of 
neighbourhood-based initiative governance are then posited. The functions envisaged 
have implications regarding the relative power of the neighbourhood level within its 
multi-level governance context.
2.7.1. UK Forms of Network Governance
It is noteworthy that in the UK, the principal visible form of urban governance 
network is actually prescribed by central government. More policy detail is provided 
in chapter 4. Here discussion focuses on academic critiques of the manifestation of 
this form of urban network governance.
In the UK, ‘partnership’ is the prevailing form of governing network, becoming the 
“ubiquitous vehicle for organising governmental and non-governmental interactions, 
particularly at the urban scale” (Davies, 2009: 18). Since the late 1990s in particular, 
development of governance processes, with an espoused focus on democratic renewal, 
have placed emphasis on statutory agencies and the private and voluntary sectors to 
work with communities to address local priorities. This is evidenced by central 
government instigation of neighbourhood-based governance initiatives.
At the urban level, the form of urban governance most relevant to neighbourhood- 
based initiative governance is the Local Strategic Partnership (LSP). This is a non- 
statutory partnership at local government level (and therefore municipal level in the 
case of urban unitary authorities). Membership comprises representatives of state and 
non-state actors. LSPs are ostensibly the locus for current policies of relevance to 
deprived neighbourhoods as they co-ordinate efforts to achieve neighbourhood 
renewal (Geddes, 2006; Cochrane, 2007). However, local government’s strategies 
regarding growth and regeneration frame the approaches determined by the LSP 
(Stewart, 2003). These local government strategies are framed in turn by policies and 
strategies determined at higher levels, particularly by central government. LSPs can 
therefore be regarded as the ‘policy subsystem’ for deprived neighbourhoods.
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In network governance theory governing networks are accorded the role of forging a 
productive, consensus-based relationship between governmental and non­
governmental actors, including community activists (Sorensen and Torfing, 2005). 
The UK’s “new urban governance” or network governance described by Stewart 
(2003: 76) “establishes shared objectives and common purpose, operates through 
inter-organisational bargaining and negotiation, and pursues joint planning and 
delivery through shared resources”. This draws on a “value system of mutual interest, 
trust and reciprocity” (op cit) shared between the state, market and citizen activists 
(Rhodes, 1996, 1997).
However, the UK’s government-led urban network governance has been subject to 
extensive critique. This reflects the steering interpretation of the function of 
neighbourhood-based governance. Marsh et al. (2003: 316-7) critique the 
restructuring of the governance system and the emergence of networks as not 
devolving power, but giving the state additional leverage at sub-national scales. 
Hoggett (1996) echoes this, arguing that the shift to governance has allowed the 
introduction of new techniques of hierarchical control, with devolution occurring 
within the bounds set by centrally-driven policies and priorities. While a variety of 
different state and non-state actors are required to be involved, the state is identified 
as the dominant partner. This is borne out by the partnership form of network 
governance mandated by government, described by Webb (1991) as “imperative co­
ordination”, exemplified by LSPs. Somerville (2005a: 124) sees cross-sectoral 
governance structures as spreading “responsibility for meeting the government’s 
strategic targets as widely as possible among citizens and communities”. Some have 
even stated that cross-sectoral governing institutions often more closely resemble 
hierarchies than networks (Skelcher et al., 2005; Wright et al., 2006; Entwistle et al., 
2007).
Several commentators argue that power relations between network actors within an 
LSP are radically unequal (Davies, 2007; Marsh, 2008). Research suggests that 
where governing networks begin with a degree of openness and plurality, there is a 
trend towards elite closure, managerialisation and de-politicisation (Lawless, 2004; 
Skelcher et al., 2005; Davies, 2007). When citizens become involved in network 
governance, a tendency has been identified for them to experience these arrangements
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•as alienating and even disempowering (Jones, 2003; Davies, 2007; Perrons and Skyer, 
2003; Wright et al., 2006). Alternatively, they may be “captured” and estranged from 
the constituencies they purport to represent (Richardson and Mumford, 2002: 224).
However, as Skelcher (2000) explains, though central government has stimulated 
development of these partnership forms of network governance, and there are 
“accountability and regulatory relationships back to the centre” (2000: 16), some 
discretion is available. This chimes with Hohn and Neuer’s (2006: 296) notion that 
the building of governance capacities makes it more difficult for government to “hold 
all the strings”. Indeed, Somerville (2005a: 127) contends that the power of national 
elites can be counteracted to some extent by building power at the municipal scale.
Several commentators have considered the relative predominance of central and local 
government in the UK with regard to urban governance. Healey, in her study of 
Newcastle’s urban governance, found that the development of such processes is 
“strongly dependent on the central-local government power dynamic” (Healey, 2006: 
316), with power at the local level constrained by the “regulatory and resource 
allocation power” of national government (op cit). Jones and Ward (2002: 485) chart 
a “process of centrally orchestrated localism” of functions in the UK to bypass the 
existing structures of local government. Davies (2002: 319) states that central 
government holds local government in “elite contempt” despite the rhetoric of 
decentralisation, encouraging “collaborative tokenism” by seeking to ensure that 
partnerships fulfil central objectives. Lowndes (2002: 146) describes the increasing 
“de-democratisation and de-statisation of local governance” as governance functions 
are transferred to “local partnership bodies and a variety of front-line service-delivery 
institutions”. However, Gibbs et al.’s (2001) case study evidence suggests that 
arguments about the declining influence of the local state in the UK, in particular that 
local authorities have ceded power to other actors and institutions, are over-stated. 
They find a significant and continuing role for local government, not least because of 
its ability to facilitate or hamper central government direction. It gains power from its 
functions, authority and legitimacy, reinforced by the expectations that residents still 
have of “the Council” (Healey, 2006: 316), and the duty of well-being placed on it by 
central government. Indeed, local government is the ‘lead partner’ in LSPs, tasked 
with establishing these governance structures.
38
m  Overall, this raises questions about how the urban governance context shapes the
functions of neighbourhood-based initiative governance. What is the relative 
dominance of governance network members, especially local and central government? 
What is the relative power of the LSP as the policy subsystem for deprived 
neighbourhoods? And what is the relative dominance of relevant actors within it, 
such as local government? How does this governance context affect the state and 
market imperatives which arise and the strategies which are pursued at city-wide and 
neighbourhood levels? What does this indicate about the relative power of the 
neighbourhood level within its multi-level governance context and the power relations 
between institutions of governance and government at different spatial scales?
2.7.2. US Forms of Network Governance
The lack of application of theories of networked governance in the US literature harks 
to differences in terminology rather than a lack of such networked arrangements. The 
predominant governance theory alluded to in the US literature is that of the ‘urban 
regime’, which stems from Stone’s (1989) work on Atlanta. Stone (1989: 6) defines 
regimes as “the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests 
function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions”, 
following what Peck (1998: 28) would describe as a “local elitist mode of policy 
formation”. A regime describes a long-term relationship between the local state (city 
government) and business interests to promote the city’s economic development 
(Jones and Evans, 2008: 37). It reflects the capacity of this local leadership to 
develop a strategic vision and co-ordinate their own and other stakeholders’ actions.
The development of regimes is linked to the highly devolved and privatist nature of 
the US governmental system. DiGaetano and Strom (2003) explain that the locus of 
authority and responsibility for urban governance sits at the local, city government, 
level, particularly since the “de facto devolution” of “federal retrenchment” in the 
1980s (op cit: 369). As illustrated by urban regime theory, such devolution has led to 
more privatist governance forms with a neo-liberal policy orientation to try and ensure 
a city’s ability to compete in the wider global economy (Martin et al., 2003: 115). 
Stone (1993) argues that the alliance of urban state and market elites makes it 
extremely difficult for “lower class” groups to gain access to the governing coalition, 
leading Davies (2009) to classify this as a “governance by exclusion or domination”
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form of networked governance. In contrast, UK network governance arrangements as 
exemplified by LSPs do seek to engage citizens.
It should be noted that there have been various attempts to apply the idea of urban 
regimes to the UK (for example, Stewart, 1996; and Peck and Tickell, 1995). 
However, consensus has emerged that the model is not generally applicable to UK 
cities given the significant differences between the two countries’ governmental 
systems as expressed in relations between the central and local state (Stewart, 2003; 
Davies, 2003). Relationships between the local state and local businesses also differ 
in the UK, with the involvement of non-state actors tending to be on a medium-term 
basis focused on specific projects rather than the same kind of long-term strategic 
overview involving the private sector which could be characterised as forming a 
regime-type relationship (Jones and Evans, 2008: 37).
The increasing privatism of forms of urban governance is linked in the US literature 
to the shift in neighbourhood renewal from being a local government responsibility to 
one supported by national and local foundations and non-profit intermediaries. The 
research will consider the extent to which a “policy subsystem” (Goetz and Sidney,
1997) exists, within the prevailing urban regime, that is focused on developing 
approaches for deprived neighbourhoods. This would be characterised by a network 
of actors with shared understanding regarding policy problems which promotes and 
attempts to institutionalise solutions to these. In this regard Martin (2004) describes 
the rise of the “neighbourhood policy regime” comprising foundations and 
community organisations as well as the local state (op cit: 394). Chaskin (2003:185) 
in turn describes a system of “neighbourhood governance”, comprising organisations, 
local government and “outsider” foundations, but explains that these interact in 
“highly improvised ways”. He found that in such systems “power dynamics are 
pervasive” (Chaskin, 2005: 418), with more effective action arising from efforts led 
by professionals (planners, government officials, foundations) rather than the 
“grassroots”.
In Stone’s (1989) model, regimes operate at the urban level, focused on broad policies 
rather than neighbourhood-specific detail, with activity focused on landownership and 
development. Urban regime theory’s “restrictive localistic empirical focus” (Gibbs et
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al., 2001: 104) has been criticised^as it is thought to underestimate the role of the 
state above or the sub-local scale below. This research’s approach ameliorates this 
criticism. While using urban regime theory to inform consideration of the expected 
characteristics of urban network governance, it also considers the impact of the state 
‘above’ by applying the lens of metagovemance. In the US federal system, the same 
‘metagovemor’ role cannot be attributed to federal government as that which is 
attributed by some commentators to UK central government. As local government 
only has a direct constitutional relationship with state, and not federal, government, it 
is understandable that the notion of metagovemance is lacking in the US literature. 
But there is recognition of conflict over “autonomy among nested government 
hierarchies” (Martin et al., 2003: 119) and this research considers the effect of the 
federal and state levels ‘above’ the urban governance form.
In turn, the research considers the sub-local scale ‘below’ in terms of neighbourhood- 
based governance’s relationships with its urban context. This is in line with Fagotto 
and Fung’s (2006:641) recognition that “even the most local of participatory 
programs... involves many layers of supra-local and centralised institutional 
machinery”. In the US literature, there has been some consideration of the 
relationships between neighbourhood-based governance and city government (for 
example, Fagotto and Fung, 2006; and Kathi and Cooper, 2005) though an explicit 
focus on the relationship with forms of urban network governance is absent.
As in the case of the UK, this consideration of urban governance forms in the US 
raises questions about how the urban governance context shapes the functions of 
neighbourhood-based initiative governance. Is an urban regime evident between city 
government and private interests? What is the relative dominance of city, state and 
federal government and non-govemmental stakeholders? Is a policy subsystem for 
deprived neighbourhoods evident, and if so, what is its relative power? And what is 
the relative dominance of relevant actors within it, such as city government, and the 
philanthropic and non-profit sectors? Overall, how does this governance context 
affect the state and market imperatives which arise and the strategies which are 
pursued at city-wide and neighbourhood levels? What does this indicate about the 
relative power of the neighbourhood level within its multi-level governance context
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and the power relations between institutions of governance and government at 
different spatial scales?
2.8 Urban network governance: Expected Characteristics
To understand the context in which neighbourhood-based governance operates and 
how this affects its functions, the forms and characteristics of urban governance 
which could be expected in the UK and US within which such initiatives are 
instigated and operate have been considered, drawing from the literature. In light of 
the discussion above, the key characteristics of the urban governance context for 
neighbourhood-based initiative governance are posited below and summarised in 
Table 2.2. The functions of neighbourhood-based governance likely to arise are then 
set out, given the state and market imperatives associated with these urban 
governance forms. The functions envisaged have implications regarding the relative 
power of the neighbourhood level within its multi-level governance context.
In considering the urban governance context for neighbourhood-based governance 
initiatives, it can be expected that in the centrist UK activities will be framed by 
central government policies, as postulated in metagovemance theory and reflected in 
the notion of ‘steering centralism’. In the federal US, the urban level can be expected 
to be more crucial in framing the context in which such initiatives operate, as 
reflected in urban regime theory. Local ‘metagovemors’ may be identified in the 
form of local state and private actors, including business interests at the urban level, 
and philanthropic interests which may form part of a policy subsystem for deprived 
neighbourhoods.
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Table 2.2: Urban Governance Context for Neighbourhood-Based Governance
Urban Governance Characteristics Associated
Neighbourhood-based 
Governance Functions
Locus of 
authority
Urban 
level lead
Urban
governance
form
Policy
subsystem for
deprived
neighbourhoods
Predominant Other
UK Central 
govt level
Local govt Not
obvious - 
but
strategies 
framed by 
central 
govt
LSP, with 
representation 
of public, 
private and 
third sectors
Steering Democracy,
Competence,
Self-help,
Tokenism
US Urban
level
City govt 
& private 
(business) 
sector
Urban
regime
Not obvious - 
but likely to 
comprise city 
govt, private 
philanthropies 
& non-profit 
sector
Self-help Democracy,
Competence,
Steering,
Tokenism
In the UK, the locus of authority remains at the central government level, with local 
government taking the lead at the local, urban level. Central government strategies 
are prioritised, reflecting the steering perspective, though accounts of democracy and 
competence and to a lesser extent self-help may receive emphasis. The most obvious 
expression of urban network governance takes a partnership form as represented by 
the LSP, but this is the policy subsystem for deprived neighbourhoods. Other 
strategies which shape the subsystem’s approaches are framed by central government 
priorities, regarding for example economic growth. This implies some tokenistic use 
of neighbourhood-based governance forms.
Overall, the predominant function of neighbourhood-based governance associated 
with the form of urban governance expected in the UK is likely to reflect the steering 
interpretation.
In the US, the locus of authority is at the city-level, with city government and private 
interests taking the lead. Neo-liberal strategies of economic growth are prioritised. 
There may be a linked emphasis on self-help for deprived neighbourhoods with the 
rhetoric that they can benefit from this growth, with associated use of accounts of 
democracy and competence to a lesser extent. There may be a policy subsystem
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regarding deprived neighbourhoods, in which private actors such as philanthropies as 
well as the non-profit sector will be engaged along with city government, indicating 
some steering of entities, but its efforts will be framed by the strategies of the 
prevailing urban regime. This implies some tokenistic use of neighbourhood-based 
governance forms.
Overall, the predominant function of neighbourhood-based governance associated 
with the form of urban governance expected in the US is likely to reflect the self-help 
interpretation.
2.9 Why this research?
The formation and activities of neighbourhood-based governance entities have 
become increasingly important areas of enquiry. Though there is a broad literature of 
relevance to the field, there is general agreement among commentators that significant 
gaps in research and understanding remain. While some academic literature does take 
a more contextual approach to the use of neighbourhood-based governance, often with 
a neo-liberal critique, there is a “paucity of well-designed, sceptical investigations” 
(Klijn & Skelcher, 2007: 601) and a lack of rigorous and systematic research 
grounded in empirical evidence. Questions remain about the underlying function of 
such governance. Addressing this gap will add value in terms of considering the role 
of neighbourhood-based governance structures in relation to state and market forces, 
such as government co-ordination (fleshing out theoretical conceptions of 
metagovemance); and adaptation to economic restructuring (exploring neo-liberal 
critiques of neighbourhood-based approaches, such as the perceived tokenism of area- 
based responses to deprivation).
Consideration and critical review of the functions attributed to neighbourhood-based 
governance aids in understanding and theorising contemporary sub-local governance, 
and assists in framing discussions not in technical or managerial terms, nor in a 
simplistic ‘best practice’ approach, but in terms of the political context they reflect.
An examination of the reality of how entities are structured and operate, rather than 
the rhetoric of their existence, assists establishment of the “stakeholder groups who 
seek to govern neighbourhood space” (Fraser, 2004: 439). This enables consideration
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of the vertical relationships of neighbourhood-based governance structures back to 
citizens or up to higher levels of government and governance, particularly at the urban 
and central/ federal government level. There is an identified need for research 
regarding these “dialectics of horizontal and vertical political co-ordination” 
(Whitehead, 2003: 13).
There is a lack of research which has empirically grounded theories of network 
governance and sited the neighbourhood level within its multi-level governance 
context in the US. This research adds to the literature by addressing regime theory’s 
“restrictive localistic empirical focus” (Gibbs et al., 2001: 104). The research’s 
approach refines regime theory by enabling consideration of the influence of higher 
levels of government and governance on the urban regime, and of the relationships of 
this regime with any policy subsystem regarding deprived neighbourhoods. In turn it 
enables examination of the relationships of these forms of network governance with 
neighbourhood-based governance entities. Of particular interest is the role of non­
state actors, for example as the sponsors of neighbourhood initiatives, given the 
privatist nature of US governance. In the UK, the research adds particular value given 
its identification of the ostensible form of urban network governance (the LSP) as a 
policy subsystem for deprived neighbourhoods, and not the forum where strategies, 
for example regarding growth, are formulated. The research enables consideration of 
the extent to which these strategies frame the subsystem’s policies and actions and 
how this affects neighbourhood-based initiative governance.
In addition to addressing the lack of empirical evidence regarding the function of 
neighbourhood-based governance in deprived areas, a unique element of this research 
is its provision of an international comparison of the role of such governance forms. 
The need for caution in making comparisons is recognised, particularly given the 
different governmental systems of the two countries. But there is considerable 
validity in conducting cross-national research on this topic, not least to counter 
Cochrane’s (2007: 13) use of the term “national boxes” to describe how urban policy 
tends to be compared. Its validity is reinforced by the history of policy transfer 
between the two countries (explored in chapter 4). While bearing in mind Halsey’s 
(1978) observation that “ideas drift casually across the Atlantic, soggy on arrival and 
of dubious utility”, policies have developed in an (albeit intermittently) intertwined
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rather than separate waytn the UK and US in the post-war period, with the US 
proving to be a source of policy lessons and as “a vision of (positive and negative) 
urban futures” for the UK (Cochrane, 2007: 14).
Governance is also regarded as subject matter which lends itself to international 
comparisons as it “enables consideration of how governments have developed new 
ways of engaging with society while seeking to strengthen their role through 
alternative modes of governance and attempts to co-ordinate action” (Pierre and 
Peters, 2000: 30). Comparing the function of neighbourhood-based governance in 
both countries should point to the different ways in which these countries have coped 
with changes in state and market forces. What is distinctive and what is similar?
How does this relate to expectations, related to perceptions of a managerial/ centrist 
UK and a privatist/ localist US, especially given the history of policy transfer?
To clarify, for the purposes of this research, the UK refers to England rather than the 
devolved administrations, given the difficulty of incorporating the variety of different 
policy approaches pursued since devolution.
2.10 Research Alms
This research is an international comparative investigation of neighbourhood-based 
initiative governance in England and the US. Using an empirically-grounded 
approach informed by theories of network governance, the research considers the 
function of such governance forms, in order to locate neighbourhood-based initiative 
governance in the context of broader networks of governance. The research aims to:
• Ascertain the functions of neighbourhood-based initiative governance entities 
according to the way they are structured and the way they operate.
• Assess the urban governance context within which these entities are instigated, 
operate and are supported, in terms of the focus on deprived neighbourhoods 
versus broader strategies, key actors and their relative power, and how these 
strategies and actors shape the functions of neighbourhood-based initiative 
governance.
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• " Consider what this implies about the use of neighbourhood-based initiative ~ r
governance in the context of broader networks of governance.
• Identify similarities and differences between the two countries, and consider these 
in light of expectations of similarities (for example, resulting from the history of 
policy transfer) and differences (for example, related to perceptions of a 
managerial/ centrist UK and a privatist/ localist US).
• Identify possible avenues for future research.
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Chapter 3 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
This chapter clarifies the nature of the evidence sought and how this relates to the 
research questions. It explains how the theoretical framework set out in chapter 2 was 
developed and then applied in the empirical work and analysis, through the design of 
a rigorous and systematic mixed-method research approach. A key strength of the 
research is that it places the same phenomenon (neighbourhood-based initiative 
governance) in two different city/ national contexts to enable a rich and rigorous 
comparison of how its functions are affected by its context.
The chapter first sets out the use of a comparative international case study approach to 
consider how neighbourhood-based governance is located within broader networks of 
governance, and explains how the methodology used has addressed the challenges 
posed by this approach to enable robust identification of the similarities and 
differences between the two countries in terms of the research questions.
The chapter then explains how the functions of neighbourhood-based initiative 
governance entities are ascertained according to the way they are structured and 
operate. The approach is founded on an examination of how entities are actually 
structured and how they operate day-to-day, rather than taking “the rhetoric of their 
existence” (Fraser, 2004: 439) at face value. It draws on Mathur and Skelcher’s 
(2007) notion of a body’s “hardware and software” by combining an assessment of 
the entities’ structure with their day-to-day operations, with data sources comprising 
documentary review and interviews with case study entity respondents. This analysis 
of four initiative governance entities, two in each of the two cities under 
consideration, was informed by the heuristic framework of ‘ideal-type’ characteristics 
according to the functions identified in the academic and policy literatures.
How the urban governance context of these entities is assessed is then explained. The 
approach draws from the ‘bottom up’ insights gained from the case study entities and
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interviews with a purposive sampling of elite respondents to ensure cross-sectoral 
representation in each of the two cities. This interpretative approach, combined with 
documentary review, enabled identification of the form taken by the urban 
governance network, and its characteristics, including its key actors and their relative 
dominance, and its focus on deprived neighbourhoods versus broader strategies.
Following explanation of how the methodology was developed, the chapter then 
explains how this was applied in the field, detailing the research’s empirical phase, 
including city and case study entity selection, elite and case study respondent 
selection, and how and what data were gathered. The chapter finally explains how 
these data were analysed and validated.
Overall, the modes of enquiry used are analytic given the conceptual phase which saw 
development of the theoretical framework and descriptive given the compilation of 
case study entity narratives. However, key to the research’s contribution to the field 
is that it is also comparative. Table 3.1 presents an overview of the stages of the 
research.
Table 3.1: Overview of Research Stages___________________________________
Theory development/ conceptual phase:
o Initial literature review 
o Identification of functions 
o Development of initial ‘ideal-type’ typology
o Development of interview guides drawing on ‘ideal-type’ typology.________
Empirical phase:
o US national elite interviews -  piloting of interview guide 
o City selection
o Baltimore elite interviews/ documentary review 
o Case study entity selection
o Case study entity interviews/ documentary review
o Bristol elite interviews/ documentary review 
o Case study entity selection
o Case study entity interviews/ documentary review. __________________
Analysis:
o Full transcription of interviews
o Development of analytic scheme using interview guide/ ‘ideal-type’ typology 
o Coding of transcripts 
o Documentary review 
o Initial write up
o Validation at presentations in respective cities/ circulation to respondents 
o Rewrite. ________________________________________
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3.2 Comparative International Case Study Approach
3.2.1. International Comparison
While the broad methodological approach, combining semi-structured interviews with 
secondary data analysis, has been employed in several previous studies in the US and 
UK (for example Fagotto and Fung, 2006; Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999; Mathur and 
Skelcher, 2007) it appears to be the first time such an approach has been applied to 
neighbourhood-based initiative governance in a cross-national setting.
As Hantrais and Mangen (1996: 1) explain, for a study to be cross-national and 
comparative, the researcher should set out to study particular issues in two or more 
countries to compare their manifestations in different socio-cultural settings, using the 
same research instruments. The expectation is that the researchers gather data about 
the object of study within different contexts and, by making comparisons, gain a 
greater awareness and a deeper understanding of social reality (Hantrais and Mangen, 
1996: 2).
The literature details several benefits to comparative research which May (2001) 
divides into four categories. The potential for theoretical development and the 
identification of avenues for future research is a strong component of comparative 
research. This potential for theoretical development is also stated as an advantage for 
the case study method. Lisle (1985: 26) argues that those undertaking cross-national 
comparisons are forced to attempt to adopt a different cultural perspective, while also 
reconsidering their own country. May (2001: 208) describes this as the “import- 
mirror view”, whereby in producing findings on the practices of other countries, 
researchers are better able to see the basis of their own country’s practices. The 
“difference view” cited by May (2001) suggests that comparative analysis is 
undertaken to explain and understand differences and similarities. It places “a clearer 
perspective on the peculiarities of local experiences and the forms and consequences 
of general processes” (Harding, 1996: 193). Finally, the “foresight view” (May,
2001) sees comparative work as enabling understanding of the potential for success of 
particular policies, systems or practices in a given society. The approach leads to 
questions about the extent to which policies formulated in one national context could 
be applied elsewhere (Hantrais and Mangen, 1996: 3).
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However these are problems in undertaking such comparative research. This 
approach “by its very nature demands greater compromises in methods than a single 
country focus” (Hantrais and Mangen, 1996: 10). The key problems are the ability of 
researchers to understand adequately different cultures and societies, and more 
specifically, to try to compare “like with like” (May, 2001: 214). These problems are 
expressed as “appropriateness and equivalence” (May, 2001). ‘Appropriateness’ 
refers to the methods employed and the conceptualisation of issues when undertaking 
comparative research. A sensitivity and understanding of cultural context are 
required, tackling the influence of the researcher’s own cultural value system and 
assumptions (Hantrais and Mangem, 1996: 9). ‘Equivalence’ is a related issue. “A... 
major methodological task in comparative research is to devise and select theoretical 
problems, conceptual schemes, samples and measurement and analysis strategies that 
are comparable or equivalent across the societies involved in a particular study” 
(Aimer, 1973: 51, quoted in May, 2001). Practical problems that arise in cross- 
national comparisons include the availability and access to comparable datasets; the 
definition of the research parameters (units of comparison); and achieving functional 
equivalence of concepts and terms (Hantrais and Mangen, 1996: 5-9).
The approach taken for this research is described as the “safari” method (Hantrais and 
Mangen, 1996: 4). This entails research into a “well-defined issue” (op cit), using 
replication of the experimental design and concepts, with the systematic collection of 
the same information across research units. The safari method is regarded as suitable 
for comparison between a small number of countries where the researchers have 
knowledge of the countries under study. This research comparison is between two 
countries of which the researcher has considerable knowledge and experience 
(derived from being a UK native and three years spent studying and working in the 
US). As Harding (1996) explains, another advantage of research being carried out by 
one researcher is that the methodology is applied consistently, and if mistakes are 
made they are made consistently.
The challenge here is in ensuring functional equivalence of concepts and terms at the 
outset. This is why the research is founded on clear definitions of the units of 
comparison, neighbourhood-based initiative governance entities and their urban 
governance context. The urban governance context is bounded at city-level, ‘city’
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■^■ defined as the area bounded by the relevant local government unit, these being the 
City of Baltimore and the City of Bristol. These comprise what in the UK would be 
described as the urban unitary authority, and in the US as municipal or city 
government. Hantrais and Mangen (1996: 9) explain that researchers have attempted 
to address the problem of the influence of the researcher’s own cultural value system 
and assumptions by refining typologies in advance. The framework of functions and 
the expected characteristics of urban network governance forms also aids in ensuring 
functional equivalence.
Overall, this chapter demonstrates that the methodology adopted has enabled 
comparative empirical work which has avoided what Harding (1996: 194) describes 
as “tendencies towards ethnocentricity” or an “overly simplistic approach”. Clear 
definition of the units of study and development of the theoretical framework, derived 
from a synthesis of the respective countries’ relevant literatures, has generated a 
consistent set of research questions against which empirical observations can be 
tested. It has thus enabled a structured and well-grounded cross-national comparison 
which enables a robust identification of the similarities and differences between the 
two countries. The design enables the “structured approach to data collection” 
(Lewis, 2003: 51) required for comparative research, to “understand difference” (op 
cit: 50).
3.2.2. Case Study Approach
A case study is defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003: 13). Lewis (2003: 52) 
clarifies that what makes the case study approach distinctive is that it enables “a 
multiplicity of perspectives which are rooted in a specific context”. The approach 
“can build up very detailed in-depth understanding... where understanding needs to 
be holistic, comprehensive and contextualised” (op cit) as “the context is critical to 
understanding the researched phenomena” (op cit: 76). Indeed, as Hammersley and 
Gomm (2000: 6) explain, “it is often argued that analysis of a case always presumes 
some wider context”. They add that when case studies are used to develop theoretical 
ideas, the task of theory is to “locate and explain what goes on within a case in terms 
of its wider societal context” (op cit). Therefore, as the case study method suits
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situations where contextual conditions are believed to be highly pertinent to the unit 
o f study, it was an ideal approach given this research’s focus on placing 
neighbourhood-based initiative governance entities in their context and exploring how 
this context affects the strategies pursued.
Given the dearth of contextual information on many cities, Bendikat (1996: 132) 
identifies one of the advantages of the case study method as its provision of a large 
amount of information and description. It can deal with “a full variety of evidence” 
(Yin, 2003: 8) such as that gathered in the course of this research (deriving from semi- 
structured in-depth interviews with a range of respondents and documentary 
evidence). The “thick descriptions” of case studies (Geertz, 1973) are regarded as a 
“rigorous and fair presentation of empirical data” (Yin, 2003: 2). Case studies are 
regarded as an especially suitable approach when the research is posing explanatory 
‘why’ questions, such as regarding the functions of neighbourhood-based 
governance, as such questions deal with operational links that need to be traced over 
time (Yin, 2003: 6). The method also suits examination of contemporary events when 
the relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated by the researcher, as the researcher can 
interview the people involved and make direct observations (Yin 2003: 9).
The case study approach may be criticised due to its perceived lack of rigor and the 
scope for equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the directions of the 
findings and conclusions. These criticisms can be addressed if systematic procedures 
are followed. The method therefore “benefits from the prior development of 
theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin, 2003: 13) as is the 
case with this research given the framework of functions and expected characteristics 
of urban network governance forms set out in chapter 2. All evidence also needs to 
be reported fairly and without bias (Yin, 2003: 10), realised in this research via the 
full transcription and coding of all interviews.
The case study may also be criticised as it provides little basis for generalisation given 
the potential scope for drawing misleading conclusions from the study of a few cases 
(Gomm et al., 2000). Care has been taken that the entities selected are reasonably 
illustrative of the range of such bodies (explained in section 3.5.2 below), given the 
importance of the selection of cases for study (Platt, 1988). However, the
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contribution of the case study approach to theory generation is broadly recognised. It 
is seen as allowing for a considered exploration of the issues which can help to 
articulate hypotheses (Yin, 2003: 10). Eckstein (2000), in discussing the use of the 
case study approach in political science, stresses its value in building theories, or 
arriving at “statements of regularity about the structure, behaviour and interaction of 
phenomena” (2000: 126). Mitchell (2000), taking a social science approach, echoes 
Eckstein by recognising the ability of the case study approach to draw inferences 
about general, abstract theoretical principles which the case is taken to exemplify. 
Such theories may ultimately be tested more systematically (Yin, 2003: 10). A 
broader outcome of this research is the identification of avenues for future research.
3 3  Ascertaining the Functions of Neighbourhood Governance Entities
33.1. Identification of functions
Five principal candidate accounts o f the functions (or roles) of neighbourhood-based 
initiative governance were identified in the literature (as set out in chapter 2). The 
relevant literatures used to identify and define these accounts were established by 
undertaking a comprehensive search of US, UK and European academic literatures:
• Initially a word search was undertaken using the Ingenta Connect and ISI 
Web of Knowledge search engines for journal articles containing either 
‘neighbourhood governance’ or ‘neighborhood (sic) governance’ in the 
title, keyword listing or abstract. All of these articles were reviewed.
• During the research period ongoing journal article alerts were received by 
e-mail from ProQuest and from Ingenta Connect InTouch, drawing from 
multiple databases, for articles including the search terms. Newly-posted 
content from the most relevant journals (such as the Journal of Urban 
Affairs, Urban Affairs Review, Public Administration, Public 
Administration Review, Environment and Planning C: Government and 
Policy and Urban Studies) was also received by e-mail.
• Key authors were identified and their publications were reviewed. Books 
were identified using key author and key word search terms. These 
searches were conducted initially on Cardiff University’s Voyager system.
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• Fiver months of the research period were spent based at the Library of
Congress in Washington DC where these searches were replicated. This 
enabled excellent access to the relevant US literature, thus ensuring that 
any possible disadvantages of the researcher being UK-based were 
circumvented.
It should be noted that though the basic set of accounts of the functions of 
neighbourhood governance has remained constant during the research, the accounts 
now described as ‘self-help’ and ‘tokenism’ were subject to the most reconsideration 
during the research period due to iteration between the initial set of accounts and 
feedback gained regarding it. Initially these functions were combined, and described 
rather uncomfortably as ‘discharge/ double re-scaling’. ‘Discharge’ referred to the 
“strategy of containment” (Lepine et al., 2007: 13), whereby deprived 
neighbourhoods are perceived as being treated tokenistically and separately from the 
mainstream. “Double re-scaling” (Healey, 2006) referred to the “twin track” (Hohn 
and Neuer, 2006) cities notion, with the adoption of different strategies at different 
spatial scales. This combined account was then re-named ‘containment’. However, a 
combination of feedback garnered on presentation of the initial set of accounts at an 
international conference1, and comments from initial US national elite respondents at 
the outset of the research’s empirical stage (prior to the Baltimore fieldwork), led to 
recognition of the importance of capacity building as a function of initiative 
governance on the part of its sponsors. Thus the function was renamed ‘self-help’. 
Subsequently and finally this was split into two: ‘self-help’, encapsulating the 
normative value of capacity building in the context of initiative governance; and 
‘tokenism’, to encapsulate the “strategy of containment” (op cit) notion.
33.2. Development of typology of ‘ideal-type’ entity characteristics
These (non-exclusive) accounts of the functions formed the basis of the heuristic 
framework (table 2.1) that posits characteristics for the structure and operations of 
‘ideal-type’ neighbourhood governance entities. This typology was developed to 
enable a systematic approach for the empirical research, providing a set of testable 
propositions to enable greater insight into the functions of the four case study bodies.
1 Pill, M.C. (2007). “What rationales are driving neighbourhood governance initiatives in the UK and 
US?” European Urban Research Association conference, Glasgow.
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-41 was not intended to overly constrain the empirical research, but rather to enable a 
robust, methodical and comparable assessment of the relative strength of the functions 
in each case study entity in both cities.
To develop the typology, the ‘ideal-type’ characteristics associated with each function 
were derived, principally drawing from the key neighbourhood governance literature 
(as cited in table 2.1). Much of the relevant literature (for example, Chaskin and 
Garg, 1997; Fagotto and Fung, 2006, and Somerville, 2005a, 2005b) combines 
theoretical with empirical work and concludes with what can be regarded as ‘success 
factors’ for neighbourhood-based governance. Such factors constitute a good basis 
for identifying ‘ideal-type’ characteristics. The characteristics without an associated 
citation derive from a priori reasoning. For example, characteristics of the self-help 
‘ideal-type’ refer to the entity’s ability to “move beyond initiative governance” 
(Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999) by becoming a self-sustaining entity independent of 
its initial sponsor. Crucial characteristics emphasised in the literature were also 
refined and expanded, for example detail about the nature of resident board 
representation was surmised (such as the requirement for a resident quorum). This 
was in part informed by some iteration with the initial empirical findings, though the 
majority of the typology was developed during the conceptual phase of the research, 
prior to its empirical phase. The framework was also amended given the change from 
a four- to five-fold set of accounts of the functions, as explained above.
3 3 3 . Neighbourhood-based initiative governance entity case studies
Overall, the research approach for the case study entities comprised a review of 
documentation, such as meeting papers, reports, evaluations, and policy papers, 
including those of sponsor organisations and partners where possible; in-depth semi- 
structured individual interviews; and observation of meetings where possible. The 
methodology used therefore combines the use of documentary data such as 
information on structures with interview data (as has been used in several previous 
studies, for example Fagotto and Fung, 2006; Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999; Chaskin, 
2003; and Mathur and Skelcher, 2007).
However, key is that the approach taken is informed by previous research which has 
recognised that neighbourhood-based governance depends on the “structuring of
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relationships and the ongoing negotiation of connections; responsibilities, 
expectations and lines of accountability, rather than on a particular organisational 
structure or a particular, formally acknowledged set of roles and relationships” 
(Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999: 77). As Mathur and Skelcher (2007) explain, 
assessing a body’s “hardware” (such as its formal structure) does not reveal how it 
operates (its “software”, or informal relationships and practices).
The research approach is designed to place neighbourhood governance entities in their 
context. With regard to the entities, this involves ascertaining the functions that they 
perform, before considering how these are affected by the context in which they are 
embedded. The bodies’ functions are ascertained by using what can be regarded as a 
form of “revealed preference” (Samuelson, 1938), the theory which states that 
preferences are revealed by behaviour rather than by statements of intent. In this 
research, conclusions about the functions of an initiative governance entity are 
derived from an assessment not only of its structure, but also of its day-to-day 
operations. This enables a more systematic assessment of the existence and operation 
of the entities, rather than taking any formal statements (for example, the terms of 
reference for the entity, or policy and programme documents) or informal opinion (for 
example, of a board member) at face value.
Detailed investigations of the structures and operations of two neighbourhood-based 
initiative governance bodies operating in each city were carried out. This focus 
encompassed 'formal’ characteristics, such as their organisational structure, legal 
status, and stated mission (informed by documentary review as well as interview 
data). In addition, the approach included ‘informal’ characteristics, such as inter- 
organisational interactions between the entity and its sponsors and other bodies 
(principally informed by interview data). This is what Mathur and Skelcher (2007: 
236) refer to as “the day-to-day behaviour of actors in a network governance system”. 
This combined approach enabled greater insight into the functions of neighbourhood- 
based initiative governance, as well as ‘bottom up’ insight into how these bodies are 
nested within and affected by the context in which they are operating.
The entity research approach is founded on the typology of ‘ideal-type’ characteristics 
explained above. This constitutes a “criteria-based instrument” (Mathur and Skelcher,
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2007: 229) which can “expose contradictions*between the ‘ideal’ and the practice” (op 
cit: 236) by establishing the attributes and enabling an assessment of the extent to 
which they are evident in “the design of the entity and its day-to-day practices” 
(Skelcher, 2006: 68). The typology enables a criteria-based assessment of the 
entities’ structure and operations by ‘ideal-type’ and thus enables conclusions to be 
drawn about the combination of functions evidenced by the entities according to the 
extent to which the attributes are evident in their actual structures and practices. The 
typologies were used as an instrument to assess the bodies’ structures, with data 
including documentary evidence about the entity (entity directors were asked to 
provide background information on the entity’s structure). The typologies were also 
applied in a way that exposed the entities’ informal practices, by informing design of 
a semi-structured interview guide for in-depth interviewing of respondents engaged in 
the entities to gather data about actors’ practices. This enabled a systematic and 
consistent way of assessing the extent to which each entity was designed and operated 
in a way that reflected each ‘ideal-type* as posited in the theoretical framework.
The approach was particularly inspired by Mathur and Skelcher (2007), who 
developed the “Governance Assessment Tool” (see also Skelcher et al., 2005), a 
criteria-based tool used to assess a governance body’s “hardware”, but also used to 
inform development of a semi-structured interview topic guide. This guide was used 
to investigate with respondents how the entities studied worked in practice and what 
their informal procedures were. This assessment method thus can be used to assess 
the formal attributes of entities but also to “gain access to tacit knowledge” (Mathur 
and Skelcher, 2007: 229).
It should be made clear that the research does not try to evaluate the success of the 
neighbourhood-based governance entities under consideration. Finding objective 
measures for successful neighbourhood-based governance is complicated by the need 
for success to be measured in terms of outcomes, or what Chaskin and Garg (1997: 
654) would term the entity’s “proven capacity to effect change”, or “the ability... to 
have an independent impact on the well-being of their citizens” (Wolman and 
Goldsmith, 1990: 24). The factors that affect well-being are many and varied, 
including income and public services, physical environment, family life and personal 
relationships, connectedness to institutions (social capital), accessibility, self-esteem,
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physical health, and safety^md security (op cit: 16-18). This research does not 
attempt to measure these outcomes and attribute changes to the activities of 
neighbourhood-based governance entities.
3J.4. Entity-Level Respondent Interview Guide
The guide (example at Appendix 2) for those directly engaged in the case study 
governance entities was tailored to ask respondents about both the way the entity was 
structured and its operations, drawing on the ‘ideal-type’ characteristics framework. 
The interview guide probed the background to the initiative, how and why it came 
about, the contributions of the various partners and the reasons they were made, the 
decision-making structures developed for realising the project, and its day-to-day 
operations. These questions were designed to enable insight into the functions of the 
bodies studied. Respondents were also asked to discuss the role, work and 
relationships engaged in by their own organisations, which enabled ‘bottom up’ 
insight into how these bodies are nested within and affected by the context in which 
they are operating. In turn, elite respondents were also asked about their knowledge 
of and any engagement with the case study entities.
3.4 Assessing the Urban Governance Context
In addition to ascertaining the functions that entities perform, the research aims to 
consider how these functions are affected by the multi-level governance context in 
which the entities are embedded. The need to complement examination of individual 
entities with investigation of the wider body of relationships in which such entities are 
engaged has been recognised in previous studies (for example, Stoker and Stone, 
2008; and Chaskin, 2003). The research approach adopted therefore locates the 
entities examined in their context, providing an analysis of the “broader ecology of 
organisations and processes that constitute neighbourhood governance systems” 
(Chaskin, 2003). Within this broader context, there is a particular focus on the urban 
level given the city-based methodology employed. In terms of the units of study, this 
broader context bounded at the city-level is defined as the area governed by the 
relevant city/ local government (the City of Baltimore and the City of Bristol).
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However, itshould be stressed that the need for a detailed contextual understanding 
not only in terms of the case study entities within the city, but also of the city in its 
regional and national policy context, is also understood. This is reflected in chapter 4, 
in which the relevant policies and approaches at higher levels which frame the city- 
level are set out, as well as in the analysis (chapters 5 and 6). As Ungerson (1996) 
explains, this enables at least to an extent, differentiation between national differences 
and local specificities, rather than assuming that differences are “predetermined by 
national systems” (Bendikat, 1996: 130). This enables some subsequent consideration 
of the extent to which extrapolation of the city findings to the national level would be 
valid.
This methodology recognises governance as a process as well as a set of formal 
institutional arrangements, emphasising that governance is not so much about 
structures but the interactions between structures (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 22). It 
makes explicit the systemic nature of the relations between neighbourhood 
governance bodies and the context in which they are established and operate. From 
the perspective of the case study entities, the research identifies the relationships in 
which the entity is engaged, not only with its constituent communities, but also its 
vertical relationships with other actors at higher levels of government and governance. 
From the city-level perspective, the research identifies the relationships in which the 
organisations of elite respondents are engaged. As explained above, given the 
importance of considering the informal as well as formal aspects of these 
relationships, the use of a qualitative, semi-structured interview-based methodology, 
combined with documentary review of secondary data, is appropriate.
The approach used to identify and define the network governance context in the cities 
investigated was thus largely based on the ways in which respondents view and 
interpret its membership and structure and assess its functioning, including its modes 
of resource allocation. This interpretative approach, which relied on extensive 
interviewing with key actors (such as that used by Sweeting et al., 2004; and Chaskin, 
2003) was combined with documentary review of secondary data. The data analysed 
included policy documents (the key documents are considered in chapter 4) and 
reports and evaluations (which are cited in analytical chapters 5 and 6). This 
combined approach enabled identification of the form taken by the urban governance
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* : ' network, and its characteristics, including its key actors and their relative dominance, 
and its focus on deprived neighbourhoods versus broader strategies.
Establishment of the form and characteristics of the urban governance network in both 
cities in the empirical phase enabled subsequent analysis (as detailed in chapters 5 and 
6) of how this governance context affects the state and market imperatives which arise 
and the strategies which are pursued at city-wide and neighbourhood levels, thus 
determining the functions of neighbourhood governance, and what this indicates 
about the relative power of the neighbourhood level within its multi-level governance 
context. It also enabled comparison of the urban governance network identified with 
the expected characteristics of US and English urban governance considered in the 
research’s conceptual phase (as set out in chapter 2, table 2.2). This enabled an 
assessment o f “conceptual antecedents” (Harding, 1996: 189) such as DiGaetano and 
Strom’s (2003) notion of a privatist and localist US and a managerial and centrist UK.
3.4.1. City-Level Elite Respondent Interview Guide
The guide (example at Appendix 1) for city-level elite respondents was tailored to 
enable an assessment of the context within which neighbourhood-based governance is 
established and operates in the city. Elites were asked why the neighbourhood is 
regarded as a basis for action, and how and why neighbourhood-based governance 
structures are instigated or supported. They were asked to discuss the role, work and 
relationships engaged in by their own organisations, and for their perspectives on the 
work of others and how, if at all, this was co-ordinated or led. Elite respondents were 
also asked about their knowledge of and any engagement with the case study entities.
3.5 Empirical Phase
Prior to commencing the empirical phase, approval was gained from Cardiff 
University School of City and Regional Planning’s Ethics Committee for the 
proposed research and associated fieldwork/ interviews.
Detailed analyses were undertaken of the City of Baltimore, Maryland (between 
October 2007 and February 2008) and the City of Bristol, England (between June and 
September 2008). The empirical work entailed detailed investigations of the
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structures and operations of four neighbourhood-based governance entities (two in 
each city), and an assessment of the city-level context within which such entities are 
established and operate. It comprised a total of 54 in-depth interviews (32 in 
Baltimore, 22 in Bristol), and documentary review of secondary data (which included 
policy documents, plans, demographic and socio-economic data, and reports and 
evaluations).
3.5.1. City selection
The cities selected were chosen to balance the ideal in terms of comparison with 
pragmatic ‘deliverability’ criteria, enabling “convenient cases without sacrifice of 
disciplinary conscience” (Eckstein, 2000: 162). The ‘deliverability’ criteria included 
making use of the researcher’s existing (academic and practitioner) contacts in each of 
the countries. The researcher’s contacts led to relatively large cities in both countries, 
which aided in achieving comparability. Such cities are also more likely to be of 
sufficient scale to represent a range of approaches to neighbourhood-based 
governance and have a history of neighbourhood-based activity. Further background 
on both cities is set out in chapter 4.
The City of Baltimore (population 631,000) was selected due its well-defined 
neighbourhoods, varied mechanisms for neighbourhood decision-making and action, 
and its long tradition of political activism, local organising and heritage of 
neighbourhood-based working. Interviews with key informants at the national level, 
including federal government, philanthropic foundations, and non-profit and research 
institutions, informed and facilitated selection of Baltimore, enabling awareness of 
existing initiatives and the identification of and access to initial respondents in the 
city, where some of the national elites operate. Baltimore was also selected for 
reasons of practicality, given both its proximity to Washington DC where the 
researcher was based at the Library of Congress during the US empirical phase of the 
research, and also given the researcher’s previous experience in the city and contacts 
there (in the City of Baltimore’s Department of Planning).
The City of Bristol (population 416,000) was selected given its history of voluntary 
activity and community activism. The national elite interviewing undertaken in the 
US was not replicated in England given the researcher’s greater knowledge of the
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country’s policy context and as the-eity- and neighbourhood-level approach had been 
consolidated as a result of the US empirical work. Bristol’s selection also related to 
practical considerations, given its proximity to Cardiff, where the researcher was 
based for the research, and also as an English city was sought given the researcher’s 
background working in central government and her familiarity with relevant English 
policy. Bristol is not as extreme in terms of the scale of deprivation compared to 
Baltimore, but certainly does have deprived pockets. Interestingly both cities also 
share a port heritage though this was not a deciding factor in their selection.
3.5.2. Case study entity selection
Two case study entities were identified in each city. Such a limited number of cases 
fulfils Bendikat’s (1996: 132) advice that for a “qualitative comparative researcher, 
numbers should be kept small”, as this enables “control over the frame of 
comparison”. Examining two entities closely enables sufficient depth by allowing a 
considered exploration of the issues (Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999) but also makes 
the research feasible. Key to such “small-n” studies (Lieberson, 2000: 217) is the 
choice of cases. No set of case studies can be strictly representative of the field as a 
whole in a statistical sense, but care was taken that the entities selected were 
reasonably illustrative of the range of neighbourhood-based governance entities, and 
had in common a set of characteristics as per the unit of study definition.
In Baltimore and Bristol the entities were selected based on the criteria for 
neighbourhood-based initiative governance; recommendations from elite respondents; 
and that they were sufficiently long-established to be a rich source of insight into the 
field. In Baltimore, entity selection was also influenced by the two entities’ contrasts 
in terms of being a non-profit and a public entity respectively. While the public entity 
is notably atypical given its sectoral status, it was felt to be a valuable case study 
selection given its “potential for learning”, used as a criterion for selection in this case 
over notions of representativeness (Stake, 2005: 451).
It should be noted that several elite respondents mentioned the East Baltimore 
Development Initiative (EBDI) as a potential case study. However, after 
consideration this was rejected given that it was relatively recently established and 
thus would not have perhaps enabled sufficient insight into the field. As a significant
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element of the initiative is^he relocation of residents, it was also felt to be atypical as 
an example.
The initial intention when seeking case study entities in Bristol was that two different 
entity sector types would also be sought. However, this was not realised as it became 
clear that there was a dearth of suitable entities that also met the unit of study 
definition in Bristol. However, a key difference between the two Bristol entities 
emphasised in the initial elite interviews in the city was that one was perceived to 
have stemmed from the ‘grassroots’, albeit having become formalised via a 
government programme, whereas the other was regarded as having arisen from a 
government programme. This apparent contrast between the two informed their 
selection as case studies.
However, it should be stressed that the scope of the research was not confined to the 
two neighbourhood-based entities selected as case studies in each of the cities. Elite 
respondents were asked questions to elicit information about the governance of 
neighbourhood-based governance in the city, not just in terms of the case study 
entities.
3S 3 .  Respondent selection 
Elite respondents
For the US empirical research, an initial set of interviews was conducted of national 
elite respondents. The two key initial contacts were gained from an academic contact 
who has worked in the US and UK, who the researcher met at an international 
conference in the UK. Using the ‘snowballing’ approach, these contacts led to 
contacts with other national elite respondents, including an official at the federal 
government Department of Housing and Urban Development. These interviews 
assisted in confirming Baltimore as the city for detailed research.
The empirical phase in both cities commenced with interviews with a set of key 
informants. These were identified following preliminary interviews with national 
elites in the case of Baltimore. In the case of Bristol, initial contacts were identified 
via academic contacts at the University of the West of England gained at an
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intemationalconference. These “knowledgeable contacts” (Harding, 1996: 192) 
aided the researcher in identifying and gaining access to other elite respondents 
quickly and often helped with introductions. These interviews also assisted the 
researcher in becoming more informed about relevant initiatives/ potential case study 
entities in the cities.
In Baltimore and Bristol a combined sampling strategy was used to identify the elite 
city-level respondents. Respondents were identified using a combination of desk 
analysis to establish the key organisations and institutions, and recommendations 
from respondents. Respondent identification comprised purposive sampling to ensure 
cross-sectoral representation of those engaged in the governance of neighbourhood- 
based governance, including city/ local government officials and elected members, 
regional tiers of government, philanthropic and community foundations, and non­
profit/ third sector organisations. This was combined with a snowballing strategy 
drawing from recommendations from respondents, which was augmented with desk 
research about potential respondents’ organisations, primarily drawing from the 
organisation’s website. Table 3.2 below sets out the elite respondents’ organisations 
in both cities. This “subjective form of network analysis” (Harding 1996: 192) 
worked by asking initial interviewees to name key individuals regarded as active with 
regard to neighbourhood-based governance, arranging further interviews, repeating 
the questions and so generating the ‘snowball effect’. In the case of Baltimore, the 
researcher’s use of a Library of Congress US government e-mail address to contact 
potential respondents also aided in ensuring responses.
More respondents were interviewed in Baltimore than in Bristol. This was due in part 
to the Baltimore empirical work being undertaken first, and greater exploration was 
needed which then provided a broad template for how to undertake the Bristol 
empirical research. It also relates to the initially greater difficulty in identifying the 
key network governance members in Baltimore, given the network’s informal nature 
compared with the easier initial identification of key actors in Bristol (resulting from 
central government’s requirement for a Local Strategic Partnership which ostensibly 
constitutes the urban governance form for neighbourhood-based initiative 
governance). Elite respondent identification in Bristol was informed in part by an 
attempt to replicate, to the extent possible, the respondent selection in Baltimore.
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Table 3.2: Elite Respondents
Baltimore Bristol
City Council
Officers
Corporate Mayor’s Office of Neighborhoods and 
Constituent Services -  Director
Chief Executive’s Office - Head of 
Policy, Performance and Equalities
Community Development - 
Community Engagement Manager
Regeneration - Strategic Resources 
Manager
Planning Department of Planning - Community 
Planners
Strategic and Citywide Policy -  
Team Manager
Housing Assistant Commissioner, Research
Office of Development
Members Councilperson (formerly Council 
President)
Councillor/ Executive Member for 
Cohesion and Raising Achievement
Formal City- 
wide
Partnership
N/A Bristol Partnership — former chair
Higher Tiers of 
Govt/
Governance
State of Maryland Department of 
Housing and Community 
Development, Neighborhood 
Revitalization Division - Director of 
Research; Manager, Catalyst Program
Government Office of the South 
West - Locality Manager Bristol
Philanthropic
Foundations/
National
Intermediaries
Annie E. Casey Foundation - 
Evaluation Manager; East Baltimore 
Development Initiative Co-ordinator; 
Baltimore Community Relations 
Manager
Joseph Rowntree Foundation - 
Principal Policy and Public Affairs 
Manager
Enterprise Community Partners - 
Eastern Regional Director
Morris Goldseker Foundation of 
Maryland -  President
Community
Foundations
Baltimore Community Foundation -  
Director of Community Investment
Quartet Community Foundation - 
Grants Director
Non-profit/ 
third sector
Baltimore Neighborhood 
Collaborative -  Program Manager
Voscur (Bristol CVS) - 
Development Manager 
(Participation)
Greater Homewood Community 
Corporation -  Director and former 
Director
Black Development Agency -  
Director
Universities Johns Hopkins University - Director 
of Community Affairs
University of the West of England 
Cities Research Centre -  faculty
Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators 
Alliance, University of Baltimore -  
Program Manager
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Case Study Entity Respondents
Elite respondents assisted in recommending contacts in the entity case studies, in 
some cases providing introductions. Respondents were selected based on gaining the 
viewpoints of different sectors involved in the structure, including its sponsors, 
professional staff and members of its board, including residents and member 
organisations. The analysis does not include the perspectives of unaffiliated 
organisations or the “community at large”. Table 3.3 below sets out the case study 
entity respondents in both cities. It should be noted that the elite respondents were 
also asked about the case study entities. The respondents set out below are case study 
entity-specific.
Table 33: Case Study Entity Respondents
Baltimore Bristol
Operation Reach Out South 
West
Community at Heart
Entity Staff Executive Director Chief Executive
Local
Government
Department of Planning 
Community Planner
Non-profit/ 
Third sector
Bon Secours of Maryland 
Foundation - Associate Director, 
Director of Neighborhood 
Revitalization; Executive Director
Barton Hill Settlement -  Vice-Chair
Residents Chair (resident representative) Chair (formerly Chief Executive, 
now resident representative); 
Resident representative
Charles Village Community 
Benefits District
Hartcliffe and Withywood 
Community Partnership
Entity Staff Executive Director/ Administrator Chief Executive; former Chief 
Executive
Local
Government
Department of Planning 
Community Planner, former 
Community Planner
Non-profit / 
Third sector
Greater Homewood Community 
Corporation -  Director; former 
Director.
Hartcliffe and Withywood Ventures 
-  Chief Executive
Residents Board President (resident 
representative); Secretary (Mayor 
of Baltimore appointee)
Chair (resident representative)
3.5.4. Interviews
Informed consent for participation in the research was gained by contacting each 
potential respondent in advance by e-mail or telephone, explaining the research and
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requesting an interview with them. If the potential respondent agreed to be 
interviewed by the researcher this was taken as informed consent for participation. 
Those contacted by e-mail were provided with an interview guide, which included a 
brief summary of the research, a request that the interview be recorded, and contact 
information for the researcher. Those contacted by telephone were asked for an e- 
mail or postal address to which this could be sent in advance of the interview. A hard 
copy was also provided at the interview for the respondent to keep. Oral consent to 
being recorded was also obtained prior to commencement of the interview.
As explained above, an interview guide was prepared for the semi-structured 
qualitative interviews (examples are appended). The guide was piloted (in the initial 
US interviews) and these initial respondents were asked for their comments and 
feedback on the guide and the interview process. All respondents were provided with 
the interview guide in advance (which included a brief explanation of the research and 
contact information for the researcher).
The guide was tailored for different categories of respondents (city-level elites and 
entity-level respondents) but incorporated a core set of open-ended questions to be 
asked of all respondents, which allowed for both specific responses and the drawing 
out of broad themes and interpretations. The ‘semi-structured’ nature of the interview 
meant that though the guide had a list of questions to be covered, the interviewee did 
have a great deal of leeway in how to reply. This enabled the interviewee’s point of 
view to emerge. Such “detailed and open-ended” (Hammersley and Gomm, 2000: 5) 
approaches assists in the development of theoretical ideas, a benefit of the case study 
approach.
Questions did not necessarily follow exactly those included in the guide, and 
questions not included in the guide were asked by the researcher as a result of the 
respondent’s responses. Earlier findings were also reflected in later guides. This was 
aided by the maintenance of a detailed field notebook following each interview, 
including notes of impressions, problems, refinements needed, and issues to pursue. 
This provided an aide memoir for subsequent interviews, especially useful when there 
had not been sufficient time to transcribe previous interviews. However, generally all
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of the questions were asked and a similar wording was used from interviewee to 
interviewee.
3.5.5. Analysis
Each interview was recorded with the permission of the respondent and fully 
transcribed by the researcher. Transcriptions were subsequently coded for analysis. 
Consideration was given to using software (such as NVivo) to provide “analytic 
support” (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996) but in discussion with her PhD Panel, the 
researcher decided that this would not add significant value to the analysis given the 
framework for coding and analysis provided by the interview guide and the ‘ideal- 
type’ characteristics heuristic. In addition to development of an initial analytic 
scheme based on these, issues were defined deductively as they arose in the course of 
the analysis and used to refine the analytic scheme. The data were also sorted so that 
patterns of common or differing perspectives among different types of respondents 
could be ascertained. Such patterns are discussed in the analysis where notable. 
Reflecting White et al.’s (2003: 306) recognition of the value of the case study 
approach in terms of “displaying verbatim text within a well-defined context”, 
presentation of the analysis (in chapters 5 and 6) includes significant use of 
respondent quotes. This assists in rendering tacit knowledge communicable 
(Donmoyer, 2000).
Analysis also drew from secondary data sources. Additional data were gathered to 
inform respondent identification and to research their organisations prior to interview. 
This was primarily gathered from the organisation’s websites, and included key city/ 
local government policy documents (which are considered in chapter 4). Some elite 
respondents also provided data either during or following interview. Such secondary 
data comprised policy documents, plans, demographic and socio-economic data, 
reports and evaluations, lists of funding recipients, maps, information leaflets and 
newspaper articles. Some of this material was internal to the respondents’ 
organisations and not available to the general public. In addition, following 
interviews the researcher gathered pertinent documents mentioned by respondents 
which had not been reviewed prior.
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With regard to the case study entities, a review of available documentary evidence,^ 
such as meeting papers, reports and evaluations, and policy papers, including those of 
sponsor organisations and partners where possible, was carried out. This informed the 
case study narratives in terms of the entity’s background, how and why they came 
about, the contributions of the various partners and the reasons they were made, and 
the decision-making structures developed. Entity directors were asked to provide 
background information on the entity’s structure, including its board membership and 
that of its constituent committees; selection or election procedures; and terms of 
reference and bylaws, which informed analysis of the entity’s structure.
3.5.6. Validation
Validation of the researcher’s interpretation has been sought where possible. Avenues 
for this have included presentation of the initial analyses in the cities under 
consideration. The initial Baltimore analysis was presented at the Urban Affairs 
Association annual meeting (held in Baltimore)2; and a detailed presentation of the 
initial Bristol and Baltimore analysis was made at the invitation of the University of 
the West of England’s City Research Centre as part of the Centre’s seminar series3, to 
which Bristol respondents were invited and which one entity staff member attended; ' 
The research has also been presented in other locations4.
In addition, each respondent was also e-mailed the initial analysis for their city 
including the case study entity findings. Only one Bristol entity-level staff respondent 
responded with comments, which resulted in minor factual amendments.
2 Pill, M.C. (2008). “Why neighbourhood governance? An investigation in Baltimore". Urban Affairs 
Association Annual Meeting, Baltimore.
3 Pill, M.C. (2008), “Why neighbourhood governance? How and by whom are neighbourhoods 
governed? An investigation in Bristol and Baltimore”. University o f the West o f England, Cities 
Research Centre Seminar Series.
4 Pill, M.C. (2008). “Who is governing neighbourhoods? An investigation in Baltimore". Joint 
Congress o f the American Association o f Collegiate Schools o f Planning and Association o f European 
Schools o f Planning, Chicago. Pill, M.C. (2009). “How is neighbourhood-based governance being 
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3.6 Conclusion
The strength of the research approach is that it places the same phenomenon 
(neighbourhood-based initiative governance) in two different city/ national contexts to 
enable rigorous exploration and comparison of how its functions are affected by these 
contexts. Use of the “safari” method (Hantrais and Mangen, 1996) addresses many of 
the challenges posed by international comparative case study research. Grounding in 
a criteria-based assessment of governance entities enables a systematic assessment of 
the reality rather than rhetoric of their role, and assessment of their urban governance 
context links the two units of study to enable consideration of the interaction and 
relative power of the key actors and their strategies at these levels.
However, the research approach does lead to potential criticisms. For example, while 
the city-level provided a useful bounding of the research approach, enabling 
‘deliverability’, the research seeks to locate neighbourhood governance in its multi­
level governance context. It thus would have benefited from broader elite respondent 
selection from higher tiers of government and governance, as well as the documentary 
review of relevant policy documents produced by these higher tiers which did take 
place. In addition, while the heuristic framework of ‘ideal-type’ characteristics 
provides a good basis for bringing empirical rigour to the research, the value of 
further development of the framework prior to being applied empirically is 
recognised, though time constraints did not permit this. For example, the framework 
would have benefited from conceptual refinement regarding how the different 
functions combine and complement or conflict with each other, and which actors in 
the governance network are likely to champion and pursue which combinations of 
functions.
These weaknesses also demonstrate the strength of comparative research in its 
potential for theoretical development and the identification of avenues for future 
research. These are set out in chapter 7.
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Chapter 4 
CONTEXT
4.1 Introduction
This chapter serves to ‘set the scene’ in both cities prior to their detailed analysis in 
light of the findings of the empirical research in the following two chapters. It first 
considers the respective post-war national policy contexts for both cities. This 
demonstrates the validity of undertaking cross-national US and England comparative 
research given their ongoing, if intermittent, policy transfer. The chapter then takes 
each city in turn and sets out the city’s neighbourhood-relevant history and the city/ 
local government’s changing orientation to neighbourhoods. It subsequently explores 
the relevant policies (identified and subject to documentary review in the course of 
the empirical research) developed at both city and higher levels of government and 
governance which frame neighbourhood approaches in both cities. This enables a 
detailed contextual understanding of the city in its regional and national policy 
context and thus assists in placing neighbourhood-level governance in its multi-level, 
multi-actor governance context.
National policies frame cities’ practices and experiences, but do not completely 
dictate these. Given England’s centrist governmental system, central government 
policy history can be tracked more readily at the city level, and indeed central 
government has played a consistently more direct role in relevant urban policy 
compared to the US’s federal government. Therefore there is a need for greater 
consideration of national trends to provide the context for Bristol, and of city-level 
trends to provide the context for Baltimore. At the city level, similarities and 
differences are clear. Some relate to the different governmental systems of the two 
countries, and some relate to the path dependence of neighbourhood governance given 
distinctive local characteristics and history.
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4.2 US and English Context
As explained in chapter 2, urban policies have developed in an intertwined way in the 
US and England in the post-war period, with English government’s “strong Atlantic 
focus” (Raco, 2003: 243) leading to the transfer of US policy lessons. In turn, urban 
policy responses in both countries derive from the negative consequences of 
deindustrialisation arising from the restructuring of the global economy. These 
responses have been framed by the rise of neo-liberalism, with a shift from 
bureaucratised to more entrepreneurial modes of governance (Harvey, 1989).
Neighbourhood governance-relevant developments can be divided into two broad 
categories. The first, which is of most relevance to this research, comprises area- 
based initiatives, a generic term for efforts which in England may be characterised as 
‘place- and people-based regeneration’, and in the US as ‘community building’ 
initiatives targeted on deprived neighbourhoods. These have been deployed since the 
1960s in successive waves in both countries. In the US, federal government policy in 
the past has taken the area-based initiative approach, though subsequently such 
initiatives have primarily been instigated at city government level with private 
foundations and intermediaries playing a key role. In England, central government 
has retained a key role in such approaches, whether directly or indirectly via local 
government. The second development is the efforts in both countries to devolve from 
the local to sub-local levels, with neighbourhood governance structures established to 
create a further layer of accountability particularly with regard to public service 
provision. Such efforts, which are often city-wide rather than being deprived 
neighbourhood-targeted, have been led for the most part by city/ local governments, 
but latterly are being encouraged by central government in England.
4.2.1. National Policy History
1960s: Urban Renewal Leading to Neighbourhood Initiatives
In the US in the 1950s the largely federal government-funded ‘urban renewal’ efforts 
and expressway development led to the restructuring of urban areas. Drastic 
suburbanisation and comprehensive redevelopment led to displacement and disruption 
in city neighbourhoods. Mounting criticism of such approaches led to a shift to
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poverty alleviation and neighbourhood revitalisation approaches. In the mid-1960s 
limited federal funds were directed to neighbourhood initiatives to provide support for 
neighbourhood organisations seeking to bring about “social reconstruction” (Stoker et 
al., 2009: 5). The Community Action Programme (CAP) and Model Cities 
programme focused on the notions of co-ordination of services and maximum feasible 
participation of the poor residents of targeted neighbourhoods (and were thus 
precursors of the area-based initiative approach). The CAP was resisted by municipal 
government, as community action agencies were organised by federal mandate 
(Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 639). The programme was then restructured to shift control 
to mayors, while Model Cities was placed under the aegis of municipal government 
from the outset. Neighbourhood-based governance of these initiatives was limited, 
and dominated by city-wide representatives. Where neighbourhood boards were 
created (as in Model Cities), their role was generally advisory and subject to 
municipal control.
England’s version of ‘urban renewal’, comprehensive redevelopment, saw the 
demolition of urban areas and the construction of public housing in the 1950s and 
1960s. Between 1969 and 1972 twelve Community Development Projects (CDPs), 
inspired by the US’s area-based CAP, were in operation. They are still regarded as 
the “high water mark” of local involvement in area-based initiatives (Foley and 
Martin, 2000: 480). CDPs set up local teams of community workers and researchers. 
The resultant highly political analysis challenged the assumption that local action 
alone could tackle problems related to the economy (Taylor, 1995). This influential 
neo-Marxist critique of the “social pathology” approach (Cochrane, 2007: 50) saw 
deprivation as structural (Taylor, 1995). CDPs operated alongside the main urban 
policy initiative of the time, the Urban Programme, founded by central government in 
1968 (which ran until the early 1990s). It funded social and welfare provision- 
focused initiatives in partnership with local authorities, though central government 
remained in control.
1970s: Bottom Up and Top Down
In the US grassroots political activism and new approaches to community organising 
led to a “backyard revolution” (Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999: 61). The early history 
of interaction between neighbourhood organisations and city agencies was
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adversarial, given assumptions that their interests would invariably be at odds (Kathi - 
and Cooper, 2005: 562). But many of these groups subsequently developed into 
formal community-based organisations that focused on one activity or a combination 
of service delivery, housing and economic development activities as well as, or 
instead of, community organising and advocacy. At the same time, a broad policy 
focus on decentralisation led many municipalities to seek to incorporate 
neighbourhoods into the structure of local government through the creation or 
recognition of various forms of neighbourhood councils. At the federal level, the 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) took effect in 1975. It is still in 
existence and provides annual, formula-based grants to ‘entitled’ cities, urban 
counties and states for economic and community development.
Given fears following English local government reform that local authorities would 
become remote from the local population, several local authorities attempted to 
develop organisational arrangements to strengthen local accountability. However, 
ultimately the initiatives were seen as ‘add-ons’ to the highly centralised local 
authority decision-making structures (Bums et al., 1994). The Urban Programme 
remained the principal source of relevant central government funding.
1980s: the Rise o f  Neo-Liberalism
This period saw a policy shift in both countries from people and community-based 
approaches to an economic and property-led focus with an emphasis on enabling 
cities to compete economically. The philosophy was one of market forces guiding the 
private sector to invest, with the state intervening only as far as it created the 
conditions for the private sector to get involved (Jones and Evans, 2008: 9).
In the US this was reinforced by a significant reduction in federal aid, which 
necessitated cities becoming more self-reliant. Insofar as there was ‘urban policy’, it 
was expressed at the city rather than federal level (Cochrane, 2007: 90). Though in 
some cities ‘urban populism’ prevailed, where mayors and community activists 
focused on creating participatory mechanisms that allowed for grassroots mobilisation 
in the governing process (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003: 389), the general trend was to 
more corporatist modes of governance in cities. This is reflected in Stone’s (1989) 
notion of an “urban regime” (explored in chapter 2). Emphasis was placed on the
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* need for cities to position themselves so they could work with the private sector more
effectively to meet their needs (Bamekov et al., 1989: 107). Some federal “policy 
leverage” (Cochrane, 2007: 91) was gained via the introduction of the competitively- 
allocated Urban Development Action Grant, which sought to stimulate private 
investment in distressed communities by providing a capital subsidy for economic 
development projects. This approach was later adopted in England.
In England, the perception that the local authority bureaucracy had become remote 
and unaccountable remained. New mechanisms were sought to make local 
government responsive. The right championed the individual consumer, with the rise 
of a managerial response to public service reform. The left advocated such strategies 
as the creation of sub-municipal forms of political decision-making (including area 
and neighbourhood committees), with the aim of giving local people a voice in 
decision-making (some are described by Bums et al., 1994).
By the late 1980s, the view that the state was an inefficient means of delivering 
services was reflected in the emergence of a business-led agenda for area-based 
regeneration, which was put in place by central government. The model of 
partnership was driven by the belief that the private sector, through the regulating 
mechanism of the market, could deliver what was best for it and therefore the aims of 
government. This is seen by Davies (2001) as a shift from “governance by 
government” to “governance by partnership”. Enterprise Zones, the Urban 
Development Grant programme (transferred from the US), and Urban Development 
Corporations were created. Interestingly, proposed federal legislation to introduce 
Enterprise Zones in the US was never enacted (Cochrane, 2007: 95), a rare example 
of east-west policy transfer.
The rise of public-private partnership during the 1980s in both countries can be 
related to what Cochrane (2007: 89) calls the “shared philosophical [neo-liberal] 
understanding” of Reagan and Thatcher. At core was the view that welfare could 
only be delivered through economic success. However, this logic was carried further 
in the US. The “de facto devolution” brought about by “federal retrenchment” 
(DiGaetano and Strom, 2003: 369) led to the development of city-level ‘urban 
regimes’. In contrast in England, while this period can be regarded as the high point
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of the “hollowing out of the state” (Rhodes, 1994; Skelcher, 2000) given the turn to 
partnerships with the private sector, it can be argued that the strength of central 
government was reinforced during this period, certainly in relation to local 
government. Urban policy was directed towards greatly reducing the power of local 
authorities as part of a broader assault on the political left (Jones and Evans, 2008:
10). Central government took much more control of managing area-based initiatives 
at the local level, involving private partners to ‘lever in’ finance, and bypassing local 
authorities with governance mechanisms that were ‘parachuted in’. The focus on 
private property investment alienated local communities and failed to utilise the skills 
and commitment of local people (Robson et al., 1994). Increasing concerns about the 
uneven distributional effects of these policies gradually led to concern about ‘social 
exclusion’.
1990s to date: the Rise o f  Self-Help
In the US some modest time-limited federal programmes of relevance were 
introduced but these were very much based on levering the market. Most notable 
(continuing the enterprise zone metaphor transferred irom England) the 
Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Communities ten-year programme was introduced 
in 1993. This provided tax incentives and additional resources for areas which could 
demonstrate pursuance of “economic opportunity, sustainable community 
development, community-based partnerships, and strategic vision for change” 
(Wallace, 2004: 597). The HOPE VI programme, instigated in 1992, focused on 
public housing improvement with a mixed-income ethos. More recently in 2000, the 
New Markets Tax Credit programme was established to incentivise investment to 
“spur revitalisation efforts of low-income and impoverished communities” (op cit).
This period’s main developments continued to occur at city level. Attempts were 
made to establish city-wide neighbourhood governance structures to incorporate 
neighbourhoods in local government (such as those in Minneapolis investigated by 
Fagotto and Fung, 2006). Chaskin and Garg (1997: 641) describe such approaches as 
enabling citizens to participate and represent their interests in services delivered by 
city agencies, while simultaneously attempting to make government more responsive 
to these entities. However, for the most part such neighbourhood bodies only have 
advisory relationships with city government (Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999: 61).
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The other significant development was that deprived neighbourhoods were 
specifically targeted by ‘community building’ initiatives, intended to promote 
comprehensive neighbourhood change through the development of increased 
neighbourhood capacity for planning, advocacy, service delivery, and implementation 
of development strategies (Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999: 58). Such initiatives tended 
to be sponsored by philanthropic foundations5 (such as the Ford Foundation and the 
Annie E. Casey Foundation) or the national intermediaries6 (the Local Initiatives 
Support Corporation and Enterprise Community Partners) rather than government. 
Chaskin and Abunimah (1999) explain that these initiatives differ from local 
government-driven attempts to create mechanisms for neighbourhood participation 
and governance. This is because they target particular, deprived, neighbourhoods, are 
independent from formal structures of representative government, and rather than 
being advisory bodies, community-building initiatives are regarded as ‘change agents’ 
in themselves.
Most recently, the creation by President Obama in 2009 of a White House Office of 
Urban Affairs, “in order to take a co-ordinated and comprehensive approach to 
developing and implementing an effective strategy concerning urban America”, has 
raised expectations of greater federal attention and resource for deprived urban 
neighbourhoods (The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2009).
In England recognition increased during this period that the partnership model had not 
tackled some of the more intractable social problems. The role of local government in 
regeneration efforts was reinstated, with acceptance that local authorities had 
considerable expertise and local knowledge which made them well-placed to co­
ordinate locally-based regeneration programmes (Jones and Evans, 2008: 12). The 
programmes introduced can be seen as the equivalent of ‘community building’ 
initiatives in the US, but these were nearly always controlled by central government
5 Philanthropic foundations are private entities that have a philanthropic mission. Some may be 
operating foundations, delivering programmes directly, but most operate via intermediaries. Some 
operate nationally, some more locally, focusing on a city or metro area.
6 ‘Intermediaries’ refer to non-profit sector entities which may operate nationally or locally (including 
at city-wide, multi-neighbourhood and single neighbourhood levels). Neighbourhood-based 
governance structures that have been established in deprived neighbourhoods in the US tend to be non­
profit entities (these are often referred to as “501(cX3)s”, the tax designation for non-profit status).
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(via local government), though non-state, non-private ‘third sector’7 actors were also 
involved. A discourse of “community involvement” became prominent (Atkinson, 
1999) and central government programmatic funding became tied, at least ostensibly, 
to involving local community ‘stakeholders’.
City Challenge, introduced in 1991, was an attempt at a comprehensive and strategic 
approach to social as well as economic and physical regeneration. It provided £37.5 
million over a five year period to designated areas. The Single Regeneration Budget 
(SRB) scheme, introduced in 1994, extended the area-based initiative approach, 
enabling greater variance in the types and duration of initiatives which could be 
funded (Jones and Evans, 2008: 12). Central government funds for both programmes 
were allocated on a competitive bidding basis, echoing use of this form of allocation 
for US federal programmes. However, while City Challenge bids were required to 
have been developed by a cross-sectoral partnership with plans reflecting local 
circumstances, the initiatives were found to be highly managerialist (Stewart, 1994). 
The competitive format penalised local authorities that were unable to develop 
comprehensive plans and demonstrate an ability to deliver (Malpass, 1994). In turn, 
the bureaucratic process of bidding for SRB funds effectively restricted the leadership 
of bids to local authorities and well-funded third sector organisations. Indeed, local 
government was generally the ‘lead partner’ as well as being the ‘accountable body’ 
to central government for the funds (via the Government Offices for the Regions, the 
regional presence of central government). The SRB regime ended in 2001 (though 
existing funding commitments were honoured).
While an increased emphasis on community involvement was empirically evident, 
community voices were felt to have been marginalised (Atkinson, 1999). In practice 
the community was often the weakest partner, “given a mere presence rather than a 
voice” (Cameron and Davoudi, 1998: 250). Such challenge programmes had little 
“impact on the levels of alienation felt by communities in the most deprived urban 
areas” (Foley and Martin, 2000: 481).
7 The Government defines the ‘third sector’ as “non-governmental organisations that are value driven 
and which principally reinvest their surpluses to further social, environmental or cultural objectives. It 
includes voluntary and community organisations, charities, social enterprises, cooperatives and 
mutuals” , http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/thirdsector/
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OtherfiindfHg sources also became important during this period. The availability of 
European Union Structural Funds for areas experiencing deindustrialisation is 
regarded by some as evidence of the “hollowing out of the state” (Rhodes, 1994).
But bids for these funds were co-ordinated by Government Offices for the Regions 
demonstrating significant central government control. In addition, the National 
Lottery, which commenced in 1994, became a significant funding source for third 
sector organisations.
The election of a Labour government in 1997 saw a further “turn to community” with 
moves to create conditions in which communities have a stronger role in developing 
regeneration strategies and monitoring local services (Foley and Martin, 2000: 480). 
Mechanisms included local participation in service delivery and design under Best 
Value, the creation of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs), and the requirement for 
Local Area Agreements (LAAs), under the aegis of a new ‘community leadership’ 
role for local government (following the Local Government Act, 2000).
This seemingly heralded a different approach to deprived neighbourhoods, with the - 
reliance-on short-term, special initiatives replaced by a more ‘strategic’ approach. 
Evidence had emerged that area-based initiatives were having only limited success in 
addressing neighbourhood disadvantage (for example, Hall, 1997; and Stewart, 2002); 
that they displaced rather than resolved problems (Hastings, 2003: 86); and that 
“partnership fatigue” (op cit) had set in, with large demands on agencies potentially 
deflecting them from their mainstream operations. Crucially, it was felt that area- 
based initiatives were masking significant problems regarding the quality and 
appropriateness of public sector provision in disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Social 
Exclusion Unit, 2001). The practice of ‘bending’ mainstream spending programmes 
became a core component of the government’s approach to tackling disadvantage and 
deprivation (Imrie and Raco, 2003: 13). This emphasis on appropriate and responsive 
local service provision for deprived areas was later reflected in the establishment of 
three-year Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders focused on the three percent most 
disadvantaged areas in England in 2005. These were funded through the 
government’s Safer and Stronger Communities Fund (SSCF).
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** However, it is noteworthy that the emphasis on mainstreaming did not supplant the 
staple area-based initiative approach to the alleviation of neighbourhood deprivation. 
The most significant initiative was New Deal for Communities (NDC), established in 
1998 to produce a local response to five indicators of social deprivation 
(unemployment, crime, educational underachievement, poor health, and problems 
with housing and the physical environment). It had a total budget of £2 billion over a 
longer, ten-year lifetime, for programmes in 39 neighbourhoods of between 1,000 and 
4,000 households. Designation combined a needs-based approach (based on the 
central government-determined Indices of Deprivation) with a bid for ‘pathfinder* 
status. Each scheme comprised a local partnership involving residents, community 
organisations, local authorities and local businesses. Particular emphasis was placed 
on the capacity building of communities to provide them with “the skills and 
knowledge to become active in eradicating (their) deprivation” (Imrie and Raco,
2003: 21), indicating an increased emphasis on the self-help account of 
neighbourhood governance.
However, the NDC has been subject to much criticism. Though the intention was that 
targets and actions should be set locally, there was initially considerable underspend 
of resources as locally-agreed targets were rejected at national level. This indicates 
that such initiatives are driven by a “policy of inclusion but on terms which have 
already been defined and set outside the community” (Diamond, 2001: 277). The 
NDC has been dominated by central government directives over the form and 
character of local community-based regeneration programmes (Diamond, 2001; Audit 
Commission, 2002). It demonstrates that “communities are often ‘shoehomed’ on to 
local policy initiatives according to central government guidelines” (Imrie and Raco, 
2003: 27).
Creation of the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit (operating from 2001 until 2008) 
stemmed from the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (Social Exclusion 
Unit, 2001). The unit oversaw a £800 million Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) 
(operating from 2000 until 2008). This provided funds to eighty-eight of the most 
deprived local authorities in England. ‘Community Chests’ (operating from 2002 
until 2006) in turn provided small grants to community groups in these areas. NRF 
recipient authorities were required to allocate funds via a Local Strategic Partnership
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(LSP), comprising representatives of state and non-state actors, most notably the local 
authority, local police authority, and the health and education sectors. These 
partnerships operate under central government control and guidance (Imrie and Raco, 
2003: 17), and require accreditation by the regional Government Office. Despite 
being non-statutory, these arrangements quickly spread across local authorities in 
England. LSPs are now responsible for developing and driving the implementation of 
Sustainable Community Strategies (SCS) and LAAs, both of which require 
government approval. Community Strategies are described as an “overarching plan 
for promoting and improving the well-being of an area” (DCLG, 2008: 28). LAAs 
are three-year agreements between central government (represented by the 
Government Office) and local authorities and their partners (represented by the LSP) 
with the aim of enabling ‘local solutions to local circumstances’. The LAA is “a 
shorter-term delivery mechanism for the SCS” (DCLG, 2008: 34) as it frames the 
allocation of funding according to local priorities as identified in the SCS.
Overall, LSPs are apparently the locus for current policies of relevance to deprived 
neighbourhoods. Rather than working at neighbourhood level, LSPs are responsible 
for co-ordinating efforts to achieve neighbourhood renewal at the local authority 
spatial scale, with an emphasis on mainstream services rather than area-based 
initiatives. While this seems to signal a shift away from a focus on the internal 
problems of deprived neighbourhoods, the approach does “remain disengaged in 
terms of the broader societal and structural processes that shape neighbourhoods” 
(Hastings, 2003: 100). In turn, Diamond (2004) finds that LSP managers perceive the 
community as a weak, dependent partner in the process.
Despite these policy shifts, it is still not evident that central government is willing to 
trust communities and local service providers with “policy space, resources and 
greater autonomy” (Foley and Martin, 2000: 488). The government remains strongly 
centralised and retains a strong emphasis on performance management, leading to 
questions regarding the extent to which local variation is really gaining precedence 
over central goals (Pratchett, 2004: 370). For example, the target-driven nature of 
government’s management of LSPs, initially via ‘floor targets’ which set minimum 
standards on a variety of social indicators for deprived areas, and latterly via LAAs, 
has meant they have remained ‘top-down’. With the introduction of a simplified
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performance framework for LAAs in'200fr,rincluding the ability to set ‘local 
improvement targets’, scope for greater local flexibility is evident, but it remains 
within a framework set by central government.
Therefore, as reflected in the steering interpretation of neighbourhood governance 
explained in chapter 2, despite the repeated assertion that urban policy is now 
community-focused, and orientated towards the involvement and activation of local 
knowledge in the policy process, the practices of urban governance remain highly 
centralised and output-focused. Indeed, commentators argue that these policies 
represent “a pragmatic evolution rather than radical change” (Tiesdell and 
Allmendinger, 2001). For others, the changes are no more than procedural with the 
rescaling of government undertaken in ways that do not effectively reduce the powers 
of the central state (Jones and Ward, 2002). The tension in English policy between 
the rhetoric of community empowerment and centrally-driven priorities is ongoing.
Since 2006 there has been a transition in central government policy approaches from 
those of area-based neighbourhood renewal, as set out in the national strategy (Social 
Exclusion Unit, 2001) to a broader ‘neighbourhoods agenda’. This more amorphous 
suite of policies includes those regarding neighbourhood management, community 
empowerment, and development of a more self-reliant third sector. For example, 
most recently, the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act (2007) 
devolved the power to create community governance structures to local authorities, 
harking back to previous attempts in cities in the 1970s and 1980s. This fulfils the 
‘double devolution’ agenda which sought some delegation of powers from central to 
local government, and then from local government to neighbourhoods (Smith et al., 
2007: 224). The Act’s introduction o f ‘community calls for action’, whereby 
councillors can involve overview and scrutiny committees in resolving constituents’ 
concerns, is an attempt to improve representative democracy. In terms of 
participative democracy, participatory budgeting and ‘community contracts’ have 
been piloted, whereby local councils, agencies and communities agree actions. This, 
along with other recent policy changes, demonstrates the increased emphasis in recent 
English policy on the need “to harness the knowledge and energy of local people” 
(Social Exclusion Unit, 2000: 7).
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This demonstrates that the policy agenda under New Labour since the late 1990s has 
increasingly drawn on the tradition of communitarianism, which is concerned with the 
revival of social structures to enable strong bonds to be forged between individuals 
and broader collectives (Imrie and Raco, 2003: 7). This reflects the self-help 
interpretation of the function of neighbourhood governance, further bome out by 
recent central government encouragement of community management and ownership 
of assets (investigated by the Quirk Review, 2007). This is reflective of US 
approaches. However, in this agenda, the ‘community’ is something to be defined 
and empowered in the pursuit of policy objectives (Imrie and Raco, 2003: 9). Such 
“responsibilisation” (Cochrane, 2007: 52) of communities is undertaken by central 
government as part of its attempt to realise its political imperatives.
4.2.2. Comparison of the US and England
In comparing the use of neighbourhood governance in the two countries, certain 
similarities can be expected given the history of (particularly US to England) policy 
transfer and their shared neo-liberal context, and certain differences can be expected 
given their different governmental systems.
This review of policy history highlights that policy relevant to neighbourhood 
governance in England has tended to follow trends from the US (Jones and Evans, 
2008: 167; Hambleton and Taylor, 1994) from the 1960s onwards. While the links 
between the two countries given the shared ethos of Reagan and Thatcher and the rise 
of neo-liberalism were particularly close in the 1980s, it is in the localist and privatist 
US that this ethos has been most fully realised. English central government has 
subsequently continued to both intervene directly and maintain policy emphasis on 
the neighbourhood level. However, more recently England appears to be mirroring 
the US given central government’s growing emphasis on community ‘self-help’.
Local action is emphasised in what can be seen as a neo-liberal discourse of self-help 
and community ownership. This highlights that similarities in neighbourhood­
relevant policy and practice do relate to policy transfer, but that this is encouraged by 
the two countries’ shared neo-liberal context, with the associated changing role of the 
state. This change in role is underpinned by the notion that the state “should exercise 
only limited powers of its own, steering and regulating rather than rowing and 
providing” (Rose, 2000: 323-24).
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Despite this, however, it is evident that in England central government policies of1 
relevance to the neighbourhood level are subject to almost constant change which in 
turn affects the forms of governance which arise at different spatial scales. Skelcher’s 
(2000) description of the “congested state” which arose in the late 1990s is 
appropriate. This term describes the “dense, multi-layered” nature of governance 
which has arisen from “a complex of networked relationships between public, private, 
voluntary and community actors” (Skelcher, 2000: 4). Even when government seeks 
to devolve powers it does so in a prescriptive manner, which is in significant contrast 
to the US.
As explored in terms of the forms of urban governance in chapter 2, the crucial 
difference which frames neighbourhood governance activity is that the US is a 
devolved and privatist governmental system, with limited government intervention in 
social and economic problems (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003: 370). England has a 
much stronger tradition of direct government intervention, exemplified by the post­
war welfare state, and while this has reduced with the rise of governance, government 
frames such arrangements. Therefore the English urban governance system is 
centralised. In both countries central/ federal government has devolved powers to 
lower levels, but the “downward shift of governing responsibility played out 
differently in the decentralised US state, [than in] the far more centralised authority of 
the UK” (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003: 387). In the English unitary system there is no 
intermediate, state, level of government, so local government is a “creature of central 
government” (Wolman and Goldsmith, 1990: 23) and can only do what has been 
specifically authorised by parliament. As explained previously, debates are ongoing 
about the real extent of devolution given the deep-seated tension between national 
prescription and local flexibility (Foley and Martin, 2000: 487). In the US federal 
system, local government is a creature of state government. But as many states grant 
their local governments varying degrees of general competencies through ‘home rule’ 
provisions (‘home rule’ being the principle or practice of self-government by 
localities), the locus of authority and responsibility for urban governance sits at the 
local level.
In both countries therefore, the extent of local government’s power is subject to 
limitations prescribed by state or central government. The degree of autonomy at the
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w * sub-local, neighbourhood, level is not only a function of the level of delegation of
powers from the local level, but the level of delegation to that level from higher levels 
such as the state or central government. Thus in both countries, the autonomy of 
neighbourhood-based entities is supervised and checked by government. This is 
described by Fung (2004) in the US as “accountable autonomy” (in the federal system 
this is to local government). In England it is described by Stoker (2004) as 
“constrained discretion”, whereby devolution occurs within the bounds set by central 
government’s policies and priorities.
It is therefore unsurprising given the federal versus centrist governmental systems that 
more commentary is required regarding English rather than US national government 
policies relevant to neighbourhoods, particularly when considering the period since 
the “de facto devolution” of “federal retrenchment” in the 1980s (DiGaetano and 
Strom, 2003: 369). The subsequent privatist urban regime-type arrangements which 
have been identified at the US city level indicate constraints on the ability of higher 
levels of government to set bounds on local arrangements in which lower levels of 
government are not the only actors. However, the potential for local autonomy varies 
not only relating to the limits imposed by higher levels of government but also to 
differences in local economic and social conditions and processes and local 
government institutional characteristics (Wolman and Goldsmith, 1990).
While national policies to an extent frame cities’ practices and experiences, and can 
particularly be expected to do so in the context of England’s centrist governmental 
system, the use of neighbourhood governance will also be affected by a city’s 
distinctive problems, local government institutional characteristics, civic society 
traditions, economic conditions, and histories. Such path dependence becomes 
apparent in the next section which sets out the policies and approaches relevant to 
neighbourhood governance in the two cities in which empirical research was 
conducted. This is particularly the case in Baltimore given the greater importance of 
city-level conditions in a federal governmental system.
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43  City of Baltimore
43.1. Population and Deprivation
The city’s population is 631,000 (US Census Bureau, 2006 estimate), a 30% decline 
since its peak in 1950. The city has a majority of African American residents at 64% 
of the total population (US Census, 2000), compared to 12.8% for the US as a whole 
(US Census Bureau, 2008 estimate).
In 1999, Baltimore’s median household income was $30,000 and 23% of its residents 
were below the (federal government-defined) poverty threshold (US Census Bureau). 
This compares to a national median household income of $51,000 and a 13% national 
rate of persons below the poverty threshold (US Census Bureau, 2007 estimate). 20% 
of the city’s 300,000 housing units are vacant (US Census Bureau American 
Community Survey, 2006).
43.2. History
Baltimore is a ‘city of neighbourhoods’, with a .strong neighbourhood awareness 
among residents that derives historically from geographic boundaries and ethnic 
identities. Before the second world war neighbourhoods had a degree of stability 
(Crenson, 1983). The post-war period saw sustained decline of the city as a port and 
an accelerating loss of manufacturing jobs. The city’s major businesses and 
government coalesced around the restructuring of the central business district, paying 
little attention to the effects on neighbourhoods. The combination of federally-funded 
expressway development and urban renewal, federally-guaranteed housing loans 
which enabled drastic suburbanisation, and in-migration of African Americans, led to 
widespread displacement and disruption and a concentration of deprivation. This left 
a legacy of distrust o f government actions among the city’s deprived population 
(Stoker et al., 2008).
With the rapid demographic change and racial succession of the post-war period the 
voluntary sector was eroded, and neighbourhoods had “left only a shell of civic life” 
(Stoker et al., 2009: 4). In the 1960s neighbourhood residents mobilised to resist the 
disruption of redevelopment, but with mixed success. Federal funding via the 
Community Action and Model Cities programmes did assist in the rise of advocacy
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fneighbourhood organisations. “UmbreHa organisations” were formed which brought 
neighbourhoods together for political purposes (Crenson, 1983: 138). These tended to 
have a board comprising neighbourhood and cross-sectoral institutional 
representatives, but did not include representatives from city government. However, 
neighbourhood disruption continued, with federal aid failing to match 
neighbourhoods’ escalating needs, and state and city funding providing no alternative 
support. A focus on redevelopment continued, such as that of the Inner Harbor, 
completed in 1980 (Stoker, 1987), which became an international model for physical 
regeneration (Raco, 2003: 243).
In the 1980s the policy agenda that gave priority to economic development with 
limited attention to increasingly distressed neighbourhood conditions was challenged 
locally. The business sector’s Greater Baltimore Committee repositioned itself as a 
regional organisation as the city’s corporate presence shrank, while its philanthropic 
sector began to play an expanded role in neighbourhood-based efforts. This coincided 
with the end of Mayor Schaefer’s 15-year tenure and the election of Mayor Schmoke 
(the city’s first elected black mayor), who had come into office on a platform of 
addressing the city’s long-neglected neighbourhoods, including an emphasis on 
community policing.
Baltimore was selected as a federal Empowerment Zone in 1994, which enabled 
provision of a variety of services to targeted neighbourhoods, including a focus on 
community capacity building. In the philanthropic sector, concerns about neglected 
urban neighbourhoods and persisting social problems gave rise to ‘community 
building’ efforts. The Sandtown-Winchester initiative was undertaken by a 
partnership between the Enterprise Foundation (founded by James Rouse, developer 
of the Inner Harbor), the city and the community. However, only marginal 
improvements were achieved and though the area was included in the Empowerment 
Zone, it did not achieve constructive and sustained community engagement. The 
initiative came to be regarded as a lesson in how intractable neighbourhood problems 
can be (Brown et al., 2001). At the same time, and reflecting national trends, CDCs 
emerged as more professional structures which combined property development and 
service provision with community outreach and participation to varying degrees. 
Stoker et al. (2009: 6) describe such bodies as “lack[ing] the indigenous volunteer
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character” of the earlier period, which in turn reflects the greater “role of government 
and other external actors in constituting the character of a neighbourhood’s civic life” 
(op cit).
While Baltimore continued to gain modest federal funds, for example Hope VI funds 
for public housing redevelopment, and also for community policing, it was not 
significant or sustained. No major new federal programmes have been instigated 
since the city’s ten-year Empowerment Zone designation, which expired in 2004. 
There has been a continuing decline in the city’s annual allocation of CDBG funds, 
which currently stands at $21 million. One project (explored below) is currently 
benefiting from significant federal and state government funding support via 
‘earmarks’ (ad hoc appropriations in federal and state budgets) and New Market Tax 
Credits, but this is a notable exception.
With the realisation that tackling deprived neighbourhoods needs a huge commitment 
of public funds, limited by the city’s shrinking tax base and reductions in federal aid, 
a shift occurred to a “greater realism” (Stoker et al., 2009: 10) which has framed the 
city’s current policy approaches.
4 3 3 . City Government Orientation to Neighbourhoods
Baltimore has a fifteen-member city council, fourteen members elected by district and 
a president separately elected city-wide. However, power is vested in the city’s 
mayor.
The city government has attempted to become more responsive to neighbourhood 
needs and priorities. With the rise of the neighbourhoods movement in the 1960s 
some city services were reorientated away from city council districts towards 
neighbourhoods. In 1970 the Department of Planning introduced district planners to 
work with neighbourhood groups, and Mayor’s Representatives theoretically enabled 
direct contact with the Mayor. More recently city functions have continued to 
restructure operations in ways that in theory enable better neighbourhood 
communication and service co-ordination. The city has designated 270 Neighborhood 
Statistical Areas (NSAs), for which the US Census Bureau prepares data. Planning 
now has nine community planning areas, which are coterminous with housing
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inspection boundaries and largely match police districts. The community planners act 
as the interface between neighbourhood groups, developers, elected officials and the 
city, but also attempt to play a proactive role in working with neighbourhood 
organisations to achieve common goals.
The Mayor’s Office of Neighborhoods was created in 2001. The original intent of the 
Mayor’s Transition Task Force that recommended the office’s formation was that it 
would co-ordinate action within neighbourhoods, not just in terms of city services, 
which has happened to some extent, but in terms of realisation of the neighbourhood 
action plans (explained below) which would have involved a much broader set of 
stakeholders, including the philanthropic and non-profit sectors. However, the office 
is a reactive rather than proactive structure which is geared to troubleshoot city 
services. Initiatives have followed the classic ‘crime and grime’ model of community 
clean ups and public safety initiatives, with community engagement in ‘walk­
throughs’ with agency representatives. City government’s emphasis on service 
responsiveness is also illustrated by the 311 phone number for residents’ issues, ‘one 
call to City Hall’. Call data are analysed as part of the CitiStat system, a management 
tool:
The following policies and approaches were identified and subject to documentary 
review in the course of the empirical research. These have been developed at both 
city and higher levels of government and governance and frame the city’s approaches 
to neighbourhoods.
43.4. Relevant Policies and Approaches 
Strategic Neighborhood Action Planning (SNAP)
In 2001 the Department of Planning undertook the SNAP initiative. This recognised 
the need for more localisation of planning but at a sufficient scale to provide a useful 
strategic product which would enable neighbourhood priorities to inform city agency 
resource allocation. Neighbourhoods which were able to form self-defined coalitions 
of a population range of 10,000 to 30,000 residents were offered technical assistance 
in preparing plans for their areas for approval by the Planning Commission. The 
process was well-received and the action plans prepared allocated responsibility for
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ti#r action not only to city agencies but to the coalitions themselves. However, the
process is generally regarded as being in abeyance, due largely to the lack of city 
agency commitment and ability to deliver, and lack of resource, which, despite the 
Department of Planning being responsible for the city’s capital budget, offers only 
“limited leverage” (Stoker and Stone, 2008: 5) given the city’s weak tax base.
City Master Plan
The first comprehensive master plan for the city since 1971 was adopted in 2006. The
plan is described as and takes the format of “a business plan for a world-class city”
(City of Baltimore, 2006), implying a strong neo-liberal orientation. The extent to
which the plan contains a neighbourhood policy is reflected in the following extract:
“As part o f  its larger, city-wide response to market forces, Baltimore will 
work with individual neighbourhoods to stabilize local real estate markets. This will 
focus City residents and services on retaining existing residents while attracting new 
residents. Tailoring City action to the particular needs o f each community will 
efficiently and effectively cut the constraints which can hinder neighbourhood 
stability, allowing more Baltimore neighbourhoods to compete with their suburban 
alternatives ” (City of Baltimore, 2006: 70).
The plan includes policies and approaches very relevant to neighbourhoods -  the 
housing typology and the city’s economic growth strategy.
Housing Typology
The market-driven ethos for public resource allocation identified above reflects the 
shift, in 2001, in the basis for city government resource allocation from being needs to 
asset-based. The housing typology (City of Baltimore, 2006: 220-24) provides the 
ostensible framework for this. The typology is a housing market classification 
scheme that uses housing market value at block level as a proxy for assets. The 
variables in the 2005 classification include the median value of home sales, along 
with the proportions of home ownership and public housing, vacancies and 
foreclosures.
The typology has five categories (op cit). “Distressed” areas are defined as such 
given the scale of disinvestment, population loss and abandonment, and the principal 
“housing market intervention” identified is demolition, ideally clustered to create 
potential for land assembly. However, recognition is given to the additional need for
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more holistic approaches including “social service interventions”. In what are 
commonly referred to as the ‘middle* categories, interventions identified include 
supporting homeownership in the “transitional” areas, marketing vacant homes in the 
“stable” areas, and providing additional incentives for development and investment in 
the “emerging” areas. The final category is “competitive” areas, regarded as not 
requiring direct market interventions (City of Baltimore, 2006: 220-24).
Economic Growth Strategy
Economic development policies since Mayor O’Malley’s tenure (1999-2007) have 
sought to exploit strategic assets in the city’s education and medical (‘ed and med’) 
institutions (in contrast to the earlier focus on the central business district). The 
economic growth strategy is included in the city master plan. This identifies 
“bioscience” as a “new industry that has demonstrated potential for growth” (City of 
Baltimore, 2006: 93) and is described as a “growth sector as a focus for targeted 
intervention” (op cit: 100). This targeted strategy is reflected in the current “mega- 
project” (Stoker and Stone, 2008: 17) underway in the city, the East Baltimore 
Development Initiative (EBDI), which is anchored by Johns Hopkins University, the 
largest private employer in the State of Maryland. ~The planning and execution of this 
project has “occupied a significant place in the macro-politics of the city” (Stoker et 
al., 2009: 11). It is receiving critical support from state and federal government, being 
slated to receive $42 million from the state government and $38 million from federal 
government via programmes and special ‘earmarks’. The project’s feasibility is also 
assisted through its allocation of $47 million in New Market Tax Credits (op cit).
Consolidated Plan
Baltimore Housing combines the city’s Housing Authority and its Department for 
Housing and Community Development. It is responsible for disbursing federal 
CDBG funds, as well as other housing entitlements, that the city receives as an 
‘entitlement community’. This is a core source of support for the city’s non-profit 
sector. CDBG allocation is essentially at the jurisdiction’s discretion within very 
broad guidelines that it should benefit ‘low and moderate income’ communities, 
which comprise the majority of the city.
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The housing typology is includecHn ^^Consolidated Plan” (Baltimore Housing, 
2005) required by the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development for 
CDBG ‘entitlement jurisdictions’. The intent is that entitlement jurisdictions 
consolidate their plans for CDBG funds with other strategic planning efforts. 
Baltimore Housing’s Plan sets out major redevelopment areas across the city for 
which it seeks to pump prime development, and a “community development” section 
that purports to guide smaller-scale developments and approaches across broader 
areas of the city (op cit).
Healthy Neighbourhoods Initiative
The city-based Goldseker Foundation sponsored a series of surveys in the late 1990s 
that suggested that neighbourhoods that are neither distressed nor privileged were 
being overlooked by policymakers and the philanthropic sector (Stoker et al., 2008). 
This led to development of a ‘market-orientated’ approach to neighbourhood 
revitalisation which culminated in the Healthy Neighborhoods initiative (launched in 
2001). This was subsequently branded as a mayoral initiative and is now an 
independent non-profit organisation which receives a modest amount of funding from 
city government. Its “limited revitalisation agenda” (Stoker et al., 2009: 19) targets 
neighbourhoods ‘in the middle’ which are regarded as at risk of disinvestment. It 
aims to stimulate real estate markets and enhance housing values though a 
combination of community development, marketing, housing subsidies, and physical 
improvements in the housing stock. It has targeted neighbourhoods which have the 
capacity to carry out the required community mobilisation and marketing functions. 
The approach’s ‘market orientation’ focused on property values, rather than ‘deficit 
orientation’, which would identify problems and seek support from government or the 
philanthropic community to redress these, can be seen as influencing the city’s 
adoption of the housing market typology in its master and consolidated plans.
Smart Growth
In line with ‘home rule’, the State of Maryland does not play a large role in 
neighbourhood approaches in Baltimore. Its CDBG allocation is significantly smaller 
than the city’s entitlement funds. However, the state’s smart growth policies (as 
contained in the State of Maryland’s Smart Growth Priority Funding Areas Act, 1997) 
frame efforts to both contain greenfield development and revitalise urban areas, with
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Baltimore City defme&as a “Smart Growth Area” (op cit). As a result, there is an 
Office of Neighborhood Reinvestment in the state’s Department of Housing and 
Community Development which administers a number of programmes which seek 
neighbourhood outcomes, a level of targeting atypical for state agencies. However, 
the state partners with the city to identify and deliver projects, and programmes 
require a local government resolution of support.
4.4 City of Bristol
4.4.1. Population and Deprivation
In 2007, Bristol’s population was 416,000 (Office of National Statistics Population 
Estimates Unit, 2007). Of this, 11.2% comprised black and minority ethnic residents 
(ONS Experimental Statistics, 2006), compared to 7.9% of the UK population (ONS, 
Census 2001). Median annual earnings are £22,900 compared to £20,000 for the UK 
(ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 2007).
Bristol has some of the most deprived areas in England (Bristol City Council, 2007). 
The city has 39 Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) in the most deprived 10% 
nationally (as measured by the Indices of Deprivation). Of these, 14 LSOAs are in 
the most deprived 3%, and four are in the most deprived 1% nationally. The number 
of people living in the most deprived 10% of LSOAs is about 65,000, or 16% of all 
Bristol residents.
Of those areas within the most deprived 10% nationally, Lawrence Hill ward (covered 
by the Community at Heart case study governance entity), Knowle West, Hartcliffe 
(covered by the Hartcliffe and Withywood Community Partnership, HWCP, case 
study entity) and Southmead experience more extreme levels of deprivation than the 
others. These others are Lockleaze, Lawrence Weston, Henbury and Withywood 
(which is also covered by the HWCP case study structure). These most deprived 
areas all comprise either peripheral social housing estates or inner city areas and have 
been identified as recipients of central government regeneration funding.
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4.4.2* History .v -h
In the post-war period Bristol’s economy was founded on its port functions and 
associated manufacturing industries. During the 1970s and 1980s the city lost almost 
half of its manufacturing jobs (Boddy et al., 2004: 53) but its economy proved 
resilient in the face of restructuring given the growth of service industries, particularly 
finance and business, and a growth in public sector employment (op cit). Overall, the 
city saw a reduction in jobs in the 1970s and in population in the 1970s and 1980s. In 
the 1980s private sector interests established the Bristol Initiative as “a local force for 
change” (Stewart, 2003: 77), and the Bristol Chamber of Commerce and Initiative 
(BCCI) developed a private sector view regarding how the city should develop.
However, from the mid-1990s there was growing resistance to further development to 
the north of the city adjacent to the M4 and M5 motorways (Boddy et al., 2004: 56). 
The resultant focus on development within the city led to a rapid expansion of new 
housing development and conversion of former commercial and industrial premises. 
While this was in line with the government’s vision of ‘urban renaissance’, much of 
this comprised high-cost development, and wider benefits in terms of the provision of 
low-cost housing were limited (op cit: 57). A series of prestigious publicly-subsidised 
developments also resulted in the city centre and the harbourside.
Despite its overall economic success, the city’s experiences emphasise that this does 
not counteract what are by national standards marked concentrations of deprivation 
(Boddy et al., 2004: 62). Given these, the city has been the recipient of a succession 
of central government neighbourhood-targeted initiatives which track national policy 
history. These start with the Urban Programme, continue through the physical 
regeneration-focused Urban Task Force and Urban Development Corporation 
approaches (introduced in the city’s harbourside in the 1980s), to the more holistic, 
community-centred programmes of the last fifteen years. However, attempts to gain 
programmatic regeneration funds from central government have had varied success. 
The unsuccessful City Challenge bids of the early 1990s were followed with greater 
success under later SRB funding rounds (with eight schemes in total), as well as the 
city gaining an NDC pathfinder. The ranking in the Indices of Deprivation was used 
as the basis to identify ten NRF areas in the city in 2001 and three Neighbourhood 
Management pilot areas in 2005. These areas have overlapped with previous SRB
and NDC designations. The city also benefited from EU URBAN and Objective 2 
programmes. All of these designations have now ended or are about to end. At the 
time of the research the effects of the ‘funding cliff precipitated by the end of the 
NRF in March 2008 were still reverberating in the city, which had received two years’ 
‘transition funding’ from central government.
In the mid-1990s the council formed the Bristol Regeneration Partnership (BRP), 
envisaged as a more independent and suitable body than the council to manage 
regeneration programmes, though the council remained as ‘accountable body’ to 
central government. The BRP was essentially a forerunner of the Bristol Partnership, 
which came into being to fulfil the requirement for a LSP for the local government 
area when the city gained access to NRF resource in 2001. In its early stages, the LSP 
struggled to establish the conditions under which the partnership could become 
effective and receive central government endorsement and what Stewart (2003: 86) 
calls the “politics of accreditation” began to dominate. There were concerns about the 
capacity of the LSP to undertake strategic decision-making, expedite action, the 
extent of community and voluntary sector engagement, and about the culture of 
partnership working. In 2002, these tensions were reflected in proposals for the 
LSP’s reformulation, put into practice with the creation of a smaller membership. 
However, at the time of the research in 2008 the LSP was in the process of being ‘re­
launched’ in its third iteration since its creation. This followed an independent peer 
review which found that it lacked a strategic role and had lost the engagement of 
statutory service providers (Warwick Business School et al., 2007).
Prevalent third (voluntary and community) sector support organisations, or ‘core 
infrastructure organisations’, in the city include specialised/ thematic organisations 
such as the Black Development Agency and the Care Forum, and Voscur (Voluntary 
Organisations Standing Conference on Urban Regeneration), which is the Council for 
Voluntary Service body in the city and the general umbrella organisation for the 
sector. Various government initiatives have fostered attempts at formal co-ordination 
amongst the city’s third sector, including the now defunct Community Empowerment 
Network (to ensure resident engagement in NRF efforts). The ChangeUp Consortium 
was established in 2004 (comprising five of the city’s third sector support 
organisations) as a result of a Home Office initiative to improve the support available
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to third sector organisations. As required by central government, a ‘compact’ is also 
in place between the city’s public agencies and the third sector. This “defines and 
strengthens positive working relationships... particularly within the Bristol 
Partnership and in the delivery of the Local Area Agreement” (The Bristol 
Partnership, 2008a). The council has an associated third sector commissioning 
agenda.
Bristol’s history of governance forms and neighbourhood-based initiatives mirrors 
changes in central government urban policies. The city has experienced a succession 
of policy instruments, a fragmentation of institutions as the traditional responsibilities 
and powers of the local authority have been dispersed, and a proliferation of 
initiatives. Stewart (2003: 76) identifies the emergence of “new urban governance” in 
Bristol as a culmination of “the fragmentation and initiative proliferation of the past 
50 years”. He characterises the city as one with “a long history both of complacency 
and conflict as well as a more recent history of positive partnership working” 
(Stewart, 2003: 86).
4.43. Local Government Orientation to Neighbourhoods
In 1974 the local authority’s loss to the new County of Avon of strategic planning and 
key service powers resulted in 20 years of “civic sulking” (Stewart, 2003: 77). With 
the national policy shift to public-private partnership in the 1980s, the council 
engaged with the private sector. However, some ambivalence to the partnership 
approach given perceptions of its imposition by central government remained. This 
was reflected in the bitterness of two rejected bids for City Challenge initiatives in 
1991 and 1992 (Malpass, 1994). The period 1992-96 was one of “gradual movement 
into joint working” (Stewart, 2003: 78). Traditionally highly departmentalised, the 
council began to develop a more corporate structure and sought unitary status, which 
it gained in 1996. Gradually “a grudging city council” realised the necessity of 
competing against other localities for central government and European resources 
(Stewart, 2003: 85) as well as Lottery Funds which could be targeted at its deprived 
neighbourhoods.
An increasing neighbourhood sensitivity is illustrated by the council asking the BRP 
to convene a community conference in 1998 to identify the area to be put forward to
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central government for NDC designation. The genesis of both case study structures as 
formal initiative governance bodies lay in this event. Barton Hill was selected, and 
the ‘consolation prize’ for the area that came second in the vote, Hartcliffe, was 
development of a bid to round five of the SRB regime.
Following New Labour’s local government modernisation, the council adopted the 
executive scrutiny model with a cabinet. The city is divided into 35 wards and has 70 
councillors. In 2008, the council gained a new chief executive and at the time of 
research was undergoing an extensive restructure with an emphasis on an orientation 
to neighbourhoods. This reflects an attempt to change its ‘silo’ mode of working to 
enable better ‘bending’ of mainstream spending. A set of strategic directors had been 
identified against functions rather than departments, including the post of Strategic 
Director of Neighbourhoods (yet to be filled during the research period). Cabinet 
posts reflect this shift, including a new post of Executive Member for 
Neighbourhoods and Involvement.
The following policies and approaches were identified and subject to documentary 
review in the course of the empirical research. These have been developed at both 
city and higher levels of government and governance and frame the city’s approaches 
to neighbourhoods.
4.4.4. Relevant Policies and Approaches 
Corporate Plan
The council’s new Corporate Plan (Bristol City Council, 2008a) contains a 
commitment to tackle deprivation, “by unlocking the potential of areas of deprivation, 
the whole city will benefit. We are committed to transformational change” (op cit: 4) 
but this lacks policy detail. More emphasis is placed on neighbourhoods in general, 
with one of the plan’s four priorities being to “ensure that Bristol residents experience 
significant change in the physical quality of their neighbourhoods and have 
opportunities to shape improvements at this level” (op cit: 21-22).
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INeighbourhood*ParUterships
To this end, the council is in the process of establishing a city-wide set of 
neighbourhood partnerships (fourteen in total), each covering two to three wards:
“All communities must be empowered to influence their neighbourhoods and 
how services are delivered. We are committed to listening and responding to 
residents, through the development o f Neighbourhood Partnerships across the city, 
creating a real opportunity to improve the quality o f  life in all neighbourhoods ” 
(Bristol City Council, 2008a: 4).
The partnerships are envisaged by the council as an equitable mechanism which re­
engages councillors with their areas, along with the representation of statutory 
agencies, local third sector groups and residents (Voscur, 2008). The approach has an 
ethos of building on what is already there in neighbourhoods, referring to the 
structures already present in deprived areas which have been consolidated and 
formalised due to programmatic government funding under NDC, SRB and the NRF 
regimes. Areas less deprived, and therefore not the target of initiatives, tend not to 
have such formalised structures in place. The partnerships are expected to develop a 
list of local priorities and develop a local action plan to “make the connections 
between neighbourhood and city-wide priorities” by enabling the partnerships to 
inform service delivery and financial allocation (op cit). The partnerships will not 
have control over devolved budgets, though they will have a small budget (of £10,000 
per ward) for their own allocation (op cit).
Sustainable Community Strategy
At the time of the research, an ‘interim’ SCS was in place, given the need for it to 
accompany the ‘refreshed’ LAA which central government required to be agreed by 
June 2008. While attributed to the Bristol Partnership, the statement had been 
prepared by council officers as the partnership was in the process of being 
reformulated. While the SCS is envisaged as setting out the strategic priorities for the 
city, the interim statement was only one page in length. The framing statement of the 
interim SCS is:
“In the next twenty years, we want to ensure that the city’s prosperity 
strengthens and grows. As an essential part o f achieving this, we will unlock the 
potential o f our disadvantaged communities to contribute to long term sustainable 
economic growth and shared prosperity ” (The Bristol Partnership, 2008b).
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Local Area Agreement
The LAA is regarded as the delivery plan for the SCS. The current LAA covers the 
period 2008 to 2011. In addition to targets from the pre-existing LAA (agreed in 
2007), and statutory education indicators, it contains indicators agreed between 
GOSW and the council and its partners (though this was hampered given that the 
Bristol Partnership was in abeyance). These ‘local’ indicators are based on the 
priorities set out in the interim SCS. One indicator, ‘the percentage of people who 
feel they can influence decisions in their locality’, relates to the creation of 
neighbourhood partnerships.
Local Development Framework
The LDF core strategy is the “spatial expression of the SCS” (Bristol City Council, 
2008b: 8), guiding physical growth and change in the city until 2026. In January 
2008 a ‘preferred options’ paper for the LDF core strategy proposed a “spatial 
vision”:
“For our city to be a prosperous, cohesive and sustainable city... The aims 
are to prioritise better outcomes for children, younger and older people, sharing 
prosperity, growth and regeneration, and to create a safe and healthy city made np-af 
thriving neighbourhoods with a high quality o f life ” (Bristol City Council, 2008b: 8).
The key strategic objectives in the core strategy are to achieve “mixed, balanced and 
sustainable communities” (op cit: 10) and “ambitious and sustainable economic 
growth... ensuring continued competitiveness” (op cit: 11). In line with the RSS 
(below) the strategy emphasises the “economic, social and physical regeneration of 
South Bristol” (op cit: 15), delivered via “an increase in the number of new homes 
and jobs” (op cit: 19). The strategy also emphasises the “continued growth of the city 
centre” (op cit: 15) which is seen as entailing “ensuring that those in the 
disadvantaged communities close to the city centre can contribute to and benefit from 
city centre growth” (op cit: 21).
Regional Spatial Strategy
The draft RSS (South West Regional Assembly, 2006) identifies Bristol, the largest 
urban area in the region, as a ‘strategically significant city’, which accordingly will 
accommodate “an increased proportion of new development, particularly housing”
(op cit: 34). It also establishes a “spatial prioritisation for economic activity” (op cit:
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‘ww- 192) and recognises the “challenge to ensure that growth strategies for these places 
achieve wider benefits, including linking successful areas with less successful ones” 
(op cit).
The RSS frames the West of England Spatial Strategy, which covers the four unitary 
authorities which used to constitute the County of Avon. Combined, these are 
regarded as the Bristol city-region and the “economic hub” of the south west (op cit: 
55). The RSS states that for these authorities, “realising their economic potential... is 
not only critical to their future success, but also to the success of the regional/ national 
economy” (op cit). The strategy requires that these authorities work together. To this 
end, in 2006 the authorities were successful in their combined bid to central 
government for designation as a ‘growth point’. The growth strategy proposed, in 
line with the RSS, involves the envisaged creation of 100,000 new jobs and 92,500 
new homes by 2026, with major development concentrated in Bristol city centre and 
South Bristol.
4.5 Conclusiona*   . -
■x
Policy transfer is evident, especially from the US to England, but overall, more recent 
policy changes in both countries are framed by the rise of neo-liberalism with an 
associated “responsibilisation” (Cochrane, 2007: 52) of communities.
Both cities have experienced the significant loss of manufacturing jobs and the 
decline of their port functions heralding a shift to a post-industrial economy with the 
restructuring of the global economy. This has affected their policy legacy, which has 
included attempts to tackle neighbourhood deprivation, though this is much more 
severe in Baltimore. Indeed, while Bristol is described as “affluent with pockets of 
deprivation” (Purdue et al., 2004: 278), Baltimore is ‘deprived with pockets of 
affluence’.
Similarities are evident between both cities, such as their pursuance of neo-liberal 
strategies exemplified by their respective ‘flagship developments’ (such as 
Baltimore’s influential Inner Harbor redevelopment, and Bristol’s harbourside 
redevelopment). Differences are also clear. These can be related both to the two
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countries’ different governmental systems but also to the-path dependence of city- 
level governance systems and policy responses. These issues are explored in the 
analysis of the empirical work in the next two chapters.
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Gtrcipter 5
BALTIMORE FINDINGS and ANALYSIS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out the findings and analysis of the empirical work in Baltimore, 
Maryland, applying the theoretical framework set out in chapter 2 and using the 
methodological approach set out in chapter 3. Chapter 4 sets the scene for this 
chapter by detailing the relevant national, state and local policies and approaches.
The chapter first presents application of the ‘ideal-type’ characteristics framework to 
two neighbourhood governance entities. While the principal interpretation of the 
entities’ roles revealed in light of the analysis are steering for one body and self-help 
for the other, overall self-help is predominant and relates to how the entities are 
anchored within their neighbourhoods. Competence is also particularly emphasised in 
terms of both entities’ emphasis on community input into their operations. Concerns 
about democracy are subservient to this account. Steering is clear given the 
relationship of one of the bodies to its sponsor, and given government involvement in 
the establishment of the other. Given that the bodies do not comprise a focus for the 
broader urban governance network, tokenism is also implicit to the predominant 
account of self-help. The bodies’ most important relationships are their horizontal 
links to their anchors/ sponsors. Given their lack of ‘market-levering’ assets which 
are sought by the network, the bodies are not vertically linked to it. Both are open- 
ended, ongoing endeavours, but this relates to their anchoring in their local areas, due 
to an anchor institution and a surtax mechanism respectively. The bodies are 
operating in spite of, rather than because of, the city-level network context.
The chapter then considers Baltimore’s urban governance system and applies the 
framework of expected characteristics for the US to the city. Analysis reveals that 
Baltimore does fulfil many of the attributes which can be expected in this localist and 
privatist governmental system. The relatively simple structure of the governance 
network is focused at city-level despite some funding flows from higher levels. Its 
operations are determined at city-level by the city government and private interests.
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The network prioritises neo-liberal strategies*^ growth. But there is also some 
divergence from the model, particularly as a governance network rather than urban 
regime is in operation, in which private interests actually comprise private 
philanthropies, who have a significant role as ‘policy-setters’ in the city, and the city’s 
major anchor institution. The network has been stable since the key shift in 2001 to a 
shared ‘logic’ of asset-based resource allocation. Neighbourhoods with sufficient 
(generally housing) assets may gain network resource. In these cases, the self-help 
account is clear given the emphasis on homeowners increasing the value of their 
homes.
Finally the implications of the urban governance network’s strategies and actions are 
considered. This focuses on the relative power of the neighbourhood level within its 
governance context The city’s lack of resource and huge need have dictated a 
pragmatic, market-driven and opportunistic ethos influenced by its neo-liberal context 
in which neighbourhood approaches are subservient to the economic imperative. The 
network focuses its attention on neighbourhoods which have the assets it prioritises 
which are regarded as having the ability tojever market forces. The relative power of 
the neighbourhood level is determined by die presence of these assets. Any ‘power’ 
gained at the neighbourhood level is enabled by the network in the pursuit of its 
imperatives. In this localist and privatist governance system, neighbourhoods that 
have the capacity for self-help are more likely to do so.
5.2 Neighbourhood-based Initiative Governance Entities
To assess the extent to which each of the five functions identified for neighbourhood- 
based initiative governance entities is evident in reality, the structures and operations 
of the two case study entities are assessed against the attributes as set out in the 
heuristic framework of ‘ideal-type’ entities by function (as set out in Table 2.1). A 
sample entity-level interview guide is appended (at Appendix 2).
For each case study below, a brief history of the entity precedes assessment against 
the framework of characteristics of ‘ideal-type’ entities according to function. This, 
set out in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, includes only those typology characteristics which are 
evidenced by the entity. Detailed consideration of each entity’s structure and
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operations by function, including representative quotes from respondents, is then 
presented. Figure 1 shows the location of the two case study entities within the city.
Figure 1: Location of Baltimore Case Study Entities
City o f  Baltimore
C n m b y W A - J B .3 0 0 1
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5.2.1; Operation Reach Out South West (OROSW)
OROSW is the neighbourhood-based governance entity for a coalition of eight 
neighbourhoods located in south west Baltimore, with a combined population of 
21,000. The area is extremely deprived8 and is classified as ‘distressed’ in the city’s 
housing typology. The entity originated in 1997 from the community planning efforts 
of Bon Secours Hospital, the anchor institution which the eight neighbourhoods 
surround. In 2002 OROSW became a formal non-profit entity and a board was 
appointed comprising community representatives and partners, including its main 
sponsor, the Bon Secours of Maryland Foundation. In 2002 its area became the pilot 
for the city’s Strategic Neighborhood Action Plan (SNAP) programme (explained in 
chapter 4). OROSW’s goal is “to make south west Baltimore a desirable place to live, 
work, and play” (OROSW SNAP, 2002: 3). The SNAP programme is now generally 
regarded as being in abeyance in city government, but the OROSW SNAP plan 
continues to guide the entity’s activities. The entity survives due to its sponsor’s 
ongoing support. It has reached a plateau, reflected in respondents citing of the need 
for a new community planning process and a reinvigoration of the entity and resident 
engagement within it.
OROSW predominantly reflects the steering interpretation of neighbourhood-based 
initiative governance, which is presented first in Table 5.1 below. OROSW’s role is 
to ensure that its sponsoring foundation remains connected to the community, and it 
thus acts as the foundation’s community outreach arm, while the foundation runs the 
programmes that are implemented within OROSW’s constituent neighbourhoods.
The entity’s structure and operations also allude to the democracy and competence 
functions, particularly due to the entity’s community planning processes. Self-help is 
evident in the emphasis on voluntary activities and capacity building, though the 
difficulties of realising this are clear. Tokenism is evident given the area’s 
‘distressed’ designation and its reliance on its local anchor institution.
8 The extent o f  deprivation in the OROSW area is well-documented. The area contains ‘The Comer’, 
the intersection o f Fayette and Monroe Streets, the focus of the 1997 book by David Simon and 
Edward Bums, which gave an account o f  a year in a drug market neighbourhood. The authors 
subsequently made the area the focus o f series one o f ‘The W ire’, the HBO series which uses 
Baltimore to present the problems o f urban America.
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Table 5.1: OROSW: ‘Ideal-Type* Entity Characteristics Evident
Structure Operations
•  Instigated by initiative sponsor •  Sponsor determ ines entity operations
•  Sponsor specifies structure (including •  Entity heavily reliant on sponsor funding
board m em bership and geographic •  Sponsor leads on im plem entation o f  projects (Foundation’s
61c area covered) 30 s ta ff m anage projects & co-ordinate programmes)
•  Sponsor represented on board - •  Sponsor leads board deliberations (staff responsible for
V-w Foundation executive director a  voting servicing board and sub-com m ittee meetings)
m em ber and secretary •  Em phasis on consensus in board deliberations
•  Sponsor em ploys the entity’s 2 s ta ff -
Executive D irector & Leadership Co­
ordinator
•  M ajority resident representation on •  Initiated following resident consultation by anchor
board  (in term s o f  voting m em bers) institution, Bon Secours Hospital
>»v •  6 resident representative-led board •  Broad (300 residents) engagem ent in identifying needs andcsu sub-com m ittees priorities (via an 18-month com m unity planning process,uor- subsequently SNAP pilot)
C
<U •  Some capacity building o f  residents, with a newO ‘Leadership C o-ordinator’ s taff member, but availability o f
capacity building resource from  city-wide intermediaries
has declined
•  Resident board representation (voting) •  Broad resident engagem ent in identifying needs and
u
e •  N on-profit service provider board priorities (comm unity planning process)
V
'v
a .
Eo
U
representation (non-voting)
•  O pen-ended tim efram e •  Extensive resident volunteer engagem ent in delivering
Wa
"3 •  Sponsor em phasis on capacity projects -  but has waned
building o f  entity and residents •  Some resource for capacity building activities as reflected
Cf l •  Expectation o f  residents ‘doing their in ‘Leadership C o-ordinator’ s ta ff m em ber
share’
E N ot applicable •  Lack o f  engagem ent from statutory service providers/
.2 government
c •  Not a priority for urban governance netw ork given
wKoH ‘distressed’ neighbourhood designation, lack o f  ‘assets’
Steering
The steering interpretation is uppermost with regard to OROSW. The body would not 
exist in the absence of the Foundation. The Foundation funds the entity, its staff 
manage the programmes which the entity oversees and service the entity’s 
committees, and all programme resources are managed by the Foundation, and 
provided or raised by it. The entity is the community outreach arm of the anchor 
institution and the entity’s processes are controlled by the anchor’s Foundation.
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That the entity predominantly fulfils the steering account is evidenced in Foundation 
respondents’ recognition of the “capacity imbalance” between the Foundation (with 
thirty staff) and OROSW (two staff):
“One o f  the unintended consequences... is a real kind o f capacity imbalance 
between the Foundation and neighbourhood residents... it ends up that we are in fact 
controlling the process... " [Anchor Foundation].
Foundation staff also recognise that the Foundation’s relative strength in both 
implementation of programmes and the operation of the entity is likely to sway 
community input:
“We have a lot o f  the staff here, we have the expertise and background... to 
implement stuff. Which aren't necessarily skills that would be in the community, I  
mean there has to be some staffed organisation that propels the priorities o f the 
community " [Anchor Foundation].
OROSW is now generally perceived as ‘ticking over’. It continues given the ongoing 
support it receives from its anchor. That the entity has reached a plateau was 
recognised by Foundation and entity-level respondents, who cited the need for a new 
planning process and a reinvigoration of the entity and resident engagement with it:
“7 think it's time for another OROSW planning process, to say it's 10 years 
later, what do we need to look like now? How do we need to behave? What should be 
our purpose? Let's tighten up the relationship and make it more explicit and clear 
between OROSW and Bon Secours ” [Anchor Foundation].
Democracy
This function is to an extent evident in the way OROSW is structured, but the 
professionalised nature of its operations and the role of the Foundation confirm the 
predominance of the steering account for this neighbourhood governance body.
Residents comprise a majority of voting members of the board, but resident 
representatives are not elected, and resident members do not represent each of the 
area’s constituent neighbourhoods. Residents can ask to be considered or invited to 
be board members. This reflects a model often followed by non-profit intermediaries, 
where board selection can be based on the perceived commitment, skills or indeed the 
‘fit’ of potential members with other board members, but it does lead to questions 
about the accountability of the board to the area’s residents. The other voting member 
of the board is the Foundation’s executive director, who also has the role of secretary.
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Respondents consistently stress ^ the democracy function and cited broader recognition 
among elites of the Foundation and entity’s relationship and their positive reputation 
for resident involvement, expressed in its selection as the SNAP pilot area:
“When we first started people just thought, oh, that depressed neighbourhood, 
things will never change, but for me OROSW proved that people who lived in 
depressed neighbourhoods do want change” [Entity staff].
The Foundation’s commitment to being community-sanctioned and also community- 
led to some degree is evidenced by the entity’s six sub-committees, which are led by 
resident representatives. These constituent committees each oversee one of the SNAP 
plan’s priority areas and the associated programmes which are run by Foundation 
staff, though budgets are not devolved to the entity. However, it is evident that the 
Foundation, albeit unintentionally, is steering the programmes and the entity sub­
committees that oversee these:
“After you develop a plan or whatever you develop a staffed organisation to 
implement it. There is a dynamic that happens where it ends up being staff-driven, 
one way or another” [Anchor Foundation].
Respondents also explain the difficulties of retaining and extending resident 
engagement now that the plan and its associated programmes are regarded as routine. 
This is compounded by an expectation that the Foundation or OROSW staff are 
responsible for delivery of these. OROSW staff are focused on increasing community 
participation in the coalition, particularly from younger people given the 
concentration of older leadership in the entity and the neighbourhood associations. 
This is regarded as a priority for secession and innovation. The staff were also 
concerned about a decline in capacity building resource available in the city:
“We don't have any resources for first time leaders in this city anymore... I  
know how I was... I  went to a neighbourhood meeting... there's some old broads 
running their mouths. Now, I'm the old broad that's running my mouth, trying to get 
young people involved” [Entity staff].
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Com petences
The competence function is clear in OROSW’s operations, particularly with regard to 
the implementation of Foundation programmes, much less so in relation to city 
service provision. It is not evident in its structuring. This also confirms the 
predominance of the steering account.
OROSW is regarded as instrumental in bringing the various neighbourhoods around 
the hospital together, despite racial divisions, and identifying shared concerns:
“With Reach Out, it brought the white population that was separate, the same 
negative indicators as the black community, together to see that the concerns they 
have, we have. It was a shared concern. So we got to work together, and started 
talking together " [Entity staff].
“[The entity’s] role is...setting standards o f  quality and expectation for 
residents ” [Anchor Foundation].
This ability to prioritise across differing constituent neighbourhoods and their varying 
needs was recognised in the area’s selection as the SNAP pilot as it enabled, in 
theoiy, effective joint working with city agencies by identifying priorities to inform 
city agency resource allocation:
“From the city's perspective, it's always best to work with coalitions in 
broader networks just because when you're trying to deal with all o f the issues that a 
particular neighbourhood or area has, it's... I f  you've got a coalition they pretty much 
prioritise what it is that's important to them ” [Baltimore Housing Office o f  
Development].
The SNAP process was the pinnacle of OROSW’s relations with the city, when the 
Foundation and OROSW received most recognition for the credibility of their 
community planning efforts. It is generally recognised that the city lacks clear 
mechanisms for the implementation of SNAP plans and that the programme is now in 
abeyance. This, combined with the seemingly ad hoc nature of current relations with 
city agencies, which are not represented on the entity’s board, does not imply that 
residents’ input into city service delivery is of high priority. The entity relies on and 
assists constituent neighbourhood associations in demanding improved service 
provision, but with limited success:
“I have begged them to please brighten the lights... I  was told, they're on 
wrong, they need washing or something. So I  mean, i f  they had people to come 
around to do that, maybe things would brighten up, but it's, to me, i t ’s the city, i t ’s 
holding up ” [Entity Neighbourhood Association Board Member].
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The sponsor sees OROSW’s role as ensuring that the Foundation remains connected 
to the community. This to an extent recognises residents’ competence in identifying 
their needs and priorities. The initial plan’s focus was broadened from housing to a 
more holistic revitalisation approach following community consultation. This 
recognition is also clear given the Foundation’s efforts to seek resident input into 
programme development via the entity’s committees:
“I went in with a very middle-class bias about cheque-cashers, me as the staff 
person... And it was through the work o f the community [that project design was 
changed], where people said actually, we like our cheque-casher better than our 
bank... they meet our needs ” [Anchor Foundation].
The planning process’s identification of shared priorities does not mean that each 
constituent OROSW neighbourhood is witnessing the same levels of programme 
implementation, despite their own perceived needs. This has led to some resentment 
on the part of the entity’s constituent neighbourhood associations, particularly those 
further away from the Foundation’s efforts to develop affordable housing near the 
hospital, who feel that their particular priorities are not being addressed:
“We're grateful for what Bon Secours started, but every community that is 
involved in OROSW wants to see things happening in their communities, not just up 
there near Bon Secours ” [Entity Neighbourhood Association Board Member].
Self-help
The self-help function is evident, particularly given the emphasis on resident capacity 
building. But the role of the Foundation in both establishing and continuing the 
entity’s operations, and indeed potentially in displacing voluntary efforts, again 
asserts the predominance of the steering account of its role.
The self-help function is not evidenced by the entity’s origins, as it was established by 
the local anchor institution, in part given its pastoral mission and in part because the 
hospital realised that if it was to stay in the area, it had to address the area’s problems. 
Amongst Baltimore elites there is general agreement that in the absence of Bon 
Secours, a neighbourhood body would not exist in the area:
“Bon Secours, when they first stepped out o f their front door, they had to do 
what they did to survive as an institution because the neighbourhood was crumbling 
around them. And because o f  their interest and commitment there... they have been 
an amazing force for renewal. Without them, there would be none, I  believe ’’ [City 
Counci lperson].
I l l
This function is evident in the way that the entity2sstafF~encourage and attempt to
build the capacity of constituent neighbourhood associations to undertake their own
activities rather than rely on the entity to undertake initiatives:
“When people call me and say this is what my problem is... Isay, we’re going 
to work on this together... my role... is to find out where the resources are, and 
develop a way or create a mechanism to get those responsible, or get those 
resources... but it's also your role not to drop it on me. Your role is to follow it 
through, because I  have other residents, and I can't take care o f every resident’s 
needs ” [Entity staff].
This chimes with the SNAP programme, the action plan for which tasked not only 
city agencies but communities themselves to contribute to the plan’s realisation. 
Indeed, unlike some of the subsequent areas which participated in the SNAP 
programme, the OROSW area is extremely deprived. The fact that the OROSW area 
was selected as the pilot for the programme is testament to the entity’s ability to build 
neighbourhood capacity sufficiently to engage, unlike other significantly deprived 
areas within the city.
However, realisation of this self-help ethos has been hampered, given the loss of
impetus now the plan is ten years’ old and programmes are not being designed, but
routinely implemented. This is expressed in the increasing difficulty of gaining
resident engagement as volunteers, for example in maintaining vacant lots, also partly
felt to reflect the expectation that this task will be performed by programme staff:
"Now we Ve got to pick up trash and mow grass, and how interesting is that? 
You know, I'd love to come to the table and say make my neighbourhood beautiful, but 
am I  going to... get behind a lawnmower to keep it that way? ” [Anchor Foundation].
Tokenism
The tokenism account is very evident when OROSW is located in its broader city 
context as it does not receive the attentions of the urban governance network or of city 
service providers. This further asserts the predominance of the steering interpretation 
of its role.
The entity is hampered by the scale of the area’s problems and its lack of links with 
the ‘asset-based’ approach which guides city government and the broader urban 
governance network’s resource allocation decisions. The activities and resource
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commitments of the urban governance network indicate that its attention is focused
elsewhere, on areas which are more asset-rich:
“They'll choose projects based on politics. And then you've got smaller 
neighbourhoods like some o f those I  represent where you've got to fight so hard to get 
our share ” [City Councilperson].
That the area is not a priority is also indicated by it not qualifying for a range of 
designations, including the federal Empowerment Zone (in operation 1994 to 2004), 
and the Healthy Neighborhoods Initiative. This is because the area is designated as 
‘distressed’ (rather than being ‘in the middle’) in the housing typology.
Despite efforts in the SNAP plan to frame the area’s case in line with the ‘asset-
based’ ethos, detailing “assets” such as its location and the hospital (OROSW SNAP,
2002: 4-5), the area has a needs rather than asset-based claim. It is classified as
‘distressed’ in the housing market typology, and is not connected to key development
areas such as the waterfront/ Central Business District or to thriving neighbourhoods.
OROSW’s anchor, Bon Secours Hospital, is the area’s most significant asset, which is
crucial to its instigation and ongoing operation:
“Baltimore funders are so cliqueish, that right now, until we get enough 
underneath our belts, then we going to have to rely on the strength o f Bon Secours, 
you know, o f our partner” [Entity staff].
However, the hospital has a local role, rather than the international role played by 
other of the city’s anchor institutions, particularly Johns Hopkins. Attention (as 
expressed in the city’s CDBG allocation, and major foundation support from the 
Annie E. Casey Foundation) is focused on initiatives such as the Johns Hopkins- 
anchored East Baltimore Development Initiative. Indeed, Stoker et al. (2009: 18) 
describe OROSW as running the risk of becoming a “forgotten child”.
5.2.2. Charles Village Community Benefits District (CVCBD)
The District is a public sector neighbourhood-based governance entity. It covers an 
area of four neighbourhoods to the north of Baltimore’s Central Business District, 
with a population of 14,000. Its existence stems from community calls for district 
designation by state and city government following a local murder in 1992. This was 
unsuccessful given concerns that the area proposed was relatively wealthy. Following 
another murder, a further application for a larger area including more deprived
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neighbourhoods'was successful. The legislation also enabled a broader set of 
neighbourhood revitalisation purposes for the entity. The entity and its associated 
Management Authority were established in 1994 following a referendum of the area’s 
residential and commercial property owners. The legislation allows a surcharge tax 
(‘surtax’) to be levied on residential and business properties in the District to fund its 
operations. The city government votes on whether to renew the relevant ordinance 
every four years.
The entity’s “mission statement” is “to provide Charles Village with sanitation and 
safety services, while empowering the community and educating residents on ways to 
keep the neighbourhoods safe and clean” (CVCBD Management Authority Mission 
Statement, no date). While the District’s core remit is thus to provide supplemental 
safety and sanitation services, the board did gradually broaden its focus, as enabled by 
the legislation, to include neighbourhood revitalisation efforts (such as addressing 
blighted properties). Since 2005, this perceived ‘mission creep’ resulted in agreement 
that the District would refocus back to its core mission of ‘crime and grime’. 
However,. there is general understanding that the size of the area to be served and its 
weak resource base challenge the District’s capacity to deliver its core mission. The 
District is an ongoing endeavour as its anchoring by legislation ensures an income 
stream from its taxation mechanism. Continued renewal of the District’s ordinance 
by the city council, most recently in 2006, indicates that the entity will continue to 
operate. However, the District is contentious and has been subject to several 
unsuccessful law suits brought by a ‘detractor’ group.
The District is distinctive due to its public entity status. Given the source of its 
income stream, the entity’s ‘sponsors’ are the residential and commercial property 
owners within the District. The city and state governments constitute the entity’s 
‘enablers’ rather than ‘sponsors’ given the legislation required to enable levying of the 
‘surtax’.
The District predominantly fulfils the self-help account given its emphasis on the area 
funding and managing its own response to its problems by supplementing service 
provision and encouraging voluntary efforts. This function is addressed first in Table 
5.2 below. The competence and democracy accounts are evident given attempts to
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structure the entity to enable community engagement. Steering by state and city 
government of the entity’s structure and remit at its outset is also clear, which has had 
significant effects upon the entity’s subsequent operations. Some tokenism is also 
evident given that the body is not subject to the attentions of the broader urban 
governance network.
Table 5.2: CVCBD: ‘Ideal-Type’ Entity Characteristics Evident
Structure Operations
Se
lf-
he
ln
•  Instigated by residents
• Majority resident representation on board
• Self-generated funding stream (the ‘surtax’)
•  Open-ended timeframe (though subject to city 
council ratification every 4 years)
• Expectation of residents ‘doing their share’
•  Devolved budgets
• Entity able to alter its operations (within 
bounds set by enabling legislation, which 
allows for broader neighbourhood 
revitalisation efforts in addition to the ‘crime 
and grime’ core mission)
•  Majority resident representation on board • Initiated following referendum
£J • Elected resident board representation by sub-area •  Resident representatives’ voice heard on
53S- (‘quad’) board
© • Resident quorum for decision-making
c •  5 resident representative-led board sub-committees
O • Board-determined funding allocation over devolved
budgets
o « Resident board representation • Monitoring and review of servicess<L> • Council member representation (and a representative-w0>©.
B©
U
of the Mayor)
s Not applicable •  Not a priority/ not linked to urbanG governance network/ plans -  given self-
C0> sustaining income stream and refocus to
oH
core mission
• ‘Sponsor’ (actually ‘enabler’ given need for state •  ‘Sponsors’ (meaning board representatives
and city govt legislation) specifies structure (eg of surtax payers) determine entity operations
c board membership, geographic area covered) (but within bounds set by enabling
© legislation)
V I • Entity heavily reliant on sponsor funding
(the ‘surtax’)
Self-help
The self-help function is uppermost with regard to CVCBD. It is strongly discernible 
in the entity’s origins. But the disjuncture between the intent to self-help and the 
body’s ability to realise this is clear.
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Rather than seek to improve city services, the emphasis in creating the District was on 
the area funding and managing its own response to its problems, albeit as a 
supplement. The District can be viewed, ironically as it is a public entity, as a 
privatist response to the inability of city government to deliver the services which 
residents expected:
“So community engagement... that's what got us started...in terms o f there 
were people that were just appalled at just, you know, the provision o f city services 
and particularly I  guess around safety when there was a murder ” [Resident Board 
Member, also community activist involved in lobbying for the District’s creation].
The self-help account is also evident given the intent in the creation of the District to 
draw on rather than supplant existing voluntary community activities, as well as to 
supplement city service provision:
“The point o f  this whole thing was not to do what you're supposed to do as a 
responsible citizen, but it was to respond to those jobs that were bigger than what any 
one or two or three people could do ” [Resident Board Member].
“We as volunteers were maxed out... and the concept was an organisation 
that would leverage the energy and support o f people but who could systematically 
address some o f  these issues full-time” [Resident Board Member],
However, in terms of the entity’s operations, respondents felt that the community is 
not particularly engaged, and indeed cite the apparent supplanting of voluntary efforts 
in the area, indicating that the intention that the District would supplement these has 
not been realised:
“People complained ‘we ’re paying our dues to have people walking round 
protecting us, not to have somebody telling us we ought to get out and protect 
ourselves ’...” [Non-profit Partner].
The District cannot determine or alter its mission, which is contained in the enabling 
legislation. But this mission does allow the entity sufficient latitude to alter its 
operations, as evidenced by the broadening and later narrowing of its functions 
regarding neighbourhood revitalisation. Therefore, technically the entity is able to 
develop, appraise and fund its own projects and engage in supplemental service 
delivery. This did occur prior to its ‘refocus’, when funding from sources other than 
the surtax (such as local foundations) was sought to undertake such efforts (for 
example to fund a post dealing with housing and economic revitalisation). But such 
activities are no longer undertaken.
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A key characteristic of the ‘ideal-type’ sdf-heljrentity is that it can continue in the 
absence of its sponsor. The District could not continue in the absence of its ‘sponsor’ 
in the form of surtax income, nor indeed without its ‘enabler’ in terms of the 
requirement for periodical city council ratification of its ordinance. However, 
indications are that it is an ongoing endeavour.
Democracy
This function is extremely evident in the way CVCBD is structured, but is not realised 
in its operations. This confirms the predominance of the self-help function.
Voting members of the Management Board include eight neighbourhood 
representatives (two from each constituent neighbourhood association), business 
association representatives, four resident representatives elected by area (‘quadrant’), 
and a representative of the Mayor. Non-voting members appointed by the board 
comprise city councilpersons and non-profit representatives. The structure resulted 
from the state’s democratic intentions in specifying the legislation to enable 
comprehensive (by sub-area and neighbourhood and business association) surtax 
payers’ input. The entity also has three professional staff, plus administrative support.
However, entity-level respondents criticise the realisation of these intentions when
describing the operations of the entity. The extent and quality of ‘sponsor’ influence
via the representatives of the District property owners on the board is widely
critiqued, and there are concerns that while their voice is heard, members may not be
representative of their constituencies:
“The people that seek out these offices have axes to grind. It's very hard to 
get people to participate, the kind o f  people you would really like to have that are 
thoughtful and positive. It's usually the disgruntled that get elected” [Non-profit 
Partner].
However, the role of a small group of board members in refocusing the entity to its 
core remit, and bringing a ‘business orientation’ to its operations, is latterly evident, 
indicating that while the representativeness of the board may be questioned, it is able 
to influence the operations of the entity.
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Some respondents state that-the perceived rigidity of its structure has hampered
gaining the extent and quality of engagement needed in the entity:
“One o f  the things that is really difficult fo r an organisation like ours is that 
we do not have the capacity to perform as a city organisation, or a state or a national 
organisation, and to be held accountable to some o f those requirements is very 
challenging” [‘Quad’ Resident Board Member].
However, atypically for initiative governance bodies, and reflecting the fact that the 
entity’s sponsors are not agencies outside the area but the property owners within it, 
the entity came into existence following a referendum. It can therefore be 
unequivocally stated that the District was supported at least at its outset by the 
majority of the community. It has an unambiguous mandate to operate which is 
subject to renewal (albeit not by referendum) every four years.
The fact that the District is a public entity and therefore subject to transparency and
accountability requirements also makes it differ from the non-profit sector status of
‘typical’ initiative governance bodies. So despite respondents’ concerns regarding the
way it is structured hampering its operations, the way it came into being and its
structuring do illustrate the democracy function in a very clear manner, though the
challenges of operating in such a way are clearly recognised:
“The organisation sort o f had to make its way in understanding what its 
obligations were in terms o f open meetings and closed meetings... There was a lot o f  
things that we had to learn along the way and definitely missteps were made " 
[Resident Board Member].
Competence
The competence function is evident given the District’s main role as a service 
deliverer, and attempts to structure it to draw on resident input to inform this. In 
terms of the entity’s operations, however, realisation of this is hampered, particularly 
regarding the responsiveness of the city services it is seeking to supplement. This 
also confirms the predominance of the self-help account.
Residents are not regarded as being particularly engaged in the effort, thus curtailing 
their expression of priorities to inform service delivery:
“The way it was set up was to get a lot o f input from all corners. Whether 
we're actually getting the input we had hoped for right now, I  don't think so ” 
[Resident Board Member].
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There arenotable exceptions with regard to engagement given the considerable effort.^  
and input from the board’s community members, and from its critics, though many 
question how representative these individuals are of majority opinion given concerns 
of parochialism, lack of connections between representatives and their nominating 
organisations, and perhaps a degree of paranoia on the part of the District’s ‘detractor 
group’:
“There are individuals who consistently only represent their immediate 
constituency... there are other members who... don't do any work outside the 
organisation” [Non-profit Board Member].
“This is not a business community, but we do have some business, and they 
really need to be on the board, otherwise what tends to happen is you get a skewed 
voice, you get only residential voices... ” [Entity Staff].
It is also not clear that the entity is capable of being especially responsive to 
community priorities when expressed. Its responsiveness appears to be curtailed by 
the equity requirements to which it is subject given its public entity status:
“In concept the leadership o f this organisation, being very grassroots 
oriented, and dictated by bylaws about who was on and who can be on it, it's kind o f 
good... but it's a very weak board...its capacity to run an organisation is very 
limited” [Non-profit Board Member].
Therefore the way the entity is structured can be seen as hampering realisation of the 
competence account in the sense of community priorities informing service delivery. 
This is compounded by the generally regarded unrealistic combination of too large a 
service delivery area and insufficient resource for the District to perform even its core 
functions regarding ‘crime and grime’, let alone tailoring service delivery in these 
areas:
“One o f  the problems with the organisation is... the resources available are 
no way adequate to deliver safety and sanitation to a hundred square block area” 
[Non-profit Board Member].
Ironically, despite the entity’s remit to supplement city agency ‘crime and grime’ 
service provision, significant statutory service provider involvement is not in 
evidence. The relevant statutory service providers are not represented on the entity’s 
management board. Despite the requirement for a baseline agreement on service 
provision between the entity and city services, one was not in effect at the time of the 
research. This lack of a baseline agreement with the city regarding the services the 
District is supplementing, despite entity-level respondent recognition of recent
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improvements in the working relationships between city and entity staff, is the most 
palpable indication that the competence account is not being realised in terms of the 
entity’s operations:
“I'm glad it's improved, but in some ways you're dealing with... some brokens 
[sic] when you're trying to deal with the city” [Resident Board Member].
“There has to be a baseline agreement [with the city]... you cannot doubly tax 
people and then have them end up with no more than what they had... because 
otherwise, what have you done? You haven't supplemented, you've supplanted” [City 
Councilperson and Board Member].
Services provided by the District are monitored and reviewed, but resident satisfaction 
is not measured except indirectly via board representation.
Tokenism
The tokenism account is very evident when CVCBD is located in its broader city 
context as it does not receive the attentions of the urban governance network. This 
further asserts the predominance of the self-help interpretation of its role, as it is ‘left 
to get on with it’.
The District is not a priority for the urban governance network. Its activities and
resource commitments are focused elsewhere. This is related in part to the very fact
of the District’s existence and its guaranteed income stream via the surtax, as well as
the area arguably not having the intense needs of other areas in the city. It is also
related to the District’s refocus back to its ‘core’ mission meaning it has stopped
seeking support from the network for supplemental activities:
“The District has a specific and narrow focus... [prior to the refocus] they 
were trying to do fa r too many things with inadequate staff, inadequate support, 
inadequate financial support but also a community that was very contentiously 
divided about what its role should be. I  don't expect to be a continuing supporter o f  
the District now that it's sort o f [ound it's actual, what it should be doing. And it's 
guaranteed an income stream ” [Local Foundation].
Steering
While steering is clear in relation to the entity’s enabling legislation and structuring, 
its origins and ongoing operations assert the self-help rather than steering account of 
its role.
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Though the District is a public sector entity ‘enabled*; rather than sponsored, by state 
and city government legislation, it was subject to governmental steering at its outset, 
particularly by state government. Respondents regard this as having significantly 
affected not only the entity’s structure but also its operations. Steering of its 
operations is evident in state government’s insistence that the entity’s remit be 
broadened to enable scope for activities in addition to ‘crime and grime’ service 
provision. Steering of its structure is evident in the state government’s insistence that 
the District was extended to include poorer areas, from the original focus on its 
relatively wealthy northern section; and in the requirements that the entity was 
structured with the intent that it fulfil the democratic expectations incumbent upon a 
public entity:
“[The District] was expanded because they didn't want it to be perceived as a 
wealthier or whiter area that was able to pay for additional services at the expense o f 
other areas that were not... ” [Resident Board Member].
“We spent an inordinate, way too much time as a board phutzing around with 
the technicalities that should be addressed in the spirit o f things... ” [Non-profit 
Board Member].
These requirements were attributed by respondents with: creating an unrealistically 
large service delivery area without a sufficient tax base, particularly deriving from 
business properties, to enable it to perform its core functions adequately; the 
propensity for ‘mission creep’; and the inability of the entity to gain sufficiently 
engaged and skilled board members:
“The bottom line is I  think that by expanding the area the way it was, you also 
did not pick up a lot more businesses which have a higher base, you picked up more 
resident ials so you diluted the per capita that you were raising, and you were trying 
to put sanitation and safety workers I  mean, all over the place and you couldn 7 ”
[City Councilperson and Board Member].
“Part o f the reason why it didn 7 perform is in part the way i t ’s established... 
there’s a difficulty in getting qualified people to serve and there ’s a difficulty in 
removing unqualified people” [‘Quad’ Resident Board Member],
“There's huge deficiencies in our legislation that have troubled this 
organisation all through its existence” [Resident Board Member].
Such steering can be interpreted as the addition of a public perspective to a privatist, 
self-help response by the District’s instigators. That the outcomes of this steering are 
regarded as the source of some of the District’s problems demonstrates the unintended 
consequences of such interventions, but also reflect the pilot nature of the District, not
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least because its surtax base-indudes residences as well as businesses. This approach 
has not been replicated elsewhere in the city.
5.2.3. Functions of Neighbourhood Governance Revealed by the Entities 
All five of the functions set out in the theoretical framework are evident to a greater or 
lesser extent in the structure and operations of both case study entities examined in 
Baltimore. Both the democracy and competence functions are clearly evident in the 
way that the entities are structured and operate, particularly in OROSW’s case due to 
its community planning processes, and in CVCBD’s case given attempts to structure 
the entity to enable community engagement. Steering is the predominant account in 
the case of OROSW due to it constituting the community outreach arm of its 
sponsoring foundation. But this account is also of relevance to CVCBD given state 
and city government influence on its structure and remit which has affected its 
subsequent operations. Self-help is the predominant function in the case of CVCBD, 
given its community-instigated, funded and managed approach. But this function is 
also of relevance to OROSW given its emphasis on voluntary activities and capacity 
building. In both cases the difficulties of realising this are clear. Tokenism is also 
manifested in neither body being a focus for the city’s governance network.
Indeed, key to the international comparative context of this research is that the two 
entities can be said to be operating in spite of rather than because of government 
(even though CVCBD was enabled via government legislation). They stem from the 
efforts of a local anchor or community activism respectively. Both entities can be 
regarded as ongoing and open-ended endeavours, given that they are both ‘anchored’, 
either by an institution or by being enshrined in legislation and thus having a 
guaranteed funding stream.
The variance in the relative manifestation of each account of the function of 
neighbourhood governance in each entity illustrates their differences. This also 
demonstrates the variety of forms that initiative governance entities can take which 
meet the unit of study definition in Baltimore. This variance can in turn be linked to 
the decentralised and more privatist context for neighbourhood-based initiative 
governance in the city, explored in the next section which assesses the city’s 
governance context.
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53  €ftv Governance Context
This section explores the city-level urban governance context for neighbourhood- 
based initiative entities. It sets out application of the theoretical framework of the 
expected characteristics of US urban governance and the likely associated function of 
neighbourhood-based initiative governance (as set out in Table 2.2) to Baltimore.
The research focuses on what can be termed Baltimore’s ‘neighbourhood governance 
network’ -  that is, the network which governs neighbourhood-based governance. The 
network’s structure and membership, key network members, and the existence of a 
policy subsystem for deprived neighbourhoods, are determined. The effects of the 
broader urban governance system on this network are then explained, in terms of the 
state and market imperatives which are evident. Finally, the implications of this 
regarding the relative power of the neighbourhood level within its multi-level 
governance context are considered.
Further background, on the city’s neighbourhood-relevant history, city government’s 
orientation to neighbourhoods, and relevant plans, policies and approaches including ~ 
the city master plan and economic growth strategy, the SNAP programme, the 
housing typology and the Healthy Neighborhoods Initiative, is included in chapter 4.
53.1. Neighbourhood Governance Network
Each Baltimore elite respondent was asked a core set of questions designed to elicit 
their understanding of the structures and processes of neighbourhood governance, that 
is, how neighbourhood-based governance is governed. Elite respondents were asked 
to discuss the role, work and relationships engaged in by their own organisations and 
for their perspectives on the work of others. Furthermore, they were also asked how, 
if at all, this is co-ordinated or led. A sample elite interview guide is appended (at 
Appendix 1).
The network identified in the course of the research is presented in Figure 2. Analysis 
of responses reveals the existence of what some Baltimore respondents term the 
‘community development system’. This can be regarded as the ‘neighbourhood 
governance network’ that governs neighbourhood-level activities, including initiative
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governance, in the city. It comprises a range of actors which operate at different 
levels and perform different roles. Its structure and membership are detailed below, 
followed by examination of its key members and their relative power.
Figure 2: Baltimore Neighbourhood Governance Network
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5.3.2. Structure and membership of the governance netw ork
Baltimore's neighbourhood-based governance entities are embedded in a broader 
network that comprises a cross-sectoral mix of public bodies (for example, the city 
government and its agencies), private organisations (the philanthropic foundations) 
and non-profit institutions (the umbrella organisations and intermediaries) as well as 
anchor institutions. Different members of this network operate at different levels - 
multi-neighbourhood, city-wide, and higher, in the case o f state government and some 
of the philanthropic foundations, as well as federal government via its funding 
regimes.
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fAs is clear from Figure 2, the multi-level context for ^ neighbourhood governance in 
Baltimore appears relatively straightforward. It is also relatively stable. The structure 
depicted has largely been in place since 2001 following Mayor O’Malley’s election 
and a shift in the basis for resource allocation from being needs- to asset-based. 
Indeed, the most recent additions in terms of principal actors are the Mayor’s Office 
of Neighborhoods and the Healthy Neighbourhoods Initiative, both established in 
2001. The next most recent addition is the Office of Neighborhood Reinvestment in 
the state’s Department of Housing and Community Development, created in 1997.
In terms of the plans and approaches (shaded in blue in Figure 2 and detailed in 
chapter 4), SNAP was also instigated in 2001 (though is now widely regarded as 
being in abeyance). The Comprehensive Master Plan (which includes the Economic 
Growth Strategy) was adopted in 2006, but draws on the housing typology, which was 
initially developed in the late 1990s. The five-year Consolidated Plan, which also 
draws on the housing typology, is required by federal government for CDBG 
‘entitlement jurisdictions’. This funding regime has been in place since 1975.
It is now useful to consider the network’s structure in terms of the actors and 
approaches of relevance at each spatial scale, as depicted in Figure 2.
Neighbourhood level
At the smallest scale, neighbourhood associations tend to cover a single 
neighbourhood and are small and weak. More affluent neighbourhoods may have 
formally constituted associations, whilst less affluent neighbourhoods may have 
associations but these are less likely to be formally constituted. All associations tend 
to be heavily reliant on voluntary involvement though some have professional staff. 
Currently there are about 900 neighbourhood associations in existence. Respondents 
recognised the difficulties of attracting and retaining community participation, and 
problems of representativeness, felt to be compounded by the tendency of 
neighbourhood leadership to stay in place and the difficulties of engaging younger 
people. Several spoke of the city’s ‘small leadership class’ which has been reduced 
by population decline.
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Elite respondents stated that the*most distressed neighbourhoods are more likely to be 
fragmented and to lack a neighbourhood association with the capacity to be an 
effective partner in informing deliberations about the area’s needs and priorities:
“Where you get these weak areas... where you’d had huge population loss... 
the matriarchs that used to run those neighbourhoods are no longer there and they’re 
not being replaced, it becomes a real problem because there is no ‘there ’ to go to in 
terms o f a social... They're people with needs but they’re not organised” [Baltimore 
Housing].
This is further complicated by the demolition/ redevelopment policy prescription as 
set out in the housing typology for such neighbourhoods (particularly those anchored 
by an institution with growth needs). The capacity of neighbourhood actors to gain 
power, for example in negotiating for community benefits from the redevelopment, is 
likely to be limited. The Annie E. Casey Foundation’s work with residents in the 
EBDI area (discussed below) recognises this. However, in order to gain any leverage, 
neighbourhood actors do need to accept the plans developed by the relevant elites, 
which could be regarded as co-option. Distressed neighbourhoods not subject to 
anchored redevelopment efforts tend to be excluded from the network’s attentions.
The capacity of neighbourhoods can be regarded as an ‘asset’ that sponsors seek to 
utilise. Neighbourhoods that have existing capacity (such as stable, effective 
leadership; active associations; and indeed connections to effective non-profits which 
cover multi-neighbourhood areas) are more likely to gain support. When the Healthy 
Neighborhoods initiative was piloted by the Goldseker Foundation, neighbourhoods 
were sought which had demonstrable organisational capacity to undertake the 
initiative:
“So it's about selecting a small handful o f neighbourhoods where there is 
some resident leadership, there's some people we know, who we feel comfortable 
investing in” [Local Foundation].
Multi-neighbourhood level
The multi-neighbourhood level is the scale at which the key unit of study - 
neighbourhood-based initiative governance -  rests (‘neighbourhood-based coalitions/ 
entities’ in Figure 2). ‘Sponsor’ respondents stress that they depend on formal non­
profit multi-neighbourhood-based bodies to be partners in ‘neighbourhood change’. 
They describe the benefits in terms of such entities’ ability to prioritise needs across a
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broader-geographical area and as a way of ensuring that activities are in line with 
community priorities:
“Things that because you don’t live there you ’re not aware of... So those are 
the things that residents make aware to you, because they have to live through it... 
that you will not find  statistically” [National Foundation].
There is no standard structure for the city’s multi-neighbourhood-based entities, 
which include Community Development Corporations and the ‘umbrella’ 
organisations. The commonality is that the entities have some form of board 
structure. But the extent of board member neighbourhood affiliation varies, 
dependent on the extent to which members are sought with a variety of skills 
irrespective of neighbourhood affiliation. Entities therefore vary in the extent to 
which a board represents the neighbourhood, or represents what the entity is trying to 
achieve. In the case of CVCBD, representation from the constituent neighbourhood 
associations was required, but this is not the case with OROSW. The Healthy 
Neighborhoods Initiative is distinctive as although it is multi-neighbourhood-based, 
these neighbourhoods are not contiguous, though all are ‘in the middle’ of the housing 
typology.
acr -:r-
Some multi-neighbourhood areas are ‘anchored’ by education and medical (‘ed and 
med’) institutions of which Baltimore has several, including the Johns Hopkins and 
University of Maryland universities and medical systems. These vary in scale, 
resource and in the extent to which they are engaged in their surrounding 
neighbourhoods. In turn, the presence of such anchors may act as an asset which 
encourages other potential sponsors to support initiatives in the anchor’s surrounding 
neighbourhoods:
“We wanted to work in neighbourhoods... where there was strong resident 
leadership, where there were anchor institutions, you know, that we could partner 
with” [Local Foundation].
“There's more benefit to working with a coalition than there is with an 
individual neighbourhood association. Especially when that coalition is tied to a Bon 
Secours o f Maryland Foundation, or they ’re tied to maybe a local non-profit that has 
resources and staff... that had a track record and had a good reputation in the city ” 
[Baltimore Housing Office of Development].
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City level
At the city level, both the federal and state government are a funding mechanism, 
while city government provides the implementation mechanism within very broad 
funding guidelines (especially when compared to the UK’s funding regimes). 
However, at the sub-city level, city government, particularly its agency, Baltimore 
Housing, is a funding mechanism (particularly using CDBG resource), and non-profit 
intermediaries are the implementers. This allocation is ostensibly framed by the 
Consolidated Plan and the housing typology. Other funders who support multi- 
neighbourhood-level initiatives, such as Baltimore’s small, city-based foundations, 
tend to focus on the typology’s ‘middle’ neighbourhoods, mirroring the approach of 
the Healthy Neighborhoods initiative, which was ‘incubated’ by a local foundation in 
the late 1990s and formally established in 2001.
Respondents explain that such neighbourhoods are regarded as places where there is 
scope for smaller-scale efforts, and where the relatively low level of foundation 
funding can improve market conditions, in contrast with areas classified in the 
typology a s ‘distressed’:
“ We wanted to work in neighbourhoods where we thought we could 
accomplish things, create stronger real estate ” [Local Foundation].
“It's very, very hard for philanthropy and small dollars to do catalytic change 
in devastated places. Working in transitional places, in places that are threatened 
with spot vacancy, or that are neighbourhoods that are sort o f challenged or facing, 
heading fo r closure activity, is something that you might be able to catch it before it 
tips this way ” [National Foundation].
“The vast majority o f the grants have targeted investments I  would say in the 
middle neighbourhoods. Healthy Neighborhoods, you have neighbourhoods that 
tended to be on the decline, but it's not in places where there's a lot o f abandonment, 
it's more then how do you improve the market conditions by having people improve 
their properties and get a lot o f community activities going on the ground. So a lot o f  
our grantmaking has stayed closely aligned with the Healthy Neighborhoods 
organisation " [Local Foundation].
Local foundations may have long-term relationships with the organisations they fund. 
The foundations regard themselves as having an impact beyond grant-making, not 
only providing financial resources but expertise and technical assistance and 
networking, and also political clout and leadership:
“The main way a foundation can have impact with its grantmaking is to 
support people that are going to accomplish the results that you say you care about... 
A foundation can have impact through our leadership, through our convening,
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through how we get involved in things. A foundation has to figure out ways to have 
impact beyond grant-making” [Local Foundation].
Such committed support from one or several foundations can be regarded as a proxy 
anchor institution for the organisation where its area lacks such infrastructure:
"It's a lot harder for the neighbourhoods where you don't have an anchor, 
right. And there what to some extent, not a complete substitute, but to some extent 
provides the stability is that you've got maybe a core set offunders who've all decided 
this is a priority area” [Local Foundation].
City-wide non-profits such as the Citizens Planning and Housing Association, the 
Community Law Center and the Neighborhood Design Center act as intermediary 
supports or provide specific expertise to multi- or single neighbourhood-based 
organisations. These bodies are heavily dependent on foundation support, which has 
declined in recent times for community organising and capacity building. This has 
particularly affected OROSW’s operations.
One consistent complaint from Baltimore's foundations is the lack of co-ordination 
amongst themselves and with city government. The foundations have increasingly 
tried to co-operate in targeting their resources and actions. But while the value of the 
Baltimore Neighbourhood Collaborative is broadly recognised, some criticise its lack 
of leadership and that it does not provide significant strategic input into the 
neighbourhood governance network. Foundation respondents also point to a lack of 
strategy and leadership on the part of city government. The city is not regarded as a 
strong partner, a view reinforced by respondents who had experience of working in 
other cities:
“We've got to look around and say, we're in twenty cities, here's what we get 
for our investment, here's the traction we're getting with city government, why would 
we stay?... For the amount o f money we've been bringing here, we're not getting what 
we're getting from other cities by way o f outcomes, because the city is not willing to 
engage and partner with us” [National non-profit intermediary].
“Part o f our next challenge... is growing the understanding that the funding 
community here is not just philanthropy, it is the city government, it is the state 
government, and they are funding partners as well” [National Foundation].
Foundations express concern that city government’s strategic priorities are neither 
explicit nor sufficiently detailed. The city government’s strategy, as expressed in the 
Consolidated Plan, is regarded as incomplete given its emphasis on comprehensive
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redevelopment initiatives, and not the ‘community development’ work in the ‘middle 
neighbourhoods’ where much non-public sector effort is concentrated and where a 
concerted, cross-sectoral strategic effort is felt to be lacking:
“I've always felt like I  wished there was a more cohesive vision coming out o f 
the city government, it would be nice to feel like we had a stronger partner there. I  
don't get a sense that we have a clear vision for how to allocate resources to follow 
up on statements like, you know, we want to have mixed-income communities ” [Local 
Foundation].
Frustration is also expressed by foundations and the non-profit sector that the SNAP 
planning effort (explained in chapter 4) is in abeyance and a lack of political 
commitment and leadership is blamed:
“7 think one way in which SNAP might have been frustrating to the 
neighbourhoods is that there wasn't a really substantial commitment o f city support to 
come after the priorities identified in SNAP. It felt like it was a city-originated 
process... and it felt like, OK, i f  you do the SNAP then will the city come in behind the 
priorities that you've identified. And that just didn't seem to happen ” [Local 
Foundation].
“People thought that process was actually pretty good. However, as they say 
about plans, they sit on the shelf because there's not leadership. And I'm not saying 
that's the planning department's fault, it's because the mayors haven't cared about it, 
right?” [National non-profit intermediary].
Respondents in the city government express support for foundation efforts and cite 
Healthy Neighbourhoods as an example of an initiative incubated by a philanthropy 
which has been fostered by city government. But these respondents stress that whilst 
government and foundation priorities may align in some cases, such as with Healthy 
Neighbourhoods and EBDI, they diverge in others given the government’s range of 
responsibilities:
“Government-based efforts, you're responsible for the whole city, and so you 
can't say, well, we're not going to deal with this area because it doesn't meet certain 
criteria. Foundations have the luxury o f pursuing what they're interested in at a 
given time... There's a tendency... some o f the foundations, what I  call ‘this year's 
model’, you know, they'll say it's economic development's the answer, and the next 
year it's child social service. As a government entity there's certain basic things you 
have to do ” [Baltimore Housing].
However, at staff level the scope for improving joint working between city 
government and the foundations and non-profit sector is recognised, particularly in 
the ‘middle’ neighbourhoods:
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“There's-xr disconnect between foundation and sort o f broader non-profit work 
that's happening and what the city is doing. I  don't think that they're in sync, I  don't 
think that their resources are matched up where they could be... Healthy 
Neighborhoods, the city can do more, not just financially, to support that 
organisation, but... you know... support the idea and the programmes itself in a 
particular neighbourhood” [Baltimore Housing Office of Development].
Regional Level
The regional level is not included in Figure 2 as it lacks significant network actors. 
However, the regional context does affect the network’s activities to some degree. In 
the 1980s the business sector’s Greater Baltimore Committee shifted from having a 
city to regional focus, reflecting the city’s loss of corporate functions to neighbouring, 
more prosperous, counties. This lack of corporate presence contributes to the lack of 
an explicit urban regime in the city, discussed below.
The regional perspective is reflected in some policy efforts regarding housing and 
public transport. Given the city’s high concentrations of poverty, some policy actors 
seek some form of regional dispersion of residents to reduce neighbourhood distress. 
Indeed, Maryland ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) is managing a small
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programme of relocating low-income households from the city into suburban 
“communities of opportunity” (Stoker et al., 2008: 12). The State’s Smart Growth 
policies also frame Baltimore in a regional perspective, wherein the city is regarded as 
a source of affordable housing for the wider region. Regional transportation 
initiatives may also have an effect on some city neighbourhoods. For example, the 
OROSW area includes the West Baltimore MARC (commuter rail) station which is 
currently subject to redevelopment plans.
However, another significant way in which the city interacts with its region is perhaps 
not fully acknowledged by network members. This is the connection between the 
city’s persistent poverty and the drugs trade, sustained in part by suburban buyers 
from outside the city limits (Moskos, 2008).
State and National level
Over time assistance from federal government to Baltimore has included a changing 
array of explicit policies. These have included time-limited categorical grants linked 
to Empowerment Zone designation and Hope VI programmes for public housing
131
ft  **** (both instigated in the 1990s). CDBG funds (available for over thirty years) comprise
the most consistent form of federal resource for the city. The federal governmental
system means that funds are devolved, emphasising that the locus of authority for
urban governance is at the city level:
“The principle initially when CDBG came along, that all this urban 
renewal, all this urban planning, and stuff, as well as other categorical grants that 
were largely federally-controlled, that we'd completely devolve that, as we here at 
HUD don't know what's going on in Seattle let alone Baltimore, and we'll let the 
locals do it, they're the ones that have a stake in it, so we'll give them the money and 
let them have the freedom to do with it what you will ” [Federal Department of 
Housing and Urban Development].
However, there has been a long-running decline in CDBG allocations. Funding for 
particular projects is spasmodically gained from ‘earmarks’. The state also offers 
various forms of modest assistance, such as the programmes run by its Office of 
Neighborhood Reinvestment.
Baltimore hosts some nationally significant non-govemmental actors. Enterprise 
Community Partners, a national non-profit intermediary, has an office in the city, 
though it has not embarked upon any significant neighbourhood initiatives since that 
of Sandtown-Winchester (discussed in chapter 4). The Annie E. Casey Foundation is 
the most significant nationally-operating non-govemmental body in Baltimore, and is 
a key partner in the city’s current most significant redevelopment, EBDI (described 
below).
5 3 3 . Key network members
The key network members - neighbourhood-based governance entities, city 
government, foundations, and anchor institutions - have differential ability to 
influence neighbourhood-based governance given their stores of power and resource. 
These stores vary, in absolute terms and regarding where they seek to expend these, 
given the type of endeavour or geographic area favoured. These network members 
shall be considered in turn.
Neighbourhood-based governance entities
It is evident that such entities’ relationships with their sponsors are at least as 
important to their continued functioning and operations as their relationships to
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fcitizens. Sponsors give a clear relative advantage to their entities, not only directly, 
but by potentially linking them into this broader network. The involvement of a 
sponsor indicates an opportunity for investment to other network members. This can 
be regarded as an extension of the asset-based allocation ethos, with network member 
sponsorship of a neighbourhood-based governance entity making other network 
members regard the entity as a neighbourhood asset upon which ‘due diligence’ for 
investment has been carried out. The resultant longevity of neighbourhood-based 
entities in turn imbues them with legitimacy from the network perspective, 
irrespective of (or in the absence of an assessment of) resident opinion:
“ We try to leverage each others' investments and deepen the investments, and 
stay with them over time ” [Local Foundation].
“One o f the more successful Healthy Neighborhoods, benefited a huge 
amount from our support... in fact we supported the process that helped them become 
a Healthy Neighborhood. Goldseker has been a very consistent support for them, so 
we've got Goldseker, Healthy Neighborhoods, and us for at least 8 years now, all 
committed" [Local Foundation].
In the case of OROSW, its sponsor and anchor, the Bon Secours Foundation, has 
partnerships with other foundations and non-profit intermediaries according to shared 
areas of interest regarding programmes that are run frr the OROSW area. These 
partners are not represented on the OROSW board. Their relationships are direct with 
the entity’s foundation sponsor.
City government
The city’s policy discourse is characterised by a strategy of harnessing market forces. 
This approach originated from the foundation and ‘ed and med’ sectors as well as city 
government, highlighting that it is not city government alone that sets the imperatives 
which frame the network’s approaches to neighbourhoods. Joint working between 
these key network members on developing the asset-based approach clearly 
influenced Mayor O’Malley when he came into office in 1999. O’Malley then 
branded Healthy Neighborhoods as a mayoral initiative in 2001, and subsequently 
enabled the Department of Planning and Baltimore Housing to develop and adopt the 
housing typology as the apparent basis for the allocation of public resources in the 
city (as reflected in the city’s master and consolidated plans). The current mayor, 
Mayor Dixon, has continued this asset-based resource allocation approach, which is 
shared by the network:
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“What happened overiimerwe went from a needs-based approach to an asset- 
based approach. The model really wasn't working. We had unlimited need but 
fairly limited resources. So, it basically became an issue, well, how do we target our 
resources? And that change was from 2000 on in the O'Malley administration ” 
[Baltimore Housing].
"When you look at the big picture, everything is driven by resources, and 
building upon assets... that's where we see that we can plug in best, you know, to put 
dollars and/or resources to support that. We see that there is a growing market, so we 
will invest more money or shift our efforts .... because in the end the market is 
stronger there ” [Baltimore Housing Office of Development].
These policy shifts emphasise the strength of the city’s office of mayor. However, the 
mayoralty does not command resources sufficient to operationalise the policy 
prescriptions set out in the housing typology, especially given the decline in federal 
assistance. Nor does the mayoralty have sufficient power to align a concerted effort 
across the neighbourhood governance network, as indicated by the abeyance of the 
SNAP process, the intent of which was to co-ordinate action on the part of all network 
members. Indeed, the case study bodies’ experiences show that even the services 
provided directly by the city are not responsive. This demonstrates what Stoker and 
Stone (2008: 18) describe as the city government’s “limited and disjointed approach 
to neighbourhoods”.
Philanthropic Foundations
Since the 1990s foundations have played an increasingly large role in the network, not 
only as initiative sponsors but also in developing policy. This demonstrates Martin’s 
(2004: 394) description of foundations as an increasingly important player in US 
urban governance as it has become more privatist in orientation.
A consistent theme is a focus on levering opportunities, echoing and in fact presaging 
the asset-based rationale for resource allocation cited by city government. That 
foundations see themselves as sources of innovation is exemplified with their 
formative role in development of the Healthy Neighborhoods initiative which 
foreshadowed the broader network shift to an asset-based ethos. But the resource 
limitations of locally-based foundations and the scale of the need within the city both 
serve to limit what foundations can do, especially in the distressed neighbourhoods. It 
is therefore unsurprising that the foundations have gravitated towards tackling more 
tractable problems in neighbourhoods ‘in the middle’.
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Foundations^ aryregarding how prescriptive they perceive themselves to be with 
regard to their conditions of support to an entity or initiative. However, the steering 
interpretation is evident in the conditions of grant-making and the types of 
organisations and initiative supported and the ‘assets’, such as capacity, sought. Such 
steering is also confirmed given the experiences of OROSW.
The nationally-operating, privately endowed Annie E. Casey Foundation, 
headquartered in Baltimore since 1994, is the city’s most significant philanthropic 
foundation and a key actor in the neighbourhood governance network. The 
foundation classifies Baltimore as a “civic site”:
“Civic Sites are, they're our home towns... We have no intent on leaving them, 
we are in here for the long haul, and so our investments and our thinking about this is 
a little deeper, a little more grounded here, than they might be in other places ” 
[National Foundation].
The foundation’s main geographical focus is East Baltimore Development Initiative 
(EBDI), the most significant of the city government-defined ‘redevelopment areas’, 
anchored by Johns Hopkins. Given the history of past antagonism related to Johns 
Hopkins, “cousring of good will has fallen largely to the Annie E. Casey Foundation 
and its efforts to pioneer a multifaceted ‘responsible redevelopment’” (Stoker and 
Stone, 2008: 17). The foundation has sufficient resource to be a major facilitator and 
has affected the way in which the initiative has proceeded. Initially the foundation 
rejected involvement in the initiative as it was viewed primarily as an economic 
development project. It then agreed to become engaged, albeit on the condition of 
enlarging the project’s focus to include an emphasis on the well-being of current 
residents, many of whom would be displaced and relocated. The foundation became a 
key partner and has committed substantial resources to augmenting the basic statutory 
relocation package, among other services such as a workforce development 
programme. A baseline residents’ survey was conducted to determine residents’ 
concerns and inform the development of appropriate services:
“We've absolutely tried... to change programmes and organisations' 
orientation to listening to residents. What voice do residents have... at every step, 
someone has to fight fo r that space for them, because they don't have the power o f the 
developer, the mayor, and everyone else. So the foundation is trying to make sure 
that they have skills to come to the table, have a presence at the table, and that they 
have some authority and some decision-making, they're participating” [National 
Foundation].
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‘Ed and med* anchor institutions
With the decline of the corporate sector, relatively immobile universities and hospitals 
have assumed an increasingly prominent role in Baltimore. The investment decisions 
of such anchor institutions can have significant effects on their surrounding 
neighbourhoods, as demonstrated by OROSW. The most prominent example of this 
in the city at the time of the research was EBDI, anchored by Johns Hopkins 
University and its associated science and technology park.
Johns Hopkins University, “the number one health care and biotechnology research 
institution in the nation” (City of Baltimore, 2006: 102), enables Baltimore to be an 
“important locus in the biomedical field” (Stoker et al., 2008: 48). It is the city’s most 
significant anchor institution and a key member of the neighbourhood governance 
network:
“Hopkins has a lot o f self-interest going on, and I  don’t say that in a negative 
way, I  mean, i f  it weren't fo r Hopkins I  don’t know who'd have a jo b ” [City 
Councilperson].
EBDI’s planning and execution has “occupied a significant place in the macro-politics
of the city” (Stoker et al., 2009: 11). Johns Hopkins’ levering power within the
neighbourhood governance network is clear given the support being received from
state and federal policies and resources as well as city government and the
philanthropic sector. In terms of the network’s broadly shared market discourse, Johns
Hopkins is seen by other network members as being able to lever market forces in a
way that public and foundation investments on their own would not:
“The advantage is that there's an economic engine to sort o f attach yourself to 
and to feed on the energy of, which is Johns Hopkins. So part o f the reason that we’ve 
gone over there is that we're able to build on and work with an economic engine ” 
[National Foundation].
Johns Hopkins is regarded as a particularly advantaged actor in the network:
“It's a fight. I  mean, it's political. Basically, any administration - any - needs 
to put its capital where the people are or where the sympathies are... Or where 
Hopkins is [laughs], right?” [City Councilperson].
53.4. Baltimore Urban Governance
Investigation of Baltimore thus reveals that neighbourhood-based governance entities 
are located within, but are to a large extent separate from, a broader network which
136
has determined a market-driven approach to the city’s neighbourhoods. This network 
comprises a cross-sectoral mix of public, private and non-profit actors as well as 
anchor institutions.
The ‘separateness’ of neighbourhood-based bodies is made clear given the 
experiences of the case study entities. Their most important relationships are their 
horizontal links to their anchors/ sponsors. In the lack of the ‘market-levering’ assets 
sought by the network within the areas covered by the entities, the entities are not 
vertically linked up to the network. They are open-ended, ongoing endeavours, but 
this does not relate to the network’s support, or indeed to the network’s policy 
approach. Their ongoing existence relates to their anchoring in their local areas, due 
to an anchor institution and a surtax mechanism respectively. Indeed, the bodies are 
operating in spite of, rather than because of, the network. In the absence of the 
entities’ horizontal links to their anchors they would cease to exist. As it is, they have 
both reached a ‘plateau’ of resident engagement and have both recognised the need to 
consider ways of refreshing their role moving forward.
Therefore, while all of the accounts of the role of neighbourhood-based governance 
are evident to some degree in both case study bodies, it is the self-help account which 
is predominant. This is particularly the case with CVCBD. However, if OROSW is 
regarded as the community outreach arm of the Bon Secours Foundation, then it is 
clearly also an endeavour which is primarily motivated by and reflects the self-help 
interpretation. This is because the hospital anchor institution, albeit clearly motivated 
by its pastoral mission, has a vested interest in improving and stabilising the 
neighbourhoods which surround it. The hospital and its foundation are certainly 
actors within the broader urban governance network, but they are not principal 
members who form part of the policy subsystem determining the broad approaches to 
neighbourhoods. Their interests are at the sub-city, multi-neighbourhood level at 
which they -  and their associated entity, OROSW -  operate. This is why it is the 
horizontal (rather than vertical) nature of the links between the entity and its sponsor/ 
anchor which are crucial.
In terms of the other functions, it is competence that is most clearly demonstrated. 
OROSW acts as the conduit for community input into the foundation’s programmes,
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and CVDBD in turn seeks community 4nput into the services it delivers. Allusions to 
the democracy function are inherent in both bodies (indeed, CVDBD was steered by 
the state to a more democratic structure given its public entity status), but democracy 
is subservient to the competence account. That competence in the sense of the 
entities’ ability to influence mainstream city service provision is not being realised 
reflects the lack of vertical links from the entities up to the network, as well as the 
city’s precarious financial position affecting its ability to provide adequate services. 
Steering is evident, and indeed is the predominant interpretation of OROSW when it 
is regarded as a body separate from its sponsoring foundation, though again this can 
be regarded as a set of horizontal rather than vertical links. The steering which 
CVDBD experienced at its outset does relate to ‘top down’ relationships with key 
actors in the broader network, but these relationships have not been significant 
subsequently. That CVDBD has been ‘left to get on with it’ since the initial success 
of community activism in gaining key network member support for the approach 
emphasises its separateness from the network and reasserts the self-help account. 
Tokenism is therefore also implicit within the experiences of the entities, in the sense 
that they operate to a large extent separate from the ‘mainstream’ in terms of the main 
concerns of the broader city-level governance network.
The relatively simple structure of this broader network and its operations are 
determined at city-level. Funding does flow from higher levels, notably federal 
CDBG monies, as well as state resource given its ‘Smart Growth’- related designation 
of Baltimore as a location for housing growth, but disbursement of these resources is 
ascertained at city-level. The network has been stable since the key shift in 2001 to a 
shared ‘logic’ of asset-based resource allocation.
Within this network a “policy subsystem” (Goetz and Sidney, 1997) or 
“neighbourhood policy regime” (Martin, 2004) is evident with regard to 
neighbourhood-based approaches. Members of this subsystem, notably philanthropic 
and non-profit sector actors as well as city government, have significantly influenced 
this ‘neighbourhood policy’ as expressed in the housing typology, which sets out 
strategies and investment approaches deemed appropriate for different market 
characteristics amongst all of the city’s neighbourhoods. This asset-based, market- 
driven discourse evidences the subsystem’s neo-liberal orientation, which echoes
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Katz’s (2004: 26)*view that neighbourhood change should be market-driven rather 4ti *****
than community-controlled. It also emphasises the increasing role of private
philanthropies as ‘policy-setters’ in the city. This can be related to the increasingly
privatist orientation of urban governance given ‘federal retrenchment’. In the absence
of significant federal funds and in light of the city’s own lack of resource, foundation
actors alighted upon what can be regarded as a pragmatic response, which was
perhaps easier for them to promote than the city government, given concerns of
equity. Their success was in gaining Mayor O’Malley’s support, who then ensured
that this approach was institutionalised via the city’s plans and approaches.
However, Chaskin’s (2003:185) description of a system of neighbourhood governance 
comprising organisations, local government and foundations interacting in “highly 
improvised ways” is also apposite. While in theory the housing typology provides a 
geographic framework for different forms of cross-sectoral intervention and 
investment across the city’s neighbourhoods, its strategies are not applied consistently 
and an opportunistic approach is evident. As can be expected given the nature of 
multi-level governance, the policy subsystem has not “carved out an autonomous 
sphere of action” (Stoker et al., 2009: 7), rather its actions are framed by broader 
market imperatives.
The network focuses on significant opportunities, as exemplified by EBDI, which can 
lever market forces in terms of gaining bioscience investment capital. The most 
routine of its operations is the Healthy Neighbourhoods Initiative and replication of 
such targeting of neighbourhoods ‘in the middle’ by the local, much less well- 
resourced, foundations. Such neighbourhoods do gain some vertical links into the 
network given their market-relevant assets. Neighbourhoods which lack the assets 
sought may undertake self-help endeavours, as demonstrated by the case studies, if 
they have the capacity (which in the case of the entities is provided by their being 
anchored) to do so.
This is why Baltimore can be described as a ‘multi-track’ city. This is expressed in 
terms of the different categories of the housing typology. It is clear that distressed 
communities are treated differently to neighbourhoods ‘in the middle’. But the 
research reveals that there are refinements which can be made to the ‘distressed’
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~  category, which can be divided into three sub-categories. The first is distressed 
communities which lack assets of any sort. Such neighbourhoods do not receive any 
network attention. The second is distressed communities which have a (locally 
operating) anchor institution which can provide sufficient horizontal linkages to 
enable the sustenance of some locally-based efforts, as is the case with OROSW 
(though its foundation anchor does in turn gain support from other network members 
for its programmes). The third category is distressed neighbourhoods which are 
subject to the redevelopment plans of a major anchor institution, which fulfils the 
city’s broader agenda driven by imperatives of economic development and growth. In 
this case neighbourhood-based bodies will rapidly gain vertical linkages to the 
network, but in engaging can be regarded as being co-opted into the network’s 
agenda. EBDI at present can be regarded as ‘the game in town’ for the network.
The neighbourhood governance network therefore fulfils Chaskin’s (2005: 418) 
observation that in such systems, “power dynamics are pervasive” with the most 
pervasive actions coming from the key network actors rather than the ‘grassroots’ 
neighbourhood-based governance entities. It is these actors who have determined the 
imperatives which frame neighbourhood approaches in the city. In Baltimore these 
actors, or ‘local metagovemors’, comprise philanthropic foundations, particularly the 
Casey Foundation, and anchor institutions, notably Johns Hopkins University, as well 
as city government. This evidences the privatist nature of Baltimore’s urban 
governance.
However, these private interests differ from the business interests described in regime 
theory (explained in chapter 2). In Baltimore’s case the most significant ‘private’ 
actors, following the decline of the city’s corporate functions, comprise a private 
philanthropic foundation and Johns Hopkins University. The latter is technically a 
non-profit institution but as the city’s largest employer, and given its significance to 
the city’s economy in the lack of a significant corporate presence, it can be said to 
have a ‘quasi-corporate’ character. Johns Hopkins constitutes the basis upon which 
the network, with the other principals, is attempting to consolidate Baltimore’s role as 
a locus for the bioscience sector. As a globally-recognised anchor institution, it is 
also anchoring the network’s agenda.
140
Localist and Privatist Urban Governance
In sum, Baltimore does fulfil many of the expected characteristics of a localist and 
privatist system of urban governance in the US, as set out in Table 5.3. The locus of 
authority is at the city-level, with city government and private interests taking the 
lead. However, a governance network rather than urban regime is evident given the 
nature of its membership. This network prioritises neo-liberal strategies of growth. 
These strategies are particularly linked to the housing market in terms of 
neighbourhoods, with job attraction focused on the efforts to consolidate the city’s 
role as a bioscience cluster. There is a linked emphasis on self-help for deprived 
neighbourhoods if they have the assets which can be levered by the market. A policy 
subsystem for neighbourhood-based approaches is evident, as expressed in the 
housing typology. The subsystem’s efforts are framed by the neo-liberal strategies of 
the prevailing governance network. Tokenistic treatment of neighbourhood-based 
governance forms in the city is apparent (demonstrated by the experiences of the case 
study entities), especially if their areas lack the assets that are perceived as able to 
lever market forces.
Table 53: Baltimore Urban Governance Characteristics
Urban Governance Characteristics Associated
Neighbourhood-based 
Governance Functions
Locus of 
authority
Urban level 
lead
Urban
governance
form
Policy
subsystem for
deprived
neighbourhoods
Predominant Other
Urban
level
City govt & 
private 
sector -  not 
corporate, 
but
philanthropic 
& ‘quasi- 
corporate’ 
non-profit 
anchor
Governance 
network 
rather than 
urban 
regime
Comprises city 
govt, private 
philanthropies 
& non-profit 
sector -  
expressed in 
housing 
typology
Self-help -  
levering 
market forces 
*
Democracy,
Competence,
Steering,
Tokenism
Baltimore’s urban governance network sets the state and market imperatives which 
are pursued at city-wide and neighbourhood levels. State imperatives are subservient 
to market imperatives given the ethos of leveraging the market in the city. The most 
significant ‘market strengths’ or assets which determine the urban governance’s 
approach to the neighbourhood-level are the state of the neighbourhood housing
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market, and the presence of anchor institutions with growth needs which underpin 
development of the bioscience sector. This results in what can be characterised as an 
ad hoc set of attempts, influenced by its neo-liberal context, where neighbourhood 
initiatives are favoured when they relate to the predominant policy driver of economic 
development.
5.4 Conclusion
To conclude it is important to consider the implications of the urban governance 
network’s strategies and actions in terms of the relative power of the neighbourhood 
level within its multi-level governance context.
Unlike the (intent at least of the) requirement for an LSP in England, Baltimore’s 
network structure lacks a means of routinely including neighbourhood-level actors in 
deliberations regarding neighbourhood-level activities and approaches. This is a 
strong indicator of the lack of power at neighbourhood level.
v * i v
The network constructs neighbourhoods in terms of the state of their housing market, 
institutionalised as a policy approach in the housing typology. The typology can be 
regarded as a proxy for levels of neighbourhood distress in which a distinction is 
made between neighbourhoods that are ‘salvageable’ in light of the resources 
available, and those that are not. This pragmatic approach resulted from a growing 
realisation, originating in the foundation community, of Baltimore’s huge extent of 
need and lack of resource. It is unsurprising that such an approach originated in the 
private philanthropic community as it is not subject to the equity requirements to 
which the city government must pay heed. It evidences what Stoker et al. (2009: 14) 
describe as “a triage approach to policymaking”.
Baltimore can therefore be described as not just a ‘twin’ but a ‘multi-track’ city. The 
typology’s ‘middle’ neighbourhoods provide the focus for some network members, 
particularly the local foundations and intermediaries, where interventions may be able 
to ‘improve market conditions’. The paradox of having a market-oriented policy in 
Baltimore is most apparent in the ‘distressed’ neighbourhoods. While some network 
members address the ‘distressed’ areas, this is not routine, but where these areas
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intersect with anchored- opportunities for redevelopment. Therefore, the 
neighbourhoods most in need -  those that are distressed and lack an asset in terms of 
an ‘ed and med’ anchor -  tend to be excluded from the network’s activity. These 
neighbourhoods are further penalised in terms of network attention as they are most 
likely to lack the neighbourhood capacity sought by initiative sponsors. There is 
significant competition between neighbourhoods for limited resources and many 
needs are unmet.
In the context of this research’s cross-national comparison, Baltimore evidences the 
experiences of a city within a federal governmental system. This system has weak 
fiscal equalisation, and lacks significant and consistent national funding for 
neighbourhood initiatives, which compounds the city’s own weak tax base. Lack of 
resource makes it much harder for the network to maintain a coherent approach, even 
though the housing typology provides a framework for targeting neighbourhoods. In 
this context network members are driven towards an opportunistic approach, best 
expressed in terms of the network’s focus on EBDI, where tackling neighbourhood 
distress is a subservient policy domain to economic development policy concerns.
Therefore network attention focuses at the neighbourhood level when the 
neighbourhood has assets which the network regards as a priority to ‘lever’. EBDI 
gains its high profile given the perceived ability of the ‘ed and med’ sector to lever 
private investment, thus encouraging network resource. Links with such projects can 
elevate neighbourhood concerns and neighbourhood actors may be able to mobilise to 
negotiate community benefits, particularly if they have the capacity to do so (and in 
this example the Casey Foundation are supporting neighbourhood capacity building). 
But by engaging, neighbourhood actors can be said to have been co-opted into sharing 
the network’s vision of their future development. So any ‘power’ gained is that 
enabled by the network in the pursuit of its imperatives and is clearly circumscribed 
by the network.
In this localist and privatist governance system, neighbourhoods that have the 
capacity to self-help are more likely to do so. This is demonstrated by the experiences 
of the case study entities. Key in the international comparative context of this 
research is that the two entities can be said to be operating in spite of rather than
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because of, not only government, but the urban governance network as a whole. " 
While this could be regarded as evidence of power accruing at the neighbourhood 
level, it is really a reflection of the localist and privatist nature of the governance 
network, in which neighbourhoods can be said to be empowered to ‘go it alone’ given 
the network’s lack of steering and its opportunistic approach. However, such 
‘power’, which relates to the internal capacities of the neighbourhoods to help 
themselves, is extremely limited. The case study entities are ongoing due to their 
being anchored in horizontal relationships. When neighbourhoods lack the assets 
sought by the key members of the urban governance network, and also lack such 
anchoring, initiatives to alleviate their deprivation will not occur.
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Chapter 6  ^ *
BRISTOL FINDINGS and ANALYSIS
6.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out the findings and analysis of the empirical work in Bristol, 
England, applying the theoretical framework set out in chapter 2 and using the 
methodological approach set out in chapter 3. Chapter 4 sets the scene for this 
chapter by detailing the relevant national, regional and local policies and approaches.
The chapter first presents application of the ‘ideal-type’ characteristics framework to 
two neighbourhood governance entities. Steering is revealed as the principal function 
of both entities, as their creation, structuring and operations have been steered by 
central government. The other functions of such governance are also evident to 
differing degrees. The democracy function is clear in the way the bodies are 
structured, which reflects the resident-led emphasis in their respective government 
funding regimes. Competence is also expressed given the bodies’ engagement in 
service provision, and latterly has received more emphasis given government’s shift 
to service-influencing neighbourhood management approaches. Self-help is apparent 
in some of the approaches enabled by the well-resourced government programmes 
and in both entities’ attempts to sustain operations after these. Given that the bodies 
are now no longer a focus for the broader urban governance network, tokenism is also 
implicit to the predominant account of steering. Both bodies are struggling to adapt 
given the context of chum in government policies and funding sources.
The chapter then considers Bristol’s urban governance system and applies the 
framework of expected characteristics for England to the city. Analysis reveals that 
Bristol does display the attributes which can be expected in this centrist and 
managerial governmental system. The network is truly multi- rather than city-level. 
The structure of this network and the relationships within it are shaped by central 
government, which directs which actors are engaged, their level of resource and 
power, and the plans and strategies which frame the approaches taken, at regional, 
city and neighbourhood level. Central government control is evident in the priorities
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which are pursued, and manifested inihe network’s structure, which is crowded, and 
in its operations, which are subject to significant chum and instability given changes 
in central government policies.
Finally, the implications of the multi-level governance network’s strategies and 
actions are considered. The relative power of the neighbourhood level, and indeed the 
urban level, within this multi-level governance context is determined by central 
government. In this centrist and managerial governance system, any power at 
neighbourhood level derives from the attentions of government funding regimes and 
policy approaches. Central government sets the imperatives which are pursued at 
city-wide and neighbourhood levels. Changes at these levels mirror central 
government policy shifts from the explicit targeting of deprived areas via area-based 
initiatives to a broader emphasis on neighbourhood engagement in and influence on 
service delivery. But the agenda of tackling deprivation is secondary to the 
predominant imperative of economic and housing growth. The needs of deprived 
neighbourhoods are subservient to this market imperative, with policies seeking to 
link such neighbourhoods to this growth. This highlights that government attempts to 
tackle neighbourhood deprivation are undertaken within and influenced by the neo­
liberal context. Without dedicated resource, the formal governance entities which 
may exist given earlier governmental initiatives are increasingly having to rely on 
notions of self-help, irrespective of their capacity to do so.
6.2 Neighbourhood-based Initiative Governance Entities
To assess the extent to which each of the five functions identified for neighbourhood- 
based initiative governance entities is evident in reality, the structures and operations 
of the two case study entities are assessed against the attributes as set out in the 
heuristic framework of ‘ideal-type’ entities by function (as set out in Table 2.1). A 
sample entity-level interview guide is appended (at Appendix 2).
For each case study below, a brief history of the entity precedes assessment against 
the framework of characteristics of ‘ideal-type’ entities according to function. This, 
set out in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, includes only those typology characteristics which are 
evidenced by the entity. Detailed consideration of each entity’s structure and
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operations by function, including representative quotes from respondents, is then 
presented. Figure 3 shows the location of the two case study entities within the city.
Figure 3: Location of Bristol Case Study Entities
City o f  Bristol
Community at Heart 
(CaH)
Hartcliffe & Withywood 
Community Partnership 
(HWCP)
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■6.2.1. Community at Heart (CaH)
Community at Heart is the body created to oversee delivery of the government’s New 
Deal for Communities (NDC) ten-year, £50 million programme in Bristol which 
commenced in July 2000 (more detail about the NDC regime is provided in chapter 
4). The area covered by CaH (generally known as Barton Hill) is located in inner east 
Bristol and has a total population of 5,500, significantly smaller than that of the other 
case study entities.
CaH is a company limited by guarantee with charitable status. Its “vision” is to 
“create a strong and responsible community that has the ability to understand, engage 
and overcome its problems, enabling residents to build a safe environment that fulfils 
local needs, inspires and provides opportunities for all” (CaH Revised Strategic Plan, 
2005: 7). In 2001 the area was designated as one of Bristol’s ten Neighbourhood 
Renewal Fund (NRF) ‘priority neighbourhoods’. This funding stream was in place 
until 2008. It was also a neighbourhood management pilot from 2006 until 2008. It is 
now gaining transitional funding until 2010. Most recently the entity has been 
commissioned by the council to lead on development of a neighbourhood partnership 
(explained in chapter 4) for its broader two-ward area.
At its inception the NDC was a ‘flagship’ government programme. CaH has 
subsequently been buffeted by changes in policy approaches, compounded by a 
decline in resource as the programme comes to its end. The scope of its operations 
has accordingly shrunk. The entity predominantly reflects the steering interpretation 
of neighbourhood-based initiative governance, which is presented first in Table 6.1 
below. This is despite the emphasis placed on community engagement in the NDC 
programme and latterly in neighbourhood management approaches, though this is 
reflected in the allusions to the democracy and competence functions evident in the 
entity’s structure and operations. Some characteristics of the self-help ‘ideal-type’ 
entity are evident, but this relates to the government’s programme and the entity will 
be unable to sustain the extent of these operations after the programme ends. 
Tokenism is also evident as the entity is no longer a focus for the broader urban 
governance network given its declining resource and a shift away from such area- 
based approaches. Indeed, the tokenism account of the function of neighbourhood 
governance is intrinsic to the predominant account of steering.
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Table 6.1: CaH: ‘Ideal-Type’ Entity Characteristics Evident
Structure Operations
St
ee
ri
ng
• Instigated by central government
• Sponsor specifies structure in terms of 
population size covered
• Sponsors) represented on board (GOSW 
and Bristol City Council)
• Sponsor funds (though does not employ) 
entity staff
• 10-year programme lifetime
• Close monitoring against targets
• Sponsor determines some of entity operations 
(defining 5 out of 10 programme themes)
• Entity heavily reliant on sponsor funding
• Emphasis on consensus in board deliberations
D
em
oc
ra
cy
• Maj ority (10 out of 17 voting members) 
resident representation on board
• Elected resident board representation by 
four sub-areas
• Resident quorum of 3 residents for 
decision-making
• Resident representative-led board sub­
committees
•  Board-determined funding allocation over 
devolved budgets
• Broad resident engagement in identifying needs and 
priorities (MORI-conducted residents’ survey)
• Capacity building o f resident members with 
leadership training and support
C
om
pe
te
nc
e •  Resident board representation
• Statutory service provider representation 
(including a local councillor)
•  Third sector service provider board 
representation
• Broad resident engagement in identifying needs and 
priorities (MORI-conducted residents’ survey)
• Significant though waning service provider 
involvement
•  Monitoring and re view of services and resident 
satisfaction
Se
lf-
he
lp
• Majority resident representation on board
• Small self-generated funding streams
• Sponsor emphasis on capacity building of 
entity and residents
•  Devolved budgets during NDC 
programme
• Entity able to determine some of its operations 
(defining 5 out of 10 programme themes)
• Able to develop, appraise and fund own projects 
during programme
• Able to design and engage in supplemental service 
delivery during programme
• Small property asset base
• Small self-generated income stream
• Resourced capacity building activities during 
programme
• Entity able to continue for at least a limited period in 
absence of sponsor but with greatly reduced 
operations
Structure Operations
T
ok
en
is
m
Not applicable •  Lack of ongoing support for entity after programme
• Lack of engagement from statutory service providers/ 
government as programme comes to an end
• No longer a priority/ links reduced to urban 
governance network
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Steering
The steering interpretation is uppermost with regard to CaH. The body would not 
exist in the absence of central government’s NDC programme. Its programmatic 
origins are evident in the way it is structured. Its central (and local) government 
sponsors are represented on the entity’s board (as ‘non-voting’ members). The 
requirements of the NDC programme have affected the entity’s structuring in terms of 
the type of neighbourhoods sought and the population covered. The entity also 
displays the steering ‘ideal-type’ characteristics of a delimited programme timeframe 
and is subject to close monitoring against targets:
“I t ’s been a flagship programme for [GOSW], and the advice and guidance 
and input that they ’ve given there, and particularly during the times when there was a 
fractious relationship between CaH and the council, they were invaluable ” [Council 
Officer].
“[The Board has] got a government person because it’s government money” 
[GOSW Official].
“In many respects, particularly early on in the programme, many 
responsibilities and actions were taken by say, the Government Office or the 
accountable body [Bristol City Council] which could have been actions and decisions 
taken by the CaH board. But for whatever reason, ofpower, o f  a desire for control, 
o f an inexperience in the resident members, certain decisions or actions were taken 
which would not necessarily I  would say show that the residents were leading the 
process ” [Entity staff].
The steering interpretation is central to the entity’s operations. Central government 
defined five thematic priorities that the entity had to pursue (albeit in areas which did 
correlate with residents’ concerns). While the board does have devolved budgets, any 
investment over £250,000 requires GOSW approval, and projects (those related to 
drugs are cited) can be ‘called in’ for review by GOSW if they are deemed 
contentious:
“[The project appraisal process] is a bit bureaucratic, we did have this really, 
really quite firm guidance from the government as to what needs to be in it” [Resident 
Board Member].
“ What happens repeatedly right the way through the process is the 
government wanted to influence what it is we did... they’ve been very, very difficult 
about for instance how assets are built up and things like that. They’ve been very, 
constantly obsessed with their own processes around spend targets ” [Resident Board 
Member].
“It was a real experiment, unfortunately the scientist has interfered so much 
with the experiment that they ’re not going to learn very much from it because they 
didn’t let it run ” [Resident Board Member].
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The entity, as a company limited by guarantee with charitable status, employs its own 
professional staff rather than these being employed by the sponsors, though the 
sponsors provide the funding for these posts. However, it is evident that staff, who 
act as theme co-ordinators, project deliverers, and prepare meeting papers, do steer 
deliberations and decisions, which undermines the purported ‘resident-led’ ethos of 
the entity. Entity staff numbers culminated at a peak of about 65 at the height of the 
programme:
“When it comes to the actual board discussions... it’s already been steered in 
whatever direction they want it to go in, so odds on it probably will do ” [Resident 
Board Member].
“I  think people have wanted to reach consensus and I  think in general people 
have hung back a little on occasions in expressing their view, in the hope o f achieving 
a consensus ” [Entity staff].
“It was total, this is the major plan [for public housing regeneration], 
this is what we ’re going to do, tough basically, is how it felt. And I  still think there’s 
a feeling o f  that now. So it was very much ‘done to ’ and it went against all o f what 
CaH’s literature and le t’s talk about resident-led” [Third sector representative Board 
Member].
The steering account is also more subtly evident in the entity’s efforts to sustain itself 
after the programme lifetime. The board decision that its succession strategy be 
reliant on development of a neighbourhood management approach and an asset-base 
can be interpreted as the entity’s attempt to adapt in the context of government policy 
shifts as bundled under the ‘neighbourhoods agenda’ banner:
“But again, I  think that’s just a government initiative, or a council initiative, 
whatever, pushing you. So you don 7 have no choice, but I  think possibly we ’11 make 
the best o f  a bad job i f  you like... ” [Resident Board Member].
“I  really do feel it’s resident-led, I  also think there’s sometimes a push in the 
background to where it should be going, and where they want you to go. As in [the 
council’s introduction o f neighbourhood partnerships]... it wouldn ’t necessarily be 
probably what people would want here, but i t’s something that the council, 
government, want, so therefore it’s sort o f happened” [Resident Board Member].
The entity’s origins, development and its shifts in operations have been absolutely 
interdependent with the government’s time-limited NDC programme that has not only 
resourced but framed these processes.
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Democracy  ^ •»
This function is particularly evident in the way CaH is structured, but the 
professionalised nature of its operations confirm the predominance of the steering 
account for this neighbourhood governance body.
Voting board members comprise a majority of elected local residents, as well as 
representatives of young people, local business, a school, churches, third sector 
organisations and a local councillor. Resident majorities are also in place on the 
various formal decision-making board sub-groups, as well as project task groups:
“I  can say i t ’s democracy, I ’m not saying I  speak for every resident, I  don’t, 
because I ’m only an employee, but my board are accountable, they were elected” 
[Entity staff).
“The quorum is... how we build in that sort o f resident power” [Resident 
Board Member].
However, respondents recognise that it is only in the entity’s operations that a 
resident-led ethos can be realised:
“Structures can help, they enshrine things in law... it provides a kind o f solid 
m o o r in g b u t almost more important than that is that there’s somehow, whether 
through'natural ability Or through training, or indeed through the way in which the ~*- 
executive report to and support those various groups, they are... empowered to take 
leadership ” [Entity Staff].
“But Ifeel that unless a resident feels that their voice is being heard, whether 
it actually is or it isn 7 [laughs], they just give up if  they know damn well it’s not 
being heard. So... yeah, I  think you ’ve always got to have that belief that it’s 
happening. And I  think once you lose that, you just give up really ’’ [Resident Board 
Member].
Respondents share a belief that not only that the way in which the entity is structured 
reflects its resident-led ethos, but that its operations attempt to deliver this. Capacity 
building of resident board members via training programmes and support is 
undertaken:
“For every board meeting we have, we do have a pre-board meeting... 
because some o f the papers are difficult to understand. I  mean, we are only sort of, at 
the end o f the day, we are only residents doing ordinary jobs, you know. We are not 
trained to do particular things’’ [Resident Board Member].
“There are issues about culture and mindset which are probably most 
important in terms o f whether the structural aspect o f resident leadership then flows 
through to a real leadership ’’ [Entity staff].
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However, overall the role of entity staff -  including as theme co-ordinators, project
deliverers, in preparing papers -  indicates a professionalised mode of operation and
raises queries about the extent to which the voice of resident representatives is heard:
“/  stay here 24/7, and I think we got very fed  up ofpeople at CaH, all their 
employees, none o f them lived in the area, so they had this sort o f weird take on it, 
you know, I ’m going home now... regeneration is about skilling people up so that they 
can deal with their own stuff, you know” [Third sector representative Board Member].
“When it comes to the actual board discussions... it’s already been steered in 
whatever direction they want it to go in, so odds on it probably will do ” [Resident 
Board Member].
The classic concern regarding the ‘usual suspects’ being engaged and a parochialism
and insularity developing is echoed by some respondents. It was also felt that now the
NDC programme is coming to its end it will be harder to refresh resident
representation on the board:
“You always get people in an area like this, you either engage them... or you 
don’t... Some people don 7 want to be engaged in all o f this, it’s just they just want to 
get on with their own lives. I ’m not one o f those [laughs], obviously” [Third sector 
representative board member].
In 2007 the board consulted residents on its structure, cited in itself as an example of 
the resident-led ethos in practice. This resulted in continuation of the same model for 
board membership of locally elected residents and service providers.
Competence
The competence function is also evident in the way CaH is structured, but CaH’s 
ability to engage in direct service delivery during the programme, combined with a 
waning in service provider engagement now that dedicated resource has declined, 
show that it is not operating in accord with this function. This also confirms the 
predominance of the steering account.
Respondents stress the importance of residents’ knowledge and experience of living
in the area to inform the entity and its operations:
‘Tom don 7 need a board place for someone who can read a profit and loss 
account, those are easy skills to get actually... what we really want is people who 
have an experience o f living here ” [Entity Staff].
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This emphasises the entity’s neighbourhood management role, also evident in the 
board’s ‘non-voting’ membership, which comprises representatives of Bristol Primary 
Care Trust, Avon and Somerset Police and Bristol City Council. Other partners, from 
agencies and the third sector, are involved in the relevant programme theme groups. 
However, respondents recognise that at its outset, the entity was under pressure to 
quickly expend the NDC grant funds. This led to a tendency for projects to be 
delivered by the entity rather than mainstream services and partners, inhibiting its 
ability to influence service delivery and encourage responsiveness on the part of 
service providers. As the programme progressed the strategic lead for some themes 
was moved to partner agencies. In 2006, the entity adopted an ethos of not 
duplicating existing services and not providing services for which suitable providers 
could be identified and funded. In all, about 40% of the NDC programme’s projects 
have been delivered by the entity itself rather than third parties.
The entity’s large resource and resultant power earlier in the programme, expressed 
via the entity’s direct delivery of services, is perceived by council respondents as 
duplicating provision as well as leading to dysfunction and ineffectiveness in the 
entity’s relationships with the council:
“At one point [CaH] had grown to the point o f having 70, 80 staff delivering 
programmes across a range o f activity, were actively jousting with the council at 
every opportunity, rather than looking at ways o f how they can engage and work with 
us to deliver what they wanted to do. And they were in a, at one point an extreme 
example o f sort o f appearing to want to try and go it alone, and do things without 
having to involve us... whatever you think o f the local authority as a neighbourhood- 
based entity, you ’ve got to work with them ” [Council Officer].
“It was quite a combative approach... an extreme gap-filling exercise that in 
some cases was starting to duplicate what the council, and other agencies, could also 
provide... ” [Council Officer].
“CaH came out o f  the same mentality as Neighbourhood Renewal and they 
were all supposed to be about influencing the mainstream to do things, and here’s a 
bit o f extra money to sort offast-track things and test things out. I  think the flaw... 
was that that pump-priming money became the programme, and it got, the 
mainstreaming agenda took second place ” [Council Officer].
Entity staff cite the need for CaH to fill gaps in provision and deliver what residents 
want:
“We took a pragmatic approach and tried to develop partnerships with the 
council and use the NDC money to lever things to happen that might not have 
happened, or might not have happened as quickly. And then you get criticism...but, 
then you wouldn ’t have it otherwise, you’d  still be waiting” [Entity Staff].
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“We would be constantly under scrutiny from some o f our residents... we 
want better lampposts, or a better school. Well... we ’re here to respond to what they 
want. But frankly, the city council ought to be providing adequate learning facilities 
and adequate street lighting, so what do we do? ’’ [Entity Staff].
Respondents report the variable engagement of the various board members as the
programme has progressed. Early on, attendance of all partners was felt to be good,
but attendance from non-resident board members has declined over time which
respondents relate to the decline in funding available:
“Going back in the early days, I  think there was every partner there was 
around the table, all quite keen because there was a lot o f money to be had. In later, 
this last year or two, now that the money’s spent, you don ’t see the partners. Which is 
quite sad really because they’ve had the money, and it just seems as though they ’re 
not interested’’ [Resident Board Member].
In the latter stages of the programme the competence account is receiving more 
emphasis given a shift to influencing mainstream service provision given its decline in 
resource. However, the true challenge of influencing service provision lies ahead in 
the absence of the level of dedicated resource which respondents state is likely to have 
encouraged agencies to engage.
Self-help
While the self-help function features strongly in the programme’s ‘vision’, it is less 
evident in CaH’s operations. This again asserts the predominance of the steering 
account of its role.
The programme’s “vision”, describing the creation of a “responsible community” and
talking of “enabling residents” (CaH Revised Strategic Plan, 2005: 7) reflects central
government’s rhetoric regarding the NDC regime. Some operationalisation of this is
implied with recognition of a growth in voluntary activity:
“I think i f  Barton Hill started off now, in this process, they ’d have been better 
placed... there is a bottom-up activity going on there that’s been nurtured through 
NDC’’ [Third Sector Support Organisation].
However, the extent to which these operations actually represent resident self-help is 
not clear, especially given the professionally staffed nature of the entity. It is also not 
evident that sufficient capacity has been built during the programme to sustain the 
voluntary activity which has been levered by funded projects. The entity’s effects on
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longstancfeig community supports such as the Barton Hill Settlement, which at one 
stage was dependent on CaH for about 80% of its funding, are also unclear.
The NDC programme did enable the entity to fulfil many of the ‘ideal-type’ self-help 
characteristics. At the programme’s outset there was scope for the identification of 
area-specific concerns and provision of funding allocations for these. An example is 
the ‘Tackling Dealing’ fund, created as a response to residents’ identification of drug 
dealing as a priority in the initial MORI-conducted residents’ survey. When the 
programme was at its height, the entity had sufficient resource to develop, appraise 
and fund its own projects, and engage in supplemental service delivery. During the 
programme the entity has also developed limited self-generated funding streams 
derived from capital assets, which are managed by a committee that deals with ‘non- 
NDC’ business:
"It’s almost like we ’re in the Republic o f New Deal, you know, you’ve got 
your own money, you get on with it” [Entity Staff].
"Over the years we’ve developed a bit o f a life o f  our own so we have a 
company that does have its own business to conduct, you know, it has money that isn 7 
NDC money” [Resident Board Member].
‘ ■**'■*-* " if
The entity’s development of a small asset portfolio during the programme lifetime, 
and its planned use of these assets to generate income, forms part of the basis of its 
“succession strategy” (as set out in the CaH Revised Strategic Plan, 2005). This 
implies continued realisation of some of the self-help ‘ideal-type’ characteristics after 
the programme ends. But the entity has a relatively small asset portfolio:
"We don 7 actually have a very big asset portfolio. Some o f the NDCs have 
got massive ones, they spent loads o f their money on that. We decided to go for the 
social programmes and not buildup big capital portfolios... probably with hindsight 
I  wish w e’d  built a bit more o f an asset base ” [Resident Board Member].
The entity’s succession strategy is to pursue a neighbourhood management model 
until 2013, with a small staff team funded by the entity’s capital assets, and council 
funding for neighbourhood management and neighbourhood partnership work 
(explained in chapter 4). Respondents had varied responses to this strategy:
"We are definitely going to a neighbourhood management structure that will 
be slightly different... what I  expect is that we will keep the same sort o f democratic 
ideas, concepts ” [Resident Board Member].
"IfNDC just came to an endfull stop, all these projects... wouldjust finish, 
and that would be an absolute shame...and i f  it was all finished, would it go back to
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what it was? And all that money would be just wasted. So Ifeel that a  
neighbourhood management model is a good succession plan for us to continue on. 
Not in the same format as CaH, because it won ’t have the money ” [Resident Board 
Member].
“I think it needs a completely fresh approach, with new people and new 
ideas... CaH has done its thing. And we worked out, it was £8,000per person, that 
£50 million. So I  don ’t know whether you’d have been better o ff giving £8,000 to 
each o f us and giving us a co-operative to work with, say, put 10 o f us together, that’s 
£80,000, yeah, OK we can do something with that” [Third sector representative Board 
Member].
While the entity does plan to continue in the absence of its sponsor (in the form of 
central government programmatic resource), these plans only extend for three years 
after the programme lifetime and its operations will be significantly scaled back. It 
will therefore not be fulfilling the self-help ‘ideal-type’ characteristics to the extent 
that it has been enabled to do by the programme. Indeed, it is unclear that the 
programme has built capacity sufficient to enable the community to ‘help itself as 
expressed in the self-help interpretation, in terms of CaH’s ability to sustain itself in 
an open-ended way.
Tokenism
The tokenism account of neighbourhood-based initiative governance is evident in 
CaH’s operations, though this relates to the overall steering of the entity by 
government, asserting the predominance of the steering interpretation of CaH’s role.
Tokenism is evident in the declining engagement of statutory service providers which 
respondents relate to the decline in funding available. It is also obvious in the lack of 
ongoing support for the entity, related to the NDC programme coming to an end and 
the shift in the entity’s operations necessitated by this. This shift in turn can be 
interpreted as being tokenistic - a way of glossing over the ‘special case’ that can be 
made for deprived areas (and the resource commitments entailed in this):
“NDC £50 million,5,500 residents; neighbourhood management up to say 
20,000 residents costs running at £200-400,000 per annum; neighbourhood 
partnerships, over 30,000 residents, £30,000 per annum... Yes o f course, let’s get 
more efficient, le t’s accept the real world, but at some point you have to go, frankly 
that’s not going to make much difference ” [Entity Staff].
“There is certainly less for local people in areas o f  disadvantage to be 
responsible for now. What we are endeavouring to achieve here at CaH is that they 
continue to have influence, and access to influence, that we provide them with some 
independence” [Entity Staff].
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“I've got little alarm bells going on about <the NDC area... the move from 
having megabucks to just having your normal bog standard amounts o f money” 
[Council Officer].
The tokenism interpretation is also evident when CaH is located in its broader context. 
For example, prior to its relaunch, CaH was represented on the Bristol Partnership as 
a ‘community-accountable body’, described as “enabling us to influence change at a 
city-wide strategic level” (CaH Revised Strategic Plan, 2005: 30). The entity’s lack 
of representation indicates that it is no longer regarded as a priority by, and certainly 
is not as explicitly linked into, the urban governance network (explored later in the 
chapter). At its inception, the NDC was central government’s ‘flagship’ programme 
and CaH was the subject of much attention. The entity has subsequently been 
subsumed by changing policies and approaches and is attempting to adapt to these.
6.2.2. Hartcliffe and Withywood Community Partnership (HWCP)
Hartcliflfe and Withywood Community Partnership (HWCP) was established in 1998 
by local residents and organisations, with the support of the Bristol Regeneration 
Partnership. The area comprises two post-war housing estates on the periphery of 
South Bristol with a total population of 18,700. At its outset HWCP was an informal 
steering group of local organisations and residents which prepared a bid for round five 
of central government’s Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) funding (more detail 
about the SRB regime is provided in chapter 4). The bid, ‘Working Together for 
Change’ was approved in 1999, with a final award of £12.15 million over seven years. 
The entity became a limited company in 2001 and a registered charity in 2002.
“The vision” set out in the SRB bid was to “create a safe, healthy, learning, working, 
locally owned, balanced and inclusive community” (HWCP, 2007: 8). The SRB 
programme ended in 2007. The entity also received NRF funds as a ‘priority 
neighbourhood’ from 2001 until 2008, and was a neighbourhood management pilot 
from 2006 until 2008. It is now gaining transitional funding until 2010. The entity 
has most recently been commissioned by the council to lead on development of a 
neighbourhood partnership (explained in chapter 4) for its broader three-ward area.
HWCP has had to adapt in the context of changing policies and funding sources. As 
its resource has declined it now plays a less direct role and the need for the entity to
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reconsider the scope of itst>peartions and also its structure moving forward is 
recognised. HWCP predominantly reflects the steering interpretation of 
neighbourhood-based initiative governance, which is presented first in Table 6.2 
below. This is despite the emphasis placed on community engagement in the SRB 
programme and latterly in neighbourhood management approaches, though this is 
reflected in the democracy and competence ‘ideal-type’ characteristics evident in the 
entity’s structure and operations. Some characteristics of the self-help ‘ideal-type’ 
entity are evident, but these were at their height during the SRB programme and the 
entity has been unable to sustain these operations at the same level now the 
programme has ended. Tokenism is also evident as the entity is not a focus for the 
broader urban governance network given its declining resource and a shift away from 
such area-based approaches.
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Table 6.2: HWCP: ‘Ideal-Type’ Entity Characteristics Evident
Structure Operations
St
ee
ri
ng
• Instigated by central government
• Sponsor broadly specifies structure
• (A) sponsor represented on board (Bristol 
City Council)
• Sponsor funds (though does not employ) 
entity staff
• 7-year programme lifetime
• Close monitoring against targets
• Sponsor determines some of entity operations 
(defining programme themes)
• Entity heavily reliant on sponsor funding
D
em
oc
ra
cy • Majority (10 out of 19) resident representation on board
• Elected resident board representation by 5 
sub-areas
• Board-determined funding allocation over 
devolved budgets during SRB programme
• Resident representatives’ voice heard on board
• Capacity building of resident members with an 
induction programme, training and mentoring
C
om
pe
te
nc
e • Resident board representation
• Statutory service provider representation 
(including a local councillor)
• Third sector service provider board 
representation
• Significant though waning service provider 
involvement
• Entity has had some influence on service provision 
(especially policing and community safety)
• Some service providers responsive
• Innovation evident
Se
lf-
he
lp
• Majority resident representation on board
• Small self-generated funding streams
• Sponsor emphasis on capacity building of 
entity and residents
• Devolved budgets during SRB programme
• Entity able to determine some of its operations
• Able to develop, appraise and fund own projects 
during programme
• Able to design and engage in supplemental service 
delivery during programme
• Small property asset base
• Small self-generated income stream
• Resourced capacity building activities during 
programme
• Entity able to continue for at least a limited period in 
absence of sponsor but with greatly reduced 
operations
To
ke
ni
sm
Not applicable • Lack of ongoing support for entity after programme
• Lack of engagement from statutory service providers/ 
government as programme ended
• No longer a priority/ links reduced to urban 
governance network
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Steering
Like CaH, HWCP would not exist in the absence of a central government funding 
regime, in this case the SRB programme. Its programmatic origins are evident in the 
way it is structured, with its sponsor (the council) represented on the entity’s board. 
Unlike CaH, however, central government in the form of GOSW is not represented. 
But the requirements of the SRB programme have bounded the entity’s broad 
structure in terms of the types of neighbourhoods sought and the population covered. 
The entity also displays some steering ‘ideal-type’ characteristics given the delimited 
SRB programme timeframe and its monitoring requirements.
The steering interpretation is central to the entity’s operations given the major effects 
that changes in its various funding streams have had upon it. HWCP has moved from 
a direct role, with the ability to appraise and fund projects as well as provide services, 
to a facilitating or influencing role as a “neighbourhood management delivery agent” 
(HWCP, 2008: 5). Via the SRB programme’s high level of funding, government 
encouraged as well as enabled the entity to have a community-led regeneration ethos. 
Latterly, the much reduced resource associated with the neighbourhood management 
pilot funded by government and then the council’s neighbourhood management/ 
neighbourhood partnership funding streams have necessitated the entity’s shift to a 
community-influencing neighbourhood management ethos. The government’s NRF, 
given the level of resource and the role of the Bristol Partnership/ council within it, 
can be seen as a transition between the two approaches. These changes in funding 
regime and their associated requirements are reflected in changes in HWCP’s 
programme themes. During the SRB programme seven ‘theme groups’ were 
established which matched the SRB programme’s ‘strategic objectives’. These were 
reduced to five with the shift from SRB to NRF, reflecting neighbourhood renewal 
floor targets. The structure now comprises six ‘neighbourhood management task 
groups’, in line with Local Area Agreement outcomes.
While respondents reiterate the entity’s resident-led ethos, they see the necessity of 
adapting in light of their changing funding context:
“The core 's always been about community involvement and listening to the 
voice o f the community and the residents that are actually here. But to actually 
qualify for these pots o f money you have to have a little bit o f negotiation... i f  we 
wouldn 7 agree how they would like this money spent, then we wouldn 7 get it... it’s
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funny because we ’ve always said i t ’s not about the money, but i t’s really difficult to 
separate... But we do know the reality is that eventually pots o f money will dwindle, 
we have to think about, OK, i f  we want to be here to stay, how do we make that 
actually happen? ” [Resident Board Member].
“[The neighbourhood management plans required as a pilot area] were nigh 
on unworkable. No one ever looked at it, once you ’dgot the damn thing signed off...
I  don 7 think they were intended to be so cumbersome, but in reality it was hell” 
[Entity staff].
“I think the neighbourhood partnership stuff... if  we didn 7 do that, city 
council would come in and do it anyway, you know. And we didn 7 see the point in 
actually having two doing very similar things in the same area, i t ’s a waste o f time 
and resources. And actually it’s also a way o f us still being able to keep our finger in 
the p ie” [Resident Board Member].
“What's been the issue with all these pots o f  money, SRB, OK fine, we knew 
that there was seven years, but you know, neighbourhood renewal, neighbourhood 
management, two year slots. I t ’s been an absolute flipping nightmare ” [Resident 
Board Member].
HWCP, as a company limited by guarantee with charitable status, employs its own 
professional staff, albeit funded by sponsors. It is not evident that the staff undermine 
HWCP’s resident-led ethos and respondents regarded HWCP’s ability to employ staff 
as a positive aspect of the entity, despite the difficulty of dealing with redundancies 
necessitated by a decline in funding, particularly with the end of NRF in 2008.
The shift in HWCP’s operations, as well as its existence, cannot be separated from the 
funding regimes from which it has gained resource. Respondents typically recognise 
that HWCP now faces the challenge, in the absence of significant funding, of 
reconsidering its structure and role:
“We had to redefine what the organisational role is. Which is a bit o f a 
challenge. The board are used to allocating money, millions. How do we find a 
board where you say, you know, wouldn 7 you like some influence? You know, it’s a 
different game” [Entity Staff].
“I think they ’re going to struggle for an identity and a focus... i t’s also 
knowing what you ’re there fo r ” [Third sector representative former Board Member].
Democracy
This function is emphasised in the HWCP’s ‘vision’ and in the way that it is 
structured, but while democratic intent is clear, the way in which changing funding 
regimes have affected the ability of the entity to have a say in its operations confirm 
the predominance of the steering account for this neighbourhood governance body.
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Like CaH, HWCP’s board has a majority of locally elected residents from the entity’s 
five constituent sub-areas. Capacity building of resident members is undertaken, 
including training and an induction programme, the provision of a computer and 
internet access, and a mentor if required. Some of the other board places are held by 
representatives of priority issue areas, including local youth projects and the area 
housing committee, and advisors on race and disability from third sector groups.
These structural characteristics do reflect that HWCP was established as a 
“community-led partnership” to “lead on the regeneration of the area”. This 
contrasted with the model used in previous rounds of SRB of a council-led 
programme:
“That local control... that also happened to be in tune with the government as 
well in the sense that NDC was meant to be resident-led... the local community 
partnership was set up to lead on the regeneration o f the area. SRB was a means o f  
doing that, it wasn 7 set up to manage an SRB programme. So that was always a 
benefit, that it had this wider vision, it wasn 7 just seen as a vehicle to run the SRB 
programme, the SRB was a way o f delivering that broader vision ” [Former Entity 
Staff].
In its “vision statement”, the entity describes itself as “a powerful voice for Hartcliffe 
and Withywood. It brings views together... and encourages active participation in the 
democratic process” (HWCP, 2008: 6). Its democratic credentials gain credence from 
its ‘grassroots’ origins. Respondents state that HWCP operates according to its ethos 
of being a community-led entity:
“We’ve felt actually that there's been a lot o f local input and it has been 
community-led’’ [Third sector representative former Board Member].
“I think one o f the things we achieved about it was I think we sorted out and 
dealt with all that bureaucracy o f all those different funding streams, we took that on 
and sorted it all out, without restraining the residents ’ decisions about what they 
wanted to do ” [Former Entity Staff].
“SRB 5, we were the ones... OK, the city council was holding the money but in 
the end we were the ones that were making the decisions ” [Resident Board Member].
However, resident member respondents were very aware of the effect that changes in 
funding streams have had upon the entity in terms of its operations. During the SRB 
programme, project proposals were considered by the entity’s relevant theme group 
composed of voluntary and statutory partners and resident members. Proposals were 
then considered by an appraisal panel before being referred to the board. However, 
the project appraisal function regarding NRF allocations was held by the Bristol
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Partnership (with thcrseouncil as ‘accountable body’ to government, as it had been for 
SRB funds) rather than the entity:
“Not being able to appraise, our panels... we took really hard. And I  think 
there were a number o f local residents that felt as i f  we were selling out, to be quite 
honest, because we Ve got the skills, we can prove that we could actually do it. So 
there was that feeling that we were selling out to the council because they’d thrown a 
wobbly and we were giving them back their dummy” [Resident Board Member].
“The change from SRB 5 to neighbourhood renewal, neighbourhood 
management. I  think going from being an organisation that made decisions about 
projects... was quite difficult... the effect it had on us was that we felt that some o f 
the controls and the powers had actually been taken away from us ” [Resident Board 
Member].
The end of NRF funding in 2008 is regarded as an especially challenging period for 
HWCP, but respondents agree that it had clarified the board’s role and built its 
members’ capacity, though partner board member engagement has declined.
However, the difficulty of sustaining and extending resident involvement in the 
absence of funding is also recognised:
‘7/ was a very difficult periodfor the Partnership... some o f the issues around 
cuts in funding, and staffing issues that came up in terms o f making people 
redundant... it made some o f the board have a stronger sense o f ownership because 
they actually realised it was up to them, that potentially they could have walked away 
and said this is all so horrible, and that would have been the end o f it, but in fact they 
kept in and worked through... so I  think there’s a challenge and a strength that came 
out o f it as they took on that and gained the experience, not a very nice experience, 
but gained the experience and skills to do that ” [Former Entity Staff].
“We do have advisors, but we hardly ever see them. Even when we ve asked 
them on odd occasions they don 7 always come, and i t ’s been quite difficult... we ’re 
quite happy with the core that we’ve got... as long as we have a majority o f residents 
actually at board meetings then I think we ’re pretty happy ” [Resident Board 
Member].
‘7  know this is the wrong thing, but i f  there’s no budgets and no money, Ifind  
that impossible to think about. I  am a resident. What’s the point? ” [Resident Board 
Member].
Respondents typically recognise the challenges now faced by HWCP as funding 
streams have dwindled and many of the projects are complete or have had to end. 
While several stress the need for a reconsideration of the entity’s structure and role 
moving forward, some emphasise the need not only for resident representation but for 
board members with appropriate skills:
“You probably want to review the nature o f the board o f HWCP... HWCP 
comes through clearly for the community and residents... I  think the agencies on the 
HWCP have not always been clear about their role... maybe they’re better
v-
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represented on the neighbourhood partnership and HWCP Board is predominantly 
residents” [Former Entity Staff].
“Actually you Ve now managing a building worth about £2 million, probably 
now a turnover o f £0.5 million... I ’d still keep obviously that resident, community 
ethos but maybe i t ’s more important that you get those skills I  think to support that” 
[Former Entity Staff].
“The main emphasis has been about community involvement and actually 
getting it, and getting the voice out there. But we do know the reality is that 
eventually pots o f money will dwindle, we have to think about, OK, i f  we want to be 
here to stay, how do we make that actually happen? ” [Resident Board Member].
Competence
The competence function is also evident in the way that HWCP is structured, and was 
evident in HWCP’s ability to influence and innovate in service provision during the 
SRB programme. However, the reduced ability to engage in service delivery and a 
waning in service provider engagement now that dedicated resource has declined, 
show that it is not operating in accord with this function. This also confirms the 
predominance of the steering account.
The entity is structured to engage local residents along with agencies in how the 
^dedicated programmatic funds from SRB and NRF were used in the area, as reflected 
in the board’s composition. This includes ‘nominated directors’ from mainstream 
partner organisations including the council, the police, and the Primary Care Trust:
“Our structures were set up to sort o f  manage and engage local residents and 
citizens... put in the same room, local residents and council officers or health and 
police, and discuss the issues. And then that ’s spilled into more broader things ” 
[Former Entity Staff].
“The resident involvement was about defining appropriate local solutions 
where services were failing. And then maybe assisting in the development ofprojects 
to try and plug those holes ” [Entity Staff].
More notably than CaH, HWCP has had some successes in influencing service 
provision, with innovation evident in its NRF-funded introduction of Police 
Community Support Officers (PCSOs), and an SRB-funded childcare advice service, 
both since introduced city-wide. However, the downside of ‘mainstreaming’ is 
recognised as the entity area has seen its three member community safety team 
reduced to one person when the initiative was more widely adopted. Respondents 
recognise that it is in operations and relationships that influence is realised. Some 
respondents also posit the possibility that the entity had a broader impact on modes of
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working and policy, facilitated by professional peer exchange rs  part of the SRB 
programme, and subsequently via the National Neighbourhood Management 
Network:
“I think [HWCP] was founded at that stage where SRB was starting to be a 
little bit less about concrete and a little bit more about actually how do we engage 
mainstream services, but I  think it was largely... how [HWCP staff] and others 
developed the partnership. Thinking along the lines o f neighbourhood renewal, 
national strategy and all those kinds o f things, and actually to an extent they’ve 
probably been more successful, even than NDC which is explicitly founded on the 
idea that you have a relationship with the service providers and they then vary what 
they do so you can tackle deprivation more effectively based on resident 
involvement... But in a way [HWCP staff] did that more effectively with less money, 
just by muscling through the right doors ” [GOSW Official].
“It was about getting our way o f thinking, yeah, influencing other people’s 
budgets, not necessarily our own. And that is really difficult because you don’t have 
control over that” [Resident Board Member].
Increased emphasis on the competence function is evident given an increased reliance 
on neighbourhood management approaches. Respondents also recognise, however, 
that it is only now that HWCP is really facing the challenge of influencing service 
provision, with its forward strategy emphasis on a neighbourhood management model 
and the new neighbourhood partnership, in the absence of its own secure funding 
streams. During the funding programmes, agencies were felt to engage in the entity 
given the money available. Indeed, several entity-level respondents comment that 
some of the agencies represented on the board, and advisors co-opted to it, now often 
do not attend meetings. Moving forward, while the new neighbourhood partnership is 
regarded as providing an opportunity for HWCP to maintain its role in relationships 
between residents and service providers, concern is also expressed regarding whether 
it will constrain scope for innovation in service provision:
“But, with the neighbourhood management, that was more about influencing 
rather than having control, and I  think i t ’s just getting into people’s heads that OK, 
w e’ve got a hell o f  a lot o f experience o f actually living in the area ” [Resident Board 
Member].
“[.Neighbourhood partnership meetings] are fundamentally reactive 
meetings... is there also a level ofproactivity in this, where you have 6 councillors 
around the table on a regular basis, and you can tackle things in a different way? ” 
[Entity staff].
Self-help
While the self-help function is evident in HWCP’s origins, it is less evident in its 
operations, again asserting the predominance of the steering account of its role.
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HWCP’s ‘grassroots’ origins imply-a greater realisation of the self-help function than 
that evidenced by CaH. However, the entity’s existence can largely be attributed to 
the SRB programme, as the entity’s inception as an informal steering group was 
promulgated by the opportunity of bidding for SRB funds. In turn, limits on the 
entity’s ability to determine its operations, exemplified by the changing structure of 
its ‘theme groups’ in response to its changing funding sources, evidence how it is 
constrained in fully realising self-help’s ‘ideal-type’ attributes. But the SRB 
programme in particular did enable the entity to at least partially fulfil many of these 
attributes, giving HWCP sufficient resource to develop, appraise and fund its own 
projects, and engage in supplemental service delivery. A further spur to HWCP’s 
partial fulfilment of the self-help account is that, in contrast with the focus on CaH 
given its ‘flagship’ status, respondents stress that they had been left to ‘get on with it’:
“In a sense it feels like we've been left alone. I ’m surprised that the 
councillors haven 7 got more engaged, more involved... I  had expected to have had 
more interference from the council. Now, when we needed to be with them they did 
support us generally. I  don 7 know whether they just sort offelt, well, let them get on 
with it” [Former Entity Staff].
However, the tension between residentself-help and the entity’s professional staffing 
is recognised:
“The downside o f having all that money meant in a sense there were people 
like me... And you 'd often be in meetings and board members, would say the 
Partnership should do this or do that, and you'd say, wait a minute, you 're the 
Partnership. And what they really meant was they were going to get the staff to do 
that. There was a little bit o f what was HWCP? Was HWCP the local residents on 
the Board, or was HWCP the staff? ’’ [Former Entity Staff].
While HWCP has continued in the absence of its principal sponsor (in the form of 
central government SRB and NRF programmatic resource), its operations have been 
scaled back significantly and it is therefore not fulfilling the self-help ‘ideal-type’ 
characteristics to the extent to which it was enabled previously. Its continued 
existence to date beyond the end of the SRB programme in 2007 does indicate some 
success in terms of HWCP building sufficient capacity during the programme to 
sustain itself, but it is unclear how long the entity will remain in existence or the 
extent to which voluntary activity will still be levered given the reduced number of 
funded projects. The area does benefit from some longstanding community supports, 
such as Hartcliffe and Withywood Ventures (a training provider), and a relatively
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strong heritage-of community-based activities, augmented during the SRB programme * ' ’§*»
with capacity building initiatives.
HWCP does have an asset in the form of the ‘@Symes’ community building, realised
as part of a supermarket-anchored redevelopment, and regarded as a major
achievement. The building, along with neighbourhood management/ neighbourhood
partnership income from the council, forms the basis of HWCP’s ‘forward strategy’.
It is seen as providing a base for the entity from which services can be delivered, and
as generating an income stream for HWCP to invest in what are determined as
priorities for the area. While this implies continued realisation of some of the self-
help ‘ideal-type’ characteristics moving forward, it will not provide a level of
resource comparable to that provided by its previous programmes:
“Really enjoyed being involved in that... I  think in that group there was a lot 
o f give and take in relation to council, Morrison’s, to the community, there was a bit 
o f give and take. So we were able to put the community ’s perspective which was 
really, really good” [Resident Board Member].
“You’ve got the core, sometimes you might just go down back to that core...
But in the end, that’s the idea that we’ve got, we could in a sense ride it out, 
depending on what the council wants or what the government does ” [Entity Staff].
“One oftSSihings we need to look at is our future. Because funding is getting 
smaller, we have to think o f other ways o f being able to generate pennies to be able to 
do some o f  the things that we want to do, and Symes was one o f those ways o f doing 
it, this building was one” [Resident Board Member].
“I  think they ’re going to struggle for an identity and a focus... Yes, they’ve 
got the building, the building is not the thing, i t’s what you do in it, very much so”
[Third sector representative former Board Member].
Tokenism
The tokenism account of neighbourhood-based initiative governance is evident in 
HWCP’s operations, though this relates to the overall steering of the entity by 
government, asserting the predominance of the steering interpretation of its role.
Tokenism is evident in the decline of statutory service provider engagement related by
respondents to its greatly reduced funds now the SRB programme has ended. It is
also obvious in the lack of ongoing support for the entity, and the shift in the entity’s
operations necessitated by this. This shift in itself is tokenistic as it discounts
deprived areas’ ‘special case’ (and the resource commitments that would be entailed):
“The board, and kind o f how much control that has, has actually changed.
And I  think throughout this last process o f neighbourhood renewal, neighbourhood
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management, I ’m sure that we’ve lost local residents through that, because they saw 
the power and the control that they could actually have with the SRB, and then had it 
taken away because o f the other sort ofpots ’’ [Resident Board Member].
“We ’re still considered deprived... I  think there still needs to be that focus. 
And I  think it’s going to be, in the future, it’s just going to have to kind o f look at how 
we can do that, without it sort o f being completely forgotten. Because it can be, with 
the neighbourhood partnership going, and the councillors taking the lead in that, I  
think it could very easily get mislaid’’ [Resident Board Member].
The tokenism interpretation is also evident when HWCP is located in its broader 
context. For example, prior to its relaunch, HWCP, along with CaH, was represented 
on the Bristol Partnership as a ‘community-accountable body’. The entity’s lack of 
representation indicates that it is no longer regarded as a priority by, and certainly is 
not as explicitly linked into, the urban governance network (explored next in the 
chapter). Indeed, HWCP has never been subject to the levels of attention from the 
network experienced by the ‘flagship’ CaH. While this is regarded as positive in 
terms of less interference, respondents are also clear that the entity is not a priority:
“There is a geographic feeling, we ’re isolated, we ’re stuck out on the edge o f  
Bristol. There’s a barrier... Certainly when I  started the feeling was it wasn ’t a 
council priority. Not on the doorstep, whereas CaH was right next to the city centre 
saJhe council’s more interested... officer representation for HWCP was seconckor 
tfnrd tier. We weren ’t considered as important or as a priority there ” [Former Entity 
Staff].
“It feels like we ’re out o f the loop a little bit because we ’re not as involved as 
we were... the city council are kind o f getting their head around all their stuff... they 
just haven’t remembered that there are other people out there that aren ’t just city 
council s ta ff’ [Entity Staff].
6.23. Functions of Neighbourhood Governance Revealed by the Entities
All five of the functions set out in the theoretical framework are evident to a greater or 
lesser extent in the structure and operations of the case study entities examined in 
Bristol. Both the democracy and competence functions are evident in the way the 
entities are structured and operate. The emphasis on competence has been heightened 
given the shift to neighbourhood management. However, the extent to which the 
entities will be able to influence service provision in the absence of the level of 
dedicated resource likely to have encouraged agencies to engage is not yet clear. 
Self-help is evident in some of the approaches, albeit bounded, taken by the entities 
that were enabled by the well-resourced government programmes. It is also apparent 
in both entities’ attempts to develop assets to support their intention to sustain 
operation. But the disjuncture between the intent to self-help and the bodies’ ability
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to realise this is clear. Tokenism is also evident as the entities-are no longer the focus 
for the broader urban governance network given their declining resources and a shift 
away from such area-based approaches.
Unsurprisingly given that both entities were formalised via government programmes, 
they share many similarities in both structure and operations. Both entities are now 
undergoing the transition from the relative security of a long-term and substantive 
government funding regime, to a more vulnerable set of circumstances where attempts 
at some self-reliance are evident in attempts to develop a potential resource- 
generating asset base. However, the main plank of both entities’ forward strategies 
can be regarded as part and parcel of broader policy shifts to neighbourhood 
management.
Steering is the predominant function of both entities, which constitute a microcosm of 
government policy over their lifetime to date as they have struggled to adapt to the 
context of chum in both government policies and funding sources. While this is 
unsurprising given the programmatic nature of the case studies selected, it should be 
stressed that in the English context, examples that meet the unit of study definition are 
almost invariably government-sponsored forms of initiative governance, which are 
thus steered in light of government policy priorities.
This is a key finding in the international comparative context of this research. It is 
also reflective of the centrist and managerial context for neighbourhood-based 
initiative governance in the city, explored in the next section which assesses the city’s 
governance context.
63  City Governance Context
This section explores the city-level urban governance context for neighbourhood- 
based initiative entities. It sets out application of the theoretical framework of the 
expected characteristics of English urban governance and the likely associated 
function of neighbourhood-based initiative governance (as set out in Table 2.2) to 
Bristol.
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The research focuses on what can betermed Bristol’s ‘neighbourhood governance 
network’ -  that is, the network which governs neighbourhood-based governance. The 
network’s structure and membership, key network members, and the existence of a 
policy subsystem for deprived neighbourhoods, are determined. The effects of the 
broader urban governance system on this network are then explained, in terms of the 
state and market imperatives which are evident. Finally, the implications of this 
regarding the relative power of the neighbourhood level within its multi-level 
governance context are considered.
Further background, on the city’s neighbourhood-relevant history, local government’s 
orientation to neighbourhoods, and relevant plans, policies and approaches including 
the council’s Corporate Strategy, the Sustainable Community Strategy (SCS), the 
Local Development Framework (LDF), the Local Area Agreement (LAA), and the 
Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS), is included in chapter 4.
63.1. Neighbourhood Governance Network
Each Bristol elite respondent was asked a core set of questions designed to elicit their
* - - 4KT i*
understanding of the structures and processes of neighbourhood governance, that is, 
how neighbourhood-based governance is governed. Elite respondents were asked to 
discuss the role, work and relationships engaged in by their own organisations and for 
their perspectives on the work of others. Furthermore, they were also asked how, if at 
all, this is co-ordinated or led. A sample elite interview guide is appended (at 
Appendix 1).
The network identified in the course of the research is presented in Figure 4. Some 
form of network which provides a city-level context for neighbourhood-based 
governance can be expected in Bristol given central government’s requirements 
(initially due to the award of NRF resources to the city) for a Local Strategic 
Partnership. However, analysis of responses reveals that Bristol’s network does not 
operate as neatly or in as co-ordinated a fashion as would be expected if its 
representation in ‘the logic’ as described by public sector elite respondents was taken 
at face value. The research reveals that the neighbourhood governance network that 
governs initiative governance in Bristol, while including the LSP, does not match it in
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terms of membership or operations. Its structure and membership are detailed below, 
followed by examination of its key members and their relative power.
Figure 4: Bristol Neighbourhood Governance Network
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6.3.2. Structure and membership of the governance network
Bristol’s neighbourhood-based governance entities are embedded in a complex 
network that comprises public sector bodies (for example, local government and 
GOSW). and third sector bodies (such as the community foundation, and various 
voluntary and community sector support organisations). The private sector is not 
evident. Different members of this network operate at different levels - multi­
neighbourhood, city-wide, regionally and nationally.
As is clear from Figure 4, the multi-level context for neighbourhood governance in 
Bristol is extremely complex and congested. This reflects Stewart’s (2003: 79) 
description of the Bristol city-region as “institutionally crowded with both regional,
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sub-regional and neighbourhood/ area-based structures pressing in on the more ,,v 
longstanding mechanisms for the government of the city”.
It is also subject to significant chum over time. This is illustrated by the rapid change 
in central government neighbourhood-targeted funding regimes and approaches 
(shaded in blue in Figure 4). These are detailed in chapter 4 and summarised in Table 
6.3. When these regimes change, so do the network’s structure and operations. One 
example in terms of peer networks (shaded in orange in Figure 4) is the replacement 
of the Neighbourhood Renewal Residents Forum targeted at deprived areas to the 
(city-wide) Neighbourhood Partnerships Residents Forum. When these regimes 
change, so does the level of central government resource specifically targeted at 
deprived neighbourhoods in the form of area-based initiatives. This is demonstrated 
by the case study bodies, who given the end of their programmes now have a small 
amount of central government NRF ‘transition’ funds, and £10,000 per ward allocated 
by local government for the Neighbourhood Partnerships approach.
Table 63: Succession of Neighbourhood Funding Regimes/ Approaches
■ 1?^ * National Lifetime Bristol Lifetime
SRBf 1994-2001 successive funding 
rounds for programmes of varying 
duration
8 successful bids. 
HWCP round 5: 1999- 
2007
NDC 2000-2010 (round 1)
2001-2011 (round 2)
CaH round 1:2000-2010
Neighbourhood Renewal 
Fund (NRF)
2000-2008 2000-2008
Neighbourhood 
Management Pathfinders
2006-2008 2006-2008
NRF ‘Transition 
Funding’
2008-2010 2008-2010
City-wide
Neighbourhood
Partnerships
2008 introduced by Bristol City 
Council (as part of national 
‘neighbourhoods agenda’/ ‘double 
devolution’)
Apparently open-ended
The network’s instability is also illustrated by changes in central government 
requirements for local authority-level strategies (also shaded blue in Figure 4, with 
further detail in chapter 4). For example, a Community Strategy was required to be 
developed in 2001 given the city’s designation for NRF resource. This had to be 
reworked in 2008 (as a ‘Sustainable Community Strategy’, for which new government 
guidance had been issued) to align with the requirement for a ‘refreshed’ LAA to have
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been agreed by June 2008 (though the city’s initial LAA had only been agreed in 
2007). The new LAA also meant that the council needed to develop a new Corporate 
Strategy in 2008. Such instability due to constantly changing central government 
requirements is compounded by instability in the key city-level institutions, with 
changes in majority party control of Bristol City Council and the LSP’s reformulation. 
This is explored below.
It is now useful to consider the network’s structure in terms of the actors and 
approaches of relevance at each spatial scale, as depicted in Figure 4.
Neighbourhood level
Here informal associations predominate, such as residents’ associations. Such 
informal associations are not directly represented on initiative governance entities 
which reside at the multi-neighbourhood level, though an entity’s elected resident 
representatives may also be involved in their local association. Third sector support 
organisation respondents value the competence of such small informal groups, which 
can access small grants from Quartet Community Foundation:
_
“A lot ofpeople’s community sense is probably limited to a few  streets 
actually ” [Councillor].
“Our residents ’ groups that we have involvement with, we know that they are 
very close to the ground, they can respond to issues quickly, they know what goes on 
in their neighbourhoods ” [Third sector support organisation].
“Our underlying thing has always been that we are targeting relatively small 
amounts o f  money to locally-based organisations, small, locally-based organisations 
where a small amount will make a difference ” [Community Foundation].
Attempts to link this smallest scale into the broader network focus on direct resident 
participation, rather than representative participation by any resident organisations 
that exist. An exception is the Bristol Neighbourhood Planning Network, a coalition 
of neighbourhood-based resident groups (as well as some city-wide groups), focused 
solely on planning issues such as development of the city’s LDF and specific planning 
applications. Voscur, the ‘generic’ (rather than community of interest-related) 
support group for third sector organisations, has been contracted by the city council to 
support resident participation. Its efforts between 2000 and 2008 were focused on 
deprived areas targeted by the NRF, but with the end of this regime have latterly 
shifted city-wide with the establishment in 2008 of the Neighbourhood Partnerships
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Residents Forum. At the time of the research, i t  was unclear how the forum would 
link with the LSP, which was in the process of being ‘relaunched’. Specifically, links 
were not clear with the LSP’s proposed ‘neighbourhoods’ sub-partnership board, 
though it is intended that a “community conference” will be convened. Non-public 
sector respondents stress that the most effective mechanism for resident engagement 
is ensuring that they directly inform spending decisions:
‘Twice a year there ’11 be a big community conference, and the idea is that, 
this is exemplifying that you don 7 have to hierarchically go through, i t’s a permeable 
structure and process, people at the grassroots can influence the [LSP] Exec Board” 
[Council Senior Officer].
“The good things are i t’s the whole city and there’s often been a tension with 
areas that are not neighbourhood renewal areas that they want to do things... i f  you 
want to empower those communities... then it’s not about consulting them and asking 
them how they might like the money spent, it’s actually giving them a direct say... 
there’s no stronger way o f getting people engaged than giving them a chance to say 
how you spend money ” [Third sector support organisation].
“A small grants programme... it really brought people together, it made the 
community think about what they were doing andfelt as i f  they were being noticed 
and actually had a voice... because you’ve got a big government machine going on, 
you can’t turn it and so actually getting access to money and being able to do 
something was quite empowering for people” [Community Foundation].
Individual neighbourhood residents associations therefore tend not to be represented 
directly on initiative governance structures, nor indeed on the new neighbourhood 
partnerships introduced in 2008. Instead resident participation is sought in the case of 
initiative governance entities via resident elections for sub-areas of the broader multi­
neighbourhood area covered by the initiative. Neighbourhoods have been selected for 
inclusion in area-based initiatives given their levels of deprivation, irrespective of the 
existence of residents’ associations.
Multi-neighbourhood level
The neighbourhood-based initiative governance structures that form the key unit of 
study for this research operate at this spatial scale (marked as ‘initiative entities’ in 
Figure 4). As typified by CaH and HWCP, these entities tend to stem from time- 
limited central government initiatives (the SRB and NDC regimes) focused on the 
city’s entrenched areas of deprivation, as defined according to the central 
government-determined indices of deprivation. However, Southmead Development 
Trust was cited as one example of a ‘bottom up’ formal entity in the city. Given the 
deprivation case, the areas covered by the case study entities became eligible for NRF
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resource in 2000 (targeted st the areas amongst the 10% most deprived nationally) 
and also for neighbourhood management approaches (within the 3% most deprived 
nationally) in 2006. Other areas in the city also qualified for NRF and neighbourhood 
management funds, but these resources were not managed by formally-constituted 
governance entities. This demonstrates that previous government programmes have 
left a heritage of entities which then need to adapt in light of changing funding 
regimes and policies for deprived areas, though these subsequent policies did not 
require the establishment of formal structures:
“Bristol... has got these kind o f entrenched areas o f  deprivation which have 
attracted funding, there was quite a lot to build on, whether it was NDC, 
neighbourhood renewal, SRB, some o f the European funding like URBAN and so on, 
all o f which fuel that neighbourhood level” [GOSW Official].
The case study entities had previously been linked into the city’s neighbourhood 
governance network, evidenced by their representation on the former incarnation of 
the LSP as ‘community-accountable bodies’ due to their elected resident board 
membership. In 2008 these bodies, at the request of local government as part of its 
response to central government’s ‘double devolution’ agenda, are now forming the 
basis of the new neighbourhood partnerships which cover a much larger area. 
However, these entities are not represented on the newly-restructured LSP’s executive 
board. At the time of the research it was unclear how and to what extent the entities 
will link with the LSP’s ‘neighbourhoods’ sub-partnership. With the advent of 
neighbourhood partnerships, the explicit emphasis of multi-neighbourhood-based 
governance in the city has shifted from its deprived areas to a city-wide sub-local 
form of governance, dominated by councillors. This indicates increased emphasis on 
representative rather than participative democracy:
‘7 think one o f the drivers with neighbourhood partnerships... that we had all 
these neighbourhood structures set up that were divorced from the council and had a 
degree o f decision-making power over what happened locally, divorcedfrom elected 
accountability. And OK, they all say well, we run our local elections, the people say 
we ve got as much legitimacy as the council, but i t ’s a different set up, really. So one 
o f the drivers early on was to bring the council much more into, or re-engage the 
ward members more specifically into being the champions for their communities...
But also give us a sub-city structure where we could more formally engage with 
neighbourhoods and hear their concerns and try and react to them ” [Council 
Officer].
“We 're relaunching that, the LSP, with a different structure. And one o f the 
underpinning parts o f the structure is the neighbourhood, i f  you like, theme group, I  
would call it partnership, which has got to be ready built up and developed. And it
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wiH beOhere that we get the linkages in from neighbourhood governance” *
[Councillor].
Case study entity staff respondents explain that the peer network for the NRF 
programme in operation until March 2008 had enabled them to have some influence 
when meeting with city council officers and other statutory service providers. It is 
unclear how, if at all, such professional networking will continue or be facilitated via 
the restructured LSP.
City level
At the city-level, Bristol City Council, the Bristol Partnership, Quartet Community 
Foundation and the city-wide third sector support organisations emerge as key 
members of the neighbourhood governance network.
Local government officer explanations of how the network ‘works’, in terms of how 
approaches to tackling deprivation are developed and put into practice, echo central 
government policy shifts from an area-based initiative approach to one which seeks to 
link deprived areas to housing and economic growth. The shared ‘logic’ amongst' w-f 
public sector respondents about how this will be operationalised in policy is via the 
council’s corporate plan, and the SCS, for which the LAA is described as the delivery 
strategy, and the LDF as its spatial expression. Except for the LDF (still being 
developed), each of these strategies had been reformulated in 2008:
"We’ve got a corporate commitment to tackle deprivation in the Corporate 
Plan, and that will run through to the SCS. We’ve got an LDF core strategy which 
highlights the need to focus on deprived communities, and that picks up on what 
we ’re doing around wanting to influence the housing and economic growth agenda to 
tackle deprivation... ” [Council Officer].
“Looking at deprivation quite strategically, as opposed to attempting, on its 
own, to resolve issues o f deprivation, on a neighbourhood basis ” [Councillor].
“The sort o f  things we are talking about, in terms ofplanning and 
development fo r transformational change, combined with the sort o f things we were 
talking about in terms o f neighbourhoods and the sort o f things we were talking about 
in terms o f tackling deprivation, all o f that should join together and link together in a 
seamless way, and i f  we get the Bristol Partnership right in its latest grouping, that 
will be the vehicle fo r getting our partners and communities engaged in that ’’
[Council Officer].
“On paper, you can find i t’s all nice and neat and tidy ” [Council Officer].
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The challenge is recognised of the council changing its modes of working so that the 
city-wide neighbourhood partnerships system (introduced as its interpretation of 
central government’s ‘double devolution’) can influence service delivery. It is not 
clear how neighbourhood-level concerns will be related to city-wide strategies:
“The council as an organisation has been set up on a service basis and on a 
city-wide basis, and the scale o f change to have a neighbourhoodfocus is actually 
quite large, and there is a resistance because it’s moving people out o f their comfort 
zones ” [Senior Council Officer].
“I t ’s about a mindset sometimes, to be enabling. Rather than stuck in we must 
do this because it’s always been done like that” [Third sector support organisation].
“We ’re undergoing a big process o f business transformation as well and 
reshaping how we do, how we’re structured as well as how we deliver services... 
removing silos” [Council Officer].
“Some people see a contradiction between city-wide strategic direction and 
locality. Yes, there is, there will always be potentially that tension, but I ’m not sure 
that i f  we get the participatory agenda right that there ’11 be necessarily that ostensible 
contradiction ” [Councillor].
However, non-public sector elite respondents do not espouse ‘the logic’ and express 
frustration regarding the lack of clarity about how the special needs of deprived areas 
will be expressed and dealt with in light of the shifting policy context for 
neighbourhood-based governance deriving from central and Ibaal government’s 
‘neighbourhoods agenda’. This is echoed by CaH and HWCP given their concerns 
regarding the introduction of the much larger, and significantly less resourced, 
neighbourhood partnership areas:
“Bristol’s LAA feels like a backwards step because there’s virtually nothing in 
it about neighbourhood targets and it almost feels like they’ve done what they needed 
to do to have an LAA which the council and GOSW can sign off and met the 
requirements with its minimum targets it has to have” [Former Entity Staff].
Respondents also cite the political ‘flip-flopping’ between Labour and Liberal 
Democrat city council control as creating a great deal of uncertainty and inconsistency 
across the network, as exemplified by the waxing and waning of approaches to sub­
city forms of neighbourhood governance. It is recognised that to an extent the third 
sector gains power from this instability but is frustrated by it:
“The political history o f Bristol in recent years as well and the chopping and 
changes but it has been destabilising for neighbourhood governance... we ’d rather 
we were supporting [voluntary and community groups] to be able to do work rather 
than have to cope with an ever-changing political situation... [Third sector support 
organisation].
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“I ’m surprised I  get so many residents coming along to the meetings we 
organise really, given... or maybe we’re the only stable organisation in the city, 
they ’re never sure what the council's going to do next, it’s why they come to us ” 
[Third sector support organisation].
“You’ve got quite a strong third sector... and because the political leadership 
generally, whichever party, is quite weak... then it’s quite prone to saying, oh well, we 
must sort o f do what the third sector thinks is right” [GOSW Official].
All recognise the Bristol Partnership’s apparent role in formulating the relevant 
policies, most notably the SCS, which, in ‘the logic’ espoused by public sector elite 
respondents, frames action regarding deprived neighbourhoods in the city. But the 
LSP is not generally well-regarded, by public sector respondents in terms of its ability 
to act strategically, and by non-public sector respondents in terms of being able to 
take neighbourhood needs and priorities into account, hindered in turn by its 
reformulation:
“The Bristol Partnership wasn ’t a coherent body at all... wasn ’t very good, 
very effective” [GOSW Official].
“/  think at the moment because o f the restructure that’s going on... it does 
kind offeel as i f  we ’re out o f the loop some times ” [Entity Resident Board Member].
The council is the most significant funder for the third sector, directly and via the 
schemes it has contracted out to be managed by Quartet Community Foundation. 
Indeed, Quartet’s importance in the network derives in large part from its 
management of government funds according to government criteria rather than from 
its limited discretionary resources. However, it is not represented on the LSP.
Voscur emerges as the predominant third sector support organisation in the city, 
reflected in its continuous representation on the Bristol Partnership. However, it 
needs to strike a balance between partnership working with the council and an 
advocacy role, and does suffer from accusations of co-option. Respondents 
emphasise the need for the capacity of sector support organisations to be developed to 
be able to participate in city-level policy-making, particularly given the council’s 
‘commissioning agenda’ with the voluntary and community (VCS or third) sector:
‘7 think that overall [the council and the third sector] have got a good, 
constructive relationship... Bristol is unusual, it’s got a very large, and I  say large in 
terms o f number o f organisations in the VCS. And that’s historic, because we’ve 
actually encouraged, either formally or informally, development o f the voluntary and 
community sector. And it’s not surprising because for a lot ofpoliticians, it’s where 
we came from in the first place” [Councillor].
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“We sometimes get acemed o f being in the council's pockets... most VCS need 
supporting, and we ’re not embarrassed to stick our head above the parapet and be 
unpopular” [Third sector support organisation].
“ There’s obviously some tension in the voluntary sector where some people 
who don 7 want to move away from grant funding to commissioned services, but it’s 
clearly the way that we ’re going... you need to be very clear and transparent about 
how you ’re commissioning services and working with the voluntary sector groups as 
well to ensure that they have the capacity to be commissioned for services... i f  
genuine neighbourhood governance was happening, that was being directed by 
residents, there would probably be a much stronger role for voluntary and community 
groups to be commissioned to do services” [Third sector support organisation].
Sub-regional level
The West of England Partnership comprises the four unitary authorities that from 
1974 until 1996 constituted the County of Avon. The Partnership has a planning, 
housing and communities programme board, but this has a deliberation rather than 
decision-making function to ensure co-ordination prior to decisions being taken by the 
unitary authorities’ respective cabinets. The area, which essentially comprises the 
Bristol city-region, was designated a ‘growth point’ for additional economic and 
housing development by central government in 2006, in line with the draft RSS which 
was released for consultaticmin 2006.
r3SF
At the time of the research, the four unitaries were engaged in developing a ‘Multi-
Area Agreement’ (which was agreed in September 2009) in partnership with GOSW.
This is also presented as part of ‘the logic’:
“I t ’s about how you connect those three [neighbourhood, city, region] and in 
fact how you work... and that followed on from the sub-national review which is all 
part and parcel o f  this double devolution thing... So, that MAA is saying... so 
transport is a big issue that you should look at at that level, city-region level, 
employment and skills... housing... the area you should be looking for effective 
policymaking is much wider than the City o f Bristol itself, so let’s get the MAA to do 
those things" [GOSW Official].
Regional Level
GOSW is the most relevant of the regional-level institutions to the neighbourhood 
governance network, as reflected in its ongoing non-voting membership of the LSP in 
its various iterations. It explicitly operates at lower spatial scales, being engaged in 
developing the MAA, and its ‘Locality Manager’ for Bristol has been very engaged in 
the development of the initial LAA in 2007 and its ‘refreshed’ version in 2008.
GOSW is also involved directly in CaH as a central government ‘flagship’
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programmer However, regional governance in the form of the Regional Assembly - 
(created in 1999), and the Regional Development Agency are also relevant actors in 
the neighbourhood governance network given their role, following government’s 
reform of the planning system in 2004, in developing the Regional Spatial Strategy 
for the south-west. This 2006 draft strategy targets Bristol as a focus for increased 
housing and jobs growth which is framing secondary efforts to tackle deprivation, as 
set out in various newly-adopted or emergent city-level strategies, such as the SCS 
and LDF.
National level
Central government, as represented by Communities and Local Government (CLG) 
and its previous incarnations (for example, ODPM from 2002 until 2006), can be 
regarded as the neighbourhood governance network member of most relevance to the 
case study initiative governance entities. The zenith of central government’s area- 
based initiative approach, as reflected in the advent of the Neighbourhood Renewal 
Unit in ODPM in 2001, was paralleled in Bristol with the instigation of CaH and the 
availability of NRF. CLG’s subsequent shift, particularly since 2006, to a broader
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(and less targeted and resourced) ‘neighbourhoods agenda’, provides the key policy 
context for current network activity. However, the policies of other Whitehall 
departments are also evident at the city-level, highlighting that central government 
cannot be regarded as a monolith. The Home Office’s policies regarding third sector 
empowerment (as reflected in the ChangeUp Consortium for the city’s third sector 
support organisations, introduced in 2004) are one example.
The role of the Audit Commission in operationalising ‘the logic’ is only mentioned by 
a GOSW (and therefore central government) respondent. The Commission, at central 
government’s behest, is replacing the previous assessment regime for local services 
with the ‘Comprehensive Area Assessment’ in 2009:
“One o f the reasons it’s becoming local again is because you have a 
framework o f national standards... what the Audit Commission do... it’s the logic 
across the new performance management framework... But policy is going in the right 
direction, you’ve just got to follow it through now really. But what the Audit 
Commission is doing, on Comprehensive Area Assessment will help to reinforce it 
too” [GOSW Official].
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The National Lottery (established in 1994) comprises a source of resource for 
neighbourhood-based entities in the city which is essentially separate from the 
network. Its conditions of funding in terms of monitoring and evaluation 
requirements are less stringent than those of the council:
“Owe issue that comes up for VCS groups a lot in Bristol is around monitoring 
and evaluation ofgrant funding, and they get relatively small amounts ofgrants from 
the council, but the monitoring and evaluation requirement is quarterly. Big Lottery 
who gives them £2m don 7 ask for that kind o f monitoring ” [Third sector support 
organisation].
It should be added that the supra-national context is also relevant, with European 
funding, from the URBAN and former Objective 2 programmes (in operation until 
2006), expended in Bristol. However, while the value of these resources is 
recognised, some public sector respondents comment that such programmes have not 
been integrated into the network’s operations, given the alternative requirements of 
such programmes compared to the funding regimes of central government:
“There was some European things that had their own life, and I  would say 
that was not a very good model at all, they were sort o f a bit orphaned” [Former 
Bristol Regeneration Partnership Staff].
“It hasn 7 always been attractive to joint the two together because you’ve then 
saddled the neighbourhood renewal-type activities with all the bureaucracy o f that 
European money i f  you like. So it’s not... it’s doubled our money in some cases, but 
in others they have been running in parallel really. Which is a flaw that’s been 
passed down from the top-down ” [Council Officer].
6 3 3 . Key network members
The key network members - neighbourhood-based governance entities, the Local 
Strategic Partnership, local government, and central government - have differential 
ability to influence neighbourhood-based governance given their stores of power and 
resource. These network members shall be considered in turn.
Neighbourhood-based governance entities
While the case study entities intend to retain their emphasis on resident-led decision­
making, the scope of such decision-making enabled at initiative governance level has 
narrowed as government policy regarding deprived neighbourhoods has shifted. This 
is irrespective of the entities’ capacity. The more recent shift in approach, given 
central government’s ‘double devolution’ agenda, to the city-wide system of 
neighbourhood partnerships draws on the competence interpretation of the functions
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of neighbourhood-based governance. There was broad agreement that there was a 
consistency and predictability in what a neighbourhood’s priorities were likely to be:
“It’s obvious what they’re going to come up with... i f  you say like reducing 
graffiti andflytipping, gosh, I  wonder if  that might be in a local neighbourhood 
partnership plan? I  think it might well be ” [Senior Council Officer].
“The clean and green stuff is, tends to be at the forefront o f  communities ’ 
minds in terms o f identifying issues, and is also the stuff that is perhaps easier to 
deliver on the ground in a neighbourhood management governance sense ” [Council 
Officer].
It is statutory service provision that is now ‘on the table’ for neighbourhood-based 
forms of governance to influence, which comprises a small element of the broad suite 
of factors affecting the lives of residents. Respondents do recognise that some issues 
are best dealt with at the neighbourhood level and some at higher levels. However, 
avenues in which neighbourhood bodies can inform the neighbourhood governance 
network’s formulation of strategies which frame neighbourhood-level efforts, such as 
those regarding housing and economic growth, are not evident:
“Some themes you can make a real significant, dramatic improvement on a 
geographic basis. Crime and environment... But when you come to things like 
worklessness and health outcomes, it’s just a lot harder” [Entity Staff].
“The biggest thing that has an impact onlfite 20,000people in Hartcliffe and 
Withywood would be just about the level o f taxing and benefits ” [Former Entity 
Staff].
“7 think there’s got to be a balance between the high rhetoric and the reality 
on the ground, and that’s what this is about [the neighbourhood partnerships], it’s 
trying to get that balance, it’s not an independent, setting up a republic in one o f the 
neighbourhoods. That’s just nonsense. They don’t have solutions... But there are 
things that can be influenced at a local level, and it should be, but you’ve got to be 
able to distinguish what it is ” [Senior Council Officer].
Local Strategic Partnership
While the Bristol Partnership (created in 2001) ostensibly constitutes the network for 
neighbourhood-based governance in the city, particularly given its formulation of the 
SCS, central government influence on policy formulation is explicit:
“The Bristol Partnership took the decision to bring forward their review o f  
the SCS a year because o f the new model LAA... we play a part in it... primarily 
about the key things that needed to be thought about from an LAA point o f view. So 
there was quite a lot o f involvement in the SCS review and how it was done ” [GOSW 
Official].
“Because o f the LAA, we ’re reviewing the SCS, the council’s corporate plan, 
as a basis for developing the LAA, so we ’re doing it together. So I  just tweaked [the 
SCS] slightly so that it was completely lined up with the corporate plan and the LAA.
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Now, I  wouldn7 say that to members, but it’s made it a hell o f a lot easier from an 
officer structure, that it’s now all completely lined up” [Senior Council Officer].
“[The council] hurriedly tried to set out what they wanted the SCS to do, 
while at the same time tried to get people to say what LAA targets they wanted, which 
seemed a little bit odd to me. Because you should say what you want to do and then 
decide which are the targets that best fit that, and they didn ’t, they went side-by-side, 
and it was all very rushed. And I ’m more sympathetic to the council, because the 
government set these ridiculous timescales... And o f course that has an impact on 
how VCS groups and residents see it, because they see it as a bit o f a sham, really ” 
[Third sector support organisation].
That the Bristol Partnership does not provide a stable context for neighbourhood- 
based initiative governance in the city is demonstrated by the fact that at the time of 
the research it was in the process of being relaunched in its third iteration. All 
respondents are critical of the LSP, expressing what Sweeting et al. (2004) would 
term “partnership fatigue”. Public sector respondents do not view it as a strategic 
forum. Third sector respondents criticise the lack of community engagement.
Moving forward there is a lack of clarity about how neighbourhood partnerships, in 
themselves open to question about representativeness and mandate, will link into the 
strategic deliberations of the relaunched LSP:
“[The LSP] it’s brougfftwith it ownership o f this is the way to get money out 
o f a central pot rather than these are the strategic objectives that we’ve got ” [Council 
Officer].
“What was absolutely missing in the last 2 years was business and higher and 
further education, but the people from the police and the PCT were sending very 
junior people, and it just... there was a complete vacuum ” [Senior Council Officer].
“The Bristol Partnership has been an absolute bugger up really, since the 
minute it started. Yes, it has. But we still recognise that it was a structure that should 
have been influential and whatever else, and that therefore we wanted to be a part of. 
I t ’s been totally useless. I  don 7 think it was properly resourced, and then I  don 7 
think they have any power over anything” [Third sector organisation].
“Let’s get the LAA to do things which are about what you do at local authority 
level, but also where that connects up to neighbourhoods, let’s get the LSP, which is 
responsible for delivering it, to connect up to neighbourhoods ” [GOSW Official].
That local government has a dominant role, framing the Bristol Partnership’s 
existence and operations, is made evident by the council’s instigation of its relaunch, 
related by council respondents to the council’s own restructure. Some non-public 
sector respondents view the two bodies as interchangeable:
“There is this thing between this is the Bristol Partnership and it shouldn 7 be 
the council, but then it is seen as the council, and everybody else is a bit o f an also- 
ran” [Third sector organisation].
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“Whai8s*really difficult is that people don’t seem to separate city council with 
Bristol Partnership” [Entity Resident Board Member].
“There’s a bit o f a chicken and egg thing here with the LSP and the council” 
[Council Officer].
However, in turn the Bristol Partnership’s existence results from the central 
government requirement for an LSP when the city gained access to NRF resource in 
2001. While it does have some flexibility (for example, when it allocated NRF 
resource within the city), its operations are very prescribed by central government. 
This is clear given GOSW’s ‘accreditation’ role for the LSP as well as its role in the 
development of the LAA and the SCS.
Local Government
It is evident that the council’s leadership and ability to provide a consistent context for 
collaborative action is significantly hampered by what Stewart (2003: 83) describes as 
“the centrality of political survival and control on collaboration and conflict in the 
city”. This is reflected in the ‘flip-flopping’ between majority party control in the city 
council. But in turn, the network’s inconsistency and instability derives from changes 
in central ^ e^fernment policies and funding regimes.
Relationships with the council emerge as key to the functioning of the case study 
entities, particularly with their latter shift in emphasis to service-influencing 
neighbourhood management. The role of councillors within the new neighbourhood 
partnerships which the entities are engaged in developing also reasserts representative 
forms of democracy in the city. However, the shift in governance forms from 
initiative governance bodies in deprived areas to a city-wide neighbourhood 
management model via the neighbourhood partnerships cannot be regarded as an 
active policy choice by the council. While council respondents are defensive about 
central government ‘steering’, city-level shifts are a pragmatic response to the loss of 
specific regeneration funds for the city:
“These broader approaches to tackling deprivation should start to deliver and 
fill the gap that this loss o f funding and structures has created” [Council Officer].
“Are we doing it because ODPM or CLG is telling us to do it? No, we ’re not 
actually. I t ’s something that we’ve decided, that we’ve looked at, and we’ve decided 
we ’re going to do. As it happen, it runs in, very much, broadly in parallel with what 
the government is encouraging us andfacilitating for us to do... So there’s a parallel
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process running here as opposed to one that attempts to i f  you like mirrorwhat the 
government is doing” [Councillor].
“How we use the resources other than government grants to deliver 
transformational change in our deprived communities. Because we knew these 
programmes were going to come to an end. And so what we were thinking and 
planning locally mirrors what’s been going on nationally... saying these things have 
been all well and good, but they’ve been semi-detached, they’ve not tackled the 
Jundamental economic challenges that these areas face ” [Council Officer].
At broader level, the emergent city-level policies such as the LDF indicate a shift 
from an explicit set of policies drawing on an area-based initiative approach for 
deprived neighbourhoods, to an approach which ostensibly seeks to link the city’s 
deprived neighbourhoods to its growth agenda. These policies of necessity reflect 
central government policy:
“The mixed communities agenda. We’ve certainly embraced that... and that’s 
certainly our big idea in terms o f transformational change, but delivering that 
through the opportunities afforded through being a growth point area, and having to 
deliver X  thousand houses and making sure that we ’re not just bolting them on as an 
oasis somewhere on the outskirts o f the city... looking at how we can put those houses 
and amenities in our deprived communities. And delivering that alongside our 
neighbourhood agenda, which builds on the good work around neighbourhood 
governance that neighbourhood programmes have sort o f trialled” [Council Officer], 
r  “Regeneration shouldn ’t just be happening on a micro level, wemeed to be
aligning need with opportunity. So rather than just saying there’s a red line around 
this deprived area, we ’re doing everything in there, we need to be looking at that, but 
more strategically... looking at how those neighbourhoods interact with the rest o f the 
city and the rest o f the sub-region ” [Council Officer].
Central Government
Central government’s predominance is very evident at both the city and 
neighbourhood levels in Bristol. It was evident at the height of the area-based 
initiative approach to tackling neighbourhood deprivation, with the government’s 
instigation of initiatives as explored in the case study entities. It was also evident in 
the, albeit more empowering to local government level, NRF approach, exemplified 
by GOSW’s accreditation role for the LSP. The more recent ‘double devolution’ 
agenda apparently delegates authority for developing neighbourhood governance to 
local government. Irony is inherent in this less centrist approach to neighbourhood- 
based governance being mandated centrally. It is also ironic that the GOSW 
respondent expresses concerns about the way in which the council is proceeding, 
regarding for example the city-wide model as inappropriate given that wealthy areas
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have adequate public service provision, while the council see this model as fulfilling a 
need for city-wide equity:
“Because our role is not just let ’s negotiate the targets and step back, our role 
is also well, what are they planning to do? And are they planning to do it in the right 
way, are they involving communities for example? ” [GOSW Official].
“Clifton [wealthy area] doesn 7 have much in the way o f neighbourhood * 
governance, but it doesn 7 really matter, because the people who are living there are 
not major beneficiaries o f public services as such, or rather the public services that 
they ve got, like schools, are working excellently, so there isn 7 a [need] ” [GOSW 
Official].
However, discussion with local government respondents about how central 
government requirements, as set out in ‘the logic’, are put into practice reveals a 
pragmatic approach. This is clear in the development of an ‘interim’ SCS so that it 
could align with the new LAA which was required by central government in June 
2008. It is stressed that such pragmatic responses are necessary:
“I  think there’s got to be a balance between the high rhetoric and the reality 
on the ground’’ [Senior Council Officer].
“I t ’s all very well to sit up there and make grand statements! There’s an 
enormous kind o f resource capacity problem. There’s just kind o f the capacity to do 
these things... even the neighbourhood partnership network is ridiculously under­
funded i f  you really want to make it work the wayfpeople will want it to work. And it’s 
just the time, the time that these kinds ofprocesses take, are never properly factored 
in ” [Council Officer].
Local government’s recent policy statements about harnessing the growth agenda to 
the benefit of the city’s deprived communities also reflects central government policy 
change. This is encapsulated in the Bristol city-region’s central government 
designation as a ‘growth point’ area. It indicates the predominance of economic 
growth as a policy driver despite a rhetoric of ‘building sustainable neighbourhoods’.
63.4. Bristol Urban Governance
Investigation of Bristol thus reveals that neighbourhood-based governance entities are 
embedded in a multi-level governance context. The entities and their context are 
steered by central government. This is evident in the priorities which are pursued, and 
manifested in the network’s structure, which is crowded, and in its operations, which 
are subject to significant chum and instability given changes in central government 
policies.
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It is clear that the case study eritrtie^predominant function of steering is due to how 
the governance network is structured and operates and the imperatives which arise as 
a result. These processes are shaped by central government. A contextual view 
reveals that both bodies’ creation, structuring and operations have been steered by 
central government and latterly their local government sponsors (though the council’s 
approaches are in turn framed by central government).
A shift is clear in both bodies’ operations from direct service provision and funding of 
projects to the influencing of service provision. This represents a change in ethos 
from one of community-led regeneration (enabled by the large resource of their 
respective principal funding programmes) to one of community-influenced 
neighbourhood management (necessitated by the intention to continue with reduced 
funding in a changed policy context which is emphasising responsive service 
provision). These shifts are interdependent with central government’s successive 
time-limited funding regimes which have had different approaches and requirements. 
The area-based funding regimes under which the bodies’ were instigated were 
augmented and then replaced, firstly by NRF, then neighbourhood management
j[ i  f g g-'
pathfinders, and now local government-instigated (but as a response to central 
government policy direction) neighbourhood partnerships. Therefore both bodies are 
subject to their sponsor -  central government - seeking to realise its priorities. These 
priorities initially included resident engagement in neighbourhood renewal, as 
expressed in the stated aims of the NDC and SRB programmes; and latterly the lesser- 
resourced resident influencing of service provision, which draws on the competence 
account but can be interpreted as rather tokenistic given the greater resource needs of 
these deprived areas. Indeed, the tokenism account of the function of neighbourhood 
governance is intrinsic to the predominant account of steering. Both entities are 
having to recourse to attempts at self-help, but their efforts to sustain operations are at 
best severely curtailed and it is not clear that they will be able to continue. The 
disjuncture between the intent to self-help and the bodies’ ability to realise this is 
clear.
The complexity of the entities’ network governance context (which is demonstrated in 
Figure 4) echoes Stewart’s (2003: 79) description of the Bristol city-region as 
“institutionally crowded”. Given its “dense, multi-layered” nature, it conforms with
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Skelcher’s(*20Gffc*4) description of the “congested state”. The structure of this 
network and the relationships within it are shaped by central government, which 
directs the actors engaged and their level of resource and power. Indeed, central 
government has instigated the existence of many of the institutions within the multi­
level network (for example, the RDA, the Regional Assembly and the LSP). It is 
also clear given central government requirements regarding the existence, content and 
timing of review of the relevant strategies required at these different levels (such as 
the RSS, the SCS, and the LAA). ‘The logic* of how this operates in theory is 
pervasive, certainly across the public sector, and to an extent persuasive as it appeals 
to the notion of subsidiarity in the sense of the devolution of policy to the lowest level 
at which it can be formulated. However, it is also very prescribed and proscribed in 
terms of tightly bounding scope for local (and indeed, sub-local, neighbourhood) 
responses.
What becomes very clear is the extent to which the network is subject to central 
government-induced chum and instability. The case study entities are both struggling 
to adapt given their churning context of changing government policies and funding 
sources. But*afl actors at all levels in the network are affected by changes in central 
government policies and approaches. The network’s institutional architecture 
represents a complex mix of old and new initiatives and approaches which tend to 
overlay one another. This clearly affects the relative stability of the context within 
which relationships have to be forged and helps reinforce the ultimate supremacy of 
central government in relation to efforts at the neighbourhood level.
When policies shift, the entire network is subject to the resultant upheaval. The 
methodological approach adopted provides a snapshot of a set period in the city. This 
period transpired to be a particularly interesting one as it coincided with a phase of 
transition of policy approaches from the programmatic approaches of deprived area- 
targeted neighbourhood renewal, to the amorphous suite of policies that comprises the 
‘neighbourhoods agenda*. As such, this particular period shed a strong light on the 
effect of national policies on local government policies and operations relevant to 
neighbourhood-based governance (as captured in the ‘double devolution’ agenda). It 
is evident that city-level leadership, as represented by the council and the LSP, is 
strongly bounded by the centre, not least due to imposition of ‘the logic*. Despite the
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relative instability of both the council and the LSP, the greatest cause of chum at the 
city-level is due to changes in central government policies and funding regimes, 
which frame the council’s leadership of the city-level neighbourhood governance 
network.
This network does not solely comprise the Bristol Partnership, though, as the LSP, 
this body is explicitly tasked with developing policies of relevance to deprived 
neighbourhoods via the SCS. The LSP in fact comprises the “policy subsystem” 
(Goetz and Sidney, 1997) for neighbourhood-based approaches. The LSP does not 
act separately from, but is interwoven with, Bristol’s broader urban governance 
context. It is the broader governance network which determines the imperatives 
which frame the approaches developed by the neighbourhood policy subsystem. But 
this broader network is not contained at urban level. Understanding of Bristol’s urban 
governance cannot be bounded at city-level but requires consideration of its multi­
level governance context, and particularly the policy lead of central government. It is 
central government which frames regional policymaking, which in turn frames 
policymaking at the local, city, level and finally sets the bounds for neighbourhood 
level approaches. Thus hierarchical modes of co-ordination are consistently evident 
with the “continuing downwards pressure from central government on localities” 
(Stewart, 2003: 89).
These neighbourhood-level approaches therefore mirror central government’s policy 
transition from the explicit targeting of deprived areas (as defined in the Indices of 
Deprivation) to a broader emphasis on neighbourhood engagement in and influence 
on service delivery. This shift in approaches comprises a move away from 
programmatic regeneration funding which made use of neighbourhood-based 
initiative governance, to an emphasis on ‘bending the spend’ or ‘mainstreaming’, 
whereby it is envisaged that communities inform the spending and delivery priorities 
of local government and other statutory agencies. The transition has apparently 
marked a shift to a greater neighbourhood or spatial sensitivity in decision-making 
regarding funding allocations and service delivery. This is reflected in Bristol with 
the council’s roll out of a version of neighbourhood management which relies on 
influencing mainstream providers rather than providing dedicated resource. It is 
bundled with the development of neighbourhood partnerships to ‘govern’ this, though
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these partnerships are multi-ward rather than neighbourhood-based and are not the 
formal entities which comprise the unit of study in this research. It is not evident how 
the resource case for deprived areas will be made in the context of this rather woolly 
(at least at the time of the research) conception of neighbourhood management/ 
governance. It can therefore be regarded as rather tokenistic.
These neighbourhood policies are framed at city-level by the emergent LDF which in 
turn illustrates the shift from an explicit set of policies for deprived neighbourhoods, 
to an approach which seeks to link the city’s deprived neighbourhoods to its plans for 
growth. This indicates a subsuming of the tackling deprivation agenda by a pro­
growth (or at least managed growth) agenda. These emerging LDF policies in turn 
are framed by the Bristol city-region’s designation as a ‘growth point’. City-level 
policies to tackle deprivation are secondary to the primary policy imperative, set at 
regional level, of growth. But all of these imperatives derive in turn from central 
government’s policy direction. In the region and at city-level, GOSW ensures that 
regional and local policies ‘fit’ central government policy direction. While at city- 
level, the key network governance actor is local government, it is central government 
which not only sets the parameters in terms of the imperatives pursued, but also 
broadly bounds how these are pursued (despite the ‘double devolution’ rhetoric with 
regard to neighbourhoods).
The shifts in policy orientation to deprived neighbourhoods signal the predominance 
of the neo-liberal context in framing attempts to tackle neighbourhood deprivation. 
The policy approaches within this context are not set by the private sector but by 
central government. Therefore, despite its pro-growth agenda, investigation of Bristol 
does not reveal a US-style urban regime in operation in the city, though Stewart 
(1996) identified what he termed an “incipient regime” in the mid-1990s. Private 
sector interests are absent (reflected by the lack of private sector engagement in the 
LSP). This finding is supported by previous research conducted by Boddy et al. 
(2004: 62), who conclude that “a governing elite or public-private coalition of 
interests, a local ‘growth regime’ as such, seeking to mould and marshal the overall 
business assets of the city-region” is not evident.
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Centrist and Managerial UrbanCcatemance
In sum, Bristol does fulfil the expected characteristics of a centrist and managerial 
system of urban governance in the UK, as set out in Table 6.4. Activities at the city 
and in turn neighbourhood levels are framed by central government policies, as 
postulated in metagovemance theory and reflected in the notion of “steering 
centralism” (Somerville, 2005a). The locus of authority remains at the central 
government level, with local government taking the lead at the local, urban level. 
Central government strategies are prioritised, reflecting the steering perspective, 
though accounts of democracy and competence and to a lesser extent self-help do 
receive emphasis as demonstrated by the case study entities. The most obvious 
expression of urban network governance takes a partnership form as represented by 
the LSP, but this is the policy subsystem for deprived neighbourhoods and is 
dominated by local government. Other strategies which shape the subsystem’s 
approaches are framed by central government priorities, regarding housing and 
economic growth, with a rhetoric of linking deprived neighbourhoods to the benefits 
of this growth. This implies some tokenistic use of neighbourhood-based governance 
forms. Tokenism is also implicit given emphasis in the policy rhetoric on the 
functions of democracy, competence and self-help despite the predominant function 
of neighbourhood-based governance being that of steering.
Table 6.4: Bristol Urban Governance Characteristics
Urban Governance Characteristics Associated
Neighbourhood-based 
Governance Functions
Locus of 
authority
Urban 
level lead
Urban
governance
form
Policy
subsystem for
deprived
neighbourhoods
Predominant Other
Central 
govt level
Local govt Not
obvious - 
but
strategies 
framed by 
central 
govt
LSP Steering Democracy,
Competence,
Self-help,
Tokenism
In Bristol, central government has set the imperatives which are pursued at city-wide 
and neighbourhood levels. The predominant imperative is of economic and housing 
growth. The needs of deprived neighbourhoods are subservient to this market
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imperative, with policies seeking to link such neighbourhoods to this growth, or what 
one council respondent terms “aligning need with opportunity”. Therefore, Bristol 
illustrates Jessop’s (2002: 464) notion that at the national and city-level, neo-liberal 
market imperatives take precedence. However, the move from specific resource for 
deprived neighbourhoods to a city-wide neighbourhood management/ neighbourhood 
partnership model does not fulfil Jessop’s (op cit) proposition that neo-communitarian 
strategies will take precedence at the neighbourhood level.
6.4 Conclusion
To conclude it is important to consider the implications in terms of the relative power 
of the neighbourhood level within its multi-level governance context.
Neighbourhoods used to be conceptualised according to their ranking in the Indices of 
Deprivation, with programmatic resource allocated accordingly. Such designations 
did bring a measure of power to the constituent neighbourhoods covered by these 
area-based initiatives. Now, however, the greater resource needs of deprived areas 
have been subsumed within an amorphous approach as represented by the roll out of 
neighbourhood partnerships, accompanied by a broader rhetoric about deprived 
communities being expected to link to market-related growth in the city. This is 
despite the general “competitive success” of the Bristol city-region not having served 
previously to combat the persistent concentrations of deprivation in its inner city and 
peripheral public housing estates (Boddy et al., 2004: 62), as evidenced by the areas 
covered by the case study entities.
The former programmatic area-based interventions, which made use of a resident-led 
rhetoric, can be said to have obscured the reality of government ‘containing’ deprived 
areas, seeking to treat them separately from the mainstream. However, government’s 
shift to more generally-applied notions of neighbourhood management/ governance 
and ‘mainstreaming’, making use of a rhetoric of resident influence, can equally be 
criticised via this lens. While public sector respondents espoused ‘the logic’ of how 
neighbourhoods and their needs will fit into the way the city is governed via the LSP, 
it is not clear how this will be put into practice. Indeed, both approaches can be 
interpreted as a tokenistic response, with government seeking to obscure the ‘special’
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**-■ (and expensive to resolve) ‘case’ of deprived areas. The neighbourhood-based 
governance entities which arose out of earlier programmatic interventions are now 
struggling to survive in a new context. This is already reflected in their operations 
and is likely to become reflected in the way they are structured if they are able to 
continue. Without dedicated resource, the formal governance entities which may 
exist given earlier initiatives are increasingly having to rely on notions of self-help, 
irrespective of their capacity to do so. The disjuncture between the rhetoric of 
programmatic interventions building the capacity of communities to help themselves 
following the initiative lifetime and outcomes in practice is clear.
The case study bodies illustrate the neighbourhood-level ramifications of government 
policy changes and demonstrate that their existence and continued operations are 
framed not only by their vertical relationships up to the city-level network, but in turn 
by the central government policy context in which this network operates. These 
vertical relationships are at least as important to their continued functioning, and what 
and how activities are carried out, as their relationships back to citizens. Despite the 
policy rhetoric about inclusion and community participation, the communities covered 
-’by the initiatives are weak actors in the network. Bristol’s neighbourhood governance 
network in turn illustrates the continuing predominance of vertical links up to 
Whitehall, rather than back to neighbourhoods. The research also illustrates the 
difficulties of realising the public sector espoused ‘logic’ in practice, given the path 
dependency of local responses to central government’s framework (illustrated by the 
LSP being on its third iteration, and a lack of consistent leadership from local 
government due to its own political chum and instability). As Boddy et al. (2004: 62) 
state, “political and administrative fragmentation have inhibited strategic initiative 
and leadership”.
In the context of this research’s cross-national comparison, Bristol evidences that its 
approaches to neighbourhood-based governance are framed by the actions of the key 
actor, central government. The urban level comprises only one, and not the 
predominant steering, layer in the context which governs neighbourhood-based 
governance. Shifting central government policy results in significant chum not only 
for neighbourhood-based entities, but for agencies and organisations at the city, sub­
regional and regional levels. Such chum relates to a seemingly constant need for
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‘new’ policy approaches and initiatives which does not enable sufficient time for 
approaches and the associated institutional arrangements to become embedded and in 
turn build capacity. These shifts particularly affect the neighbourhood as it is the 
level at which community engagement is sought and expectations of change hinder 
such engagement and development of capacity. Overall, the research supports the 
notion that though partnership as a mode of governance brings non-state actors into 
the process, the aims of the state are still dominant.
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Chapter 7 ^
____________________________CONCLUSION____________________________
7.1 Introduction
The purpose of this research was to consider how neighbourhood-based governance 
entities are located in broader networks of governance. It did this by undertaking an 
international comparative investigation of neighbourhood governance in two cities, 
Baltimore, Maryland in the US and Bristol in England. This made use of an 
empirically-grounded approach to ascertain the function of such governance forms 
according to the way they are structured and the way they operate. It then assessed 
the governance context, particularly focused at the urban level, within which these 
entities are located. The assessment entailed consideration of the key actors and their 
relative power and the focus on deprived neighbourhoods versus broader strategies. 
This enabled consideration of how these strategies and actors shape the functions of 
neighbourhood-based initiative governance and the implications in terms of the 
relative power vested at the neighbourhood level. In so doing the research addressed 
questions concerning the “paucity of well-designed, sceptical investigations” (Klijn & 
Skelcher, 2007: 601) of governance networks, and the need for “rigorous comparative 
studies” of these (Davies, 2002: 301).
The governance networks identified in Baltimore and Bristol fulfil Chaskin’s (2005: 
418) observation that in such systems, “power dynamics are pervasive”, with the 
dominant actions coming from the key network actors rather than the ‘grassroots’. 
Identification of the key network members and the locus of authority demonstrates the 
localist and privatist nature of Baltimore’s urban governance context, and the centrist 
and managerial nature of Bristol’s. Within both networks a policy subsystem is 
evident with regard to neighbourhood-based approaches, but it is the broader 
governance network which determines the state and market imperatives which are 
pursued which frame neighbourhood approaches. In Baltimore and latterly in Bristol, 
tackling deprivation is a subservient agenda to the predominant neo-liberal imperative 
of growth. This highlights the important similarity of the two cities’ shared neo- 
liberal context despite their different governmental systems.
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In Baltimore, the localist-andsprivatist system of governance at city-level is replicated 
at the neighbourhood level. Neighbourhoods do not gain resource from the city-level 
governance network if they lack the assets this network seeks. The function of 
neighbourhood governance which results is self-help, as long as neighbourhoods have 
the capacity to do so. In turn in Bristol, the centrist and managerial governance 
system, steered by central government at city-level, is also replicated at the 
neighbourhood level. Neighbourhood governance is steered by central government, 
via its funding regimes and policy approaches. Changes in these have heralded a shift 
from the explicit targeting of deprived areas via area-based initiatives to seeking to 
link deprived neighbourhoods to the benefits of broader economic and housing 
growth. This indicates that neighbourhood governance entities are being steered to 
adopt self-help strategies, such as those identified in Baltimore, irrespective of their 
capacity to do so. Overall, it is clear that in both cities the neighbourhood and its 
governance continues to be a contested domain between different actors and as a scale 
for intervention it is subject to competing imperatives.
This chapter considers the value of the approach used in the research by considering 
and contrasting the finding in Baltimore and Bristol. It then reflects back on the 
literature in light of the research findings, and concludes with some key themes which 
have emerged which are indicative of future policy direction. These have informed 
identification of possible future lines of enquiry.
7.2 The Value of the Research Approach
The approach used attempted to address the challenge identified by Klijn and 
Skelcher (2007: 606) of developing “a more rigorous and systematic assessment of 
the governance network literature in order to build theoretical propositions that can 
form the basis of research programmes”. This attempt is reflected in the development 
and application of the frameworks of expected characteristics of both ‘ideal-type’ 
neighbourhood governance bodies and of urban governance forms. There is of course 
significant scope for their further testing and refinement (addressed in section 7.4.1 
below).
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The researe&sought to locate neighbourhood governance in its multi-level governance 
context to consider the “governance of governance” (Jessop, 2004). This entailed 
analysis of what Chaskin (2003: 163) terms “the broader ecology of organisations and 
processes that constitute neighbourhood governance systems”. Network governance 
theory has been criticised as being “merely descriptive and lacking a perspective on 
power” (Stewart, 2003: 85), and US regime theory in turn has been criticised for its 
“restrictive localistic empirical focus” (Gibbs et al., 2001: 104). The approach used 
tried to temper these criticisms by attempting to empirically ground neighbourhood- 
based governance within its multi-level, multi-actor governance context. The 
intention was to undertake a finer-grained and less prescriptive analysis which 
attempted to consider the effects of this multi-level context on neighbourhood-level 
approaches.
In so doing, the research touched on debates about the applicability of notions of 
regime and network governance in the US and England. The evidence in Bristol 
indicates that England is not moving towards the US model of urban regimes (as 
stated by Davies, 2002; and Jones and Evans, 2008), given the lack of private sector 
engagement and the supreme role of the state. Research findings in Baltimore, ^
however, do indicate that network theories of governance are applicable in the US 
despite the greater predominance of non-state actors in setting city-level imperatives.
But it should be stressed that this applicability can only be indicated rather than 
confirmed given the US sample size of only one city. Given its federal governmental 
system, extrapolation regarding the US drawing from the Baltimore research would 
not be robust. For example, the lack of an urban regime in Baltimore is linked in 
large part to the city’s lack of corporate entities. Regimes may indeed be in place in 
other cities. In contrast, it can be argued that such extrapolation from the Bristol 
empirical research to England as a whole would be to a degree robust given that the 
relevant policies are set in large part by central government and thus also frame the 
activities in other cities.
7.2.1. Multi-Level Governance Context
Overall, the research has contributed to knowledge regarding the underlying function 
o f neighbourhood-based governance and how this relates to broader governance 
networks. The research’s innovative international comparative approach has enabled
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exploration of the similarities and differences engendered by different governmental 
systems. The value of this comparative study is demonstrated when each spatial scale 
within the multi-level governance context in both cities is compared (with particular 
emphasis on the spatial scales of the two units of study -  neighbourhood-based 
initiative governance entities, and the city-level governance network in which they are 
embedded). This is set out below. What is clear is that in both countries the 
neighbourhood level, and indeed particularly the aggregated neighbourhood level, has 
resonance as a site and scale with which governments and other governance network 
actors can work. However, at the city-level very different power dynamics emerge 
between the two cities/ countries in terms of the localist and privatist character of 
Baltimore and the centrist and managerial character of Bristol. This results in 
different emphases in terms of the functions of neighbourhood governance, though 
signs of convergence are evident which can be linked to the two cities’ shared neo­
liberal context.
Neighbourhood level
In both cities the neighbourhood as a spatial scale emerged as the building block for 
the higher spatial scale of aggregated neighbourhoods at which initiative governance 
exists. The informal groups that exist at this spatial scale do not have particular 
leverage or power at higher spatial scales in either city. In Baltimore, neighbourhoods 
with ‘capacity’ are more likely to be targeted by initiatives, a quality which the most 
deprived neighbourhoods are likely to lack. While neighbourhoods can gain leverage 
when their area is targeted for strategic reasons, this requires that they accept the 
proposals and work within the framework dictated by the sponsors of redevelopment. 
In Bristol, the existence of such informal groups and their capacity is not a relevant 
consideration. Neighbourhoods were selected for inclusion in initiatives given their 
levels of deprivation and work within the bounds of the government programme to 
which they are subject.
In both cities therefore the conception of ‘neighbourhood’ reflects Cochrane’s 
contention about the creation of “new institutional spaces” (2007: 61) with which 
government can work. In Baltimore, the network constructs neighbourhoods in terms 
of the state of their housing market, institutionalised as a policy approach in the 
housing typology. The typology can be regarded as a proxy for levels of
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neighbourhood distress in which a distinction is madrbetween neighbourhoods that 
are ‘salvageable’ in light of the resources available, and those that are not. In Bristol, 
neighbourhoods were similarly constructed with use of the Indices of Deprivation, 
which was the principal means of identifying the target areas for initiatives. A 
notable difference is that in Bristol, initiatives were focused on the most deprived, not 
the most ‘salvageable’, areas. With the decline of area-based initiatives, and the 
creation of the “new institutional space” (op cit) of neighbourhood partnerships in the 
city, it is not yet clear how, if at all, deprived neighbourhoods will be ‘constructed’ in 
terms of how their ‘special case’ will be made.
Multi-neighbourhood level
The multi-neighbourhood level is the scale at which neighbourhood-based initiative 
governance is located. This demonstrates that in both cities, it is aggregated 
neighbourhoods that are regarded by government and other governance network 
members as a valuable scale with which to work. In Baltimore, elite respondents 
emphasised the value of working with aggregated neighbourhood entities given then- 
perceived ability to be able to prioritise needs. Such entities tend to have formal non­
profit status, and their links into the broader governance network tend to be via their 
sponsors. In Bristol, previous government programmes, which required establishment 
of an initiative governance structure, have left a heritage of such entities which have 
had to adapt in light of changed funding regimes and policies for deprived areas.
Such bodies, including the case study entities, had previously been linked into the 
broader network via direct representation on the LSP. However, the advent of 
neighbourhood partnerships has meant that the explicit emphasis of multi­
neighbourhood-based governance in the city has shifted from its deprived areas to a 
city-wide sub-local form of governance of neighbourhood management. This shift 
reasserts representative rather than participative governance and emphasises that the 
multi-neighbourhood level is perceived as the level suitable for linking with statutory 
service provision. That these partnerships actually cover multi-ward areas much 
larger than the areas covered by previous initiatives does not indicate that service 
provision will be particularly tailored to community priorities.
The research reveals similarities regarding neighbourhood-based initiative governance 
bodies in the two cities. These include the form the bodies take, generally with a
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board with resident and partner organisation representatives, and topic-based sub­
committees. Respondents in both cities stressed the difficulties of ‘operationalising 
democracy’, emphasising the need to build resident capacity to not only be ‘at the 
table’ but to participate and be heard. Concerns about the ‘usual suspects’ being 
engaged and a parochialism and insularity developing were also consistently 
expressed. Other common issues regarded the professionalisation of entities, and the 
role of residents as representatives, versus scope for bringing needed skills to the 
board. In both cities respondents also recognised that certain types of activity were 
better suited to neighbourhood-based working, particularly what Baltimore 
respondents term ‘crime and grime’, and that such issues were consistently identified 
as priorities by communities.
However, significant differences were also apparent. The Bristol entities arose from 
time-limited programmatic approaches, and there was accordingly a much greater 
emphasis on their ‘forward strategies’ as they tried to adapt to a context in which they 
lacked a significant (government) sponsor. In Baltimore, both entities were anchored 
and were open-ended endeavours, though both had reached a plateau of resident 
engagement and were endeavouring to reinvigorate their operations. Though the 
entities undoubtedly had funding concerns, they were not subject to the ‘funding 
cliffs’ of their Bristol counterparts. Indeed, it can be posited that in Bristol, central 
government had acted as the temporary ‘anchor’ for these entities.
City level
The broader governance network is focused at this level, as represented by the bounds 
of city/ local government. In Baltimore it is at this scale that network members 
considered ways to classify sub-city patterns of deprivation and ways of addressing 
this, as captured in the housing typology. Federal and state government act as a 
funding mechanism to the city level, with city government providing the 
implementation mechanism within very broad funding guidelines. At the sub-city 
level, city government acts as a funding mechanism to non-profit intermediaries, 
apparently guided by the Consolidated Plan and the housing typology. To an extent 
foundation sponsors of multi-neighbourhood-level initiatives follow this pattern with 
their focus on the ‘middle’ neighbourhoods.
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The Baltimore4*emmunity development system’ is not formally stated and had to be 
identified during the course of the research. Its approach or guiding principles are 
more stable than those of Bristol, the last major change occurring with the shift to 
asset-based allocation in 2001 during the O’Malley administration. The network is 
also more diffuse, with neighbourhood-based governance entities sponsored by a 
greater number of different network members, from different sectors (such as private 
philanthropies and anchor institutions). Baltimore’s diffuse neighbourhood policy 
mix also derives from the important policy-setting role of philanthropic foundations 
as well as city government. But despite this framework, the major activities of the 
network are opportunistic given the lack of resource.
In Bristol, the city level is also ostensibly the level at which the network, represented 
by the Bristol Partnership (LSP), formulates policies for deprived neighbourhoods in 
the city (as contained in the Sustainable Community Strategy, or SCS). As such, the 
city-level context for neighbourhood governance in terms of the relevant actors and 
policies is more explicit in Bristol. However, central government policy steers these 
approaches via such mechanisms as the definition of deprivation, GOSW’s 
accreditatiorrof the LSP, and GOSW’s engagement in development of the Local Area 
Agreement, which frames formulation of the SCS. In contrast to the relative stability 
in Baltimore, and despite ‘the logic’ espoused by government respondents, the 
network is chaotic, and is subject to rapid change, disruption and insecurity related to 
shifting central government policy, which affects all actors at all spatial scales.
The city is adjusting to a changing central government approach to neighbourhood 
deprivation, with a commensurate shift from deprived area-targeted initiatives 
towards a sub-city-wide neighbourhood partnership/ neighbourhood management 
model. A commitment to tackling deprivation remains, but approaches hinge on a 
purportedly more strategic approach which will attempt to link deprived 
neighbourhoods to the benefits of the city’s growth, rather than trying to resolve 
deprivation at a neighbourhood level. These shifts herald a decline in formal 
neighbourhood-based governance entities. Those that remain as a heritage of 
previous approaches are having to adapt or will cease to exist.
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. It is at this spatial scale that the most significant differences between the two cities 
emerged. These in large part can be related to the two countries’ different 
governmental systems (expanded in section 7.2.2). However, the research did reveal 
some similarities between the two cities at this scale. Tensions were evident between 
the non-profit/ third sectors and city/ local government with a call for greater 
leadership from city/ local government and frustration over the lack of consistency 
and commitment over a timeframe regarded as commensurate with effecting change. 
That relations between the sectors affect efforts at greater collaboration illustrates 
some of the path dependency of network and neighbourhood governance given 
distinctive local characteristics and history. In Baltimore of particular note is the 
philanthropic community’s ‘policy-setting’ role given their ability to influence the 
mayor, which has set the approaches taken by the network. In Bristol, the ‘flip- 
flopping’ of city council control has further destabilised the network governance 
context for neighbourhood governance and increased the importance of third sector 
support organisations.
Regional level
At this level broader policy considerations which frame city-level imperatives are 
determined. The State of Maryland has prioritised Baltimore as a focus for housing 
provision, aligning with its ‘smart growth’ policies. Bristol in turn is designated the 
focus for housing and economic growth in the south-west region as expressed in the 
draft Regional Spatial Strategy.
National level
In Baltimore CDBG funds comprise the most consistent form of federal resource for 
the city and constitute the main public funding stream for the city’s neighbourhood- 
based organisations, though there has been a long-running decline in allocations. 
CDBG funds are subject to very broad federal government guidelines and disbursed 
by the City of Baltimore as an entitlement community according to its own criteria, as 
influenced by the network’s deliberations. In Bristol, central government’s award of 
NRF, for which decision about dispersal within the city’s deprived areas was at the 
LSP’s discretion, can be regarded as being the closest equivalent to CDBG. But this 
funding regime was in place for only seven years, compared to CDBG’s continued 
existence since 1975. In Bristol, the criteria for government funding are much more
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stringent than in Baltimore and indeed central government essentially directly funded 
the initiative governance bodies (via local government as ‘accountable body’) and had 
extensive monitoring requirements for these funding regimes. Later shifts in central 
government policy away from area-based initiatives, combined with the introduction 
of ‘greater local flexibility’ with LAAs, still evidence a strong central government 
hand in the process.
7.2.2. Effects on Neighbourhood Governance
This comparison of the two cities by spatial scale confirms the characteristics of urban 
governance which can be expected in the US and England. Different power dynamics 
exist in these different contexts, with power focused at the city-level in Baltimore and 
in Whitehall in the case of Bristol. The likely predominant interpretations of the role 
of neighbourhood governance, of self-help in the localist and privatist US, and 
steering in centrist and managerial England, are also confirmed. However, despite 
these differences with regard to the network governance context and the resultant role 
of neighbourhood governance, what both cities have in common is that significant 
power does not accrue at the neighbourhood level, and especially not with 
neighbourhood governance bodies in deprived areas,’compared to institutions at 
higher spatial scales. This is explored below.
Baltimore
In Baltimore the locus of authority is at the city-level, with city government and 
private interests taking the lead. In contrast with Bristol, there is no prescribed ‘logic’ 
for the network in terms of its structure, and it does not seek to include 
neighbourhood-level actors in its deliberations. The governance network’s (rather 
than urban regime) private interests comprise private philanthropies, who have a 
significant role as ‘policy-setters’ in the city, and the city’s major anchor institution.
However, there is a pervasive and pragmatic ‘logic’ about the network’s asset-based 
approach, adopted in 2001. This approach, which Stoker et al. (2009: 14) described 
as “a triage approach to policymaking”, is rooted in Baltimore’s huge extent of 
deprivation and its lack of resource. This contrasts with Bristol, which is “affluent 
with pockets of deprivation” (Purdue et al., 2004: 278). The weak fiscal equalisation 
of the federal governmental system compounds the city’s own weak tax base and the
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city does not have sufficient resource^sr a concerted and systematic effort to alleviate 
deprivation in its neighbourhoods. Network actors are driven towards a market- 
driven, opportunistic approach influenced by the neo-liberal context which attempts to 
lever private capital.
The needs of deprived areas are therefore subservient to the market imperative. The 
network focuses its attention on neighbourhoods which have the assets it prioritises 
which are regarded as having the ability to lever market forces. The ‘middle’ 
neighbourhoods provide the focus for some network actors where interventions are 
perceived as being able to ‘improve market conditions’. Focus on ‘distressed’ areas is 
not routine, but where these areas intersect with anchored opportunities for 
redevelopment which boost the city’s standing in the bioscience sector. Network 
attention accrues at the neighbourhood level when the neighbourhood has assets 
which the network regards as a priority to ‘lever’. Any ‘power’ gained is that enabled 
by the network in the pursuit of its imperatives and neighbourhood actors can be said 
to have been co-opted into the network’s vision of their future development. In this 
context, neighbourhoods that have the capacity to self-help are more likely to do so.
In Baltimore’s localist and privatist governance system, self-help is the predominant 
function of neighbourhood governance. These localist and privatist characteristics of 
the city-level governance network are replicated at neighbourhood level where self- 
help predominates if neighbourhoods have sufficient capacity to undertake such 
efforts. This is demonstrated by the two case study entities, which are operating in 
spite of rather than because of government or the governance network. They are both 
ongoing, open-ended endeavours. This is not because they have the assets capable of 
levering the market which the governance network seeks, but because they are 
‘anchored’, either by an institution or by being enshrined in legislation and having a 
guaranteed funding stream.
Bristol
In Bristol, the locus of authority is at central government level, with local government 
taking the lead at the city-level. Central government prescribes the ‘logic’ which 
determines the structure of the network and the relationships within it. This contrasts 
with the city-level determination of the network and its approaches in Baltimore,
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despite increasing&ails in central government policy to enable ‘space’ for ‘local ^
responses to local problems’. This indicates severe limitations on central 
government’s ‘competence’ or ability to learn from and adapt in light of the needs of 
local government and of the neighbourhood structures it has instigated, despite the 
policy rhetoric of devolution. Network structuring includes the provision, via the 
Bristol Partnership, of an institutional structure which includes neighbourhood-level 
actors in its deliberations, though it is unclear how this will be operationalised in the 
new LSP. Central government directs which actors are engaged, their level of 
resource and power, and the plans and strategies which frame the approaches taken, at 
regional, city and neighbourhood levels. This direction is evident in the priorities 
which are pursued, and manifested in the network’s structure, which is crowded, and 
in its operations, which are subject to significant chum and instability given changes 
in central government policies. This is in contrast to the relative stability of 
Baltimore’s network.
The relative power of the city and neighbourhood levels within this multi-level 
governance context is determined by central government which sets the imperatives 
pursued. Any power at neighbourhood level derives from the attentions of 
government funding regimes and policy approaches. In Bristol programmatic 
resource used to be allocated to neighbourhoods according to their ranking in the 
Indices of Deprivation. Such designations did bring a measure of power to the 
constituent neighbourhoods covered by the initiatives, despite the “twin-track” (Hohn 
and Neuer, 2006) critique. The greater resource needs of deprived areas have since 
been subsumed by the comprehensive introduction of much less resourced 
neighbourhood partnerships, accompanied by a rhetoric about deprived communities 
being expected to link to market-related growth in the city. The needs of deprived 
neighbourhoods are therefore secondary to the predominant imperative of economic 
and housing growth. This highlights that government attempts to tackle 
neighbourhood deprivation are undertaken within and influenced by the neo-liberal 
context.
In Bristol’s centrist and managerial governance system, the predominant 
interpretation of the role of neighbourhood-based governance is steering. Bristol’s 
two entities, typical in terms of entities that meet the unit of study definition, are
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' operating because of government. The case study narratives form a microcosm©#- 
changes in the relevant government policies. Their transition from the security of a 
government funding regime to a more vulnerable set of circumstances has 
necessitated the entities to rethink their operations and perhaps the way they are 
structured. Such neighbourhood-based governance entities which arose out of earlier 
programmatic interventions are now struggling to survive in their new context, which 
continues to be steered by central government. Without dedicated resource, the 
formal governance entities which may exist given earlier governmental initiatives 
increasingly have to rely on notions of self-help, irrespective of their capacity to do 
so. These recent shifts in government policies, with a reduction in dedicated resource 
for deprived neighbourhoods and emphasis on the need to link deprived areas to the 
benefits of growth, indicate a convergence with the approaches evident in Baltimore 
as captured in the self-help ethos.
In sum, the predominant interpretations of the role of neighbourhood governance 
identified, of self-help in the localist and privatist US, and steering in the centrist and 
managerial England, are unsurprising. What is noteworthy is that there are signs of 
- convergence between England and the US. In both cities neighbourhood-based 
initiatives to tackle deprivation are a secondary concern to the neo-liberal strategies of 
growth of the prevailing governance networks. Emergent English policies, which 
draw on notions of communitarianism, promulgate self-help and demonstrate that the 
US continues to provide policy inspiration. This is explored in section 7.4.2 below.
73 Reflections on the Governance Literature
To conclude, it is important to reflect back on the literature which informed 
development of the research approach, and consider its applicability in terms of what 
has been confirmed in the empirical research.
Within this literature, governance is described both as a process, and as an expression 
of political change. As a process, governance is associated with a network, rather 
than a market or hierarchical mode of co-ordination of political and economic 
activity. But the empirical research evidences that hierarchy is very evident in the
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networks studied, given the way power is vested in and wieldedfry the key network 
actors.
This is particularly evident in Bristol given central government’s steering role, which 
adds validity to Davies’ (2002) critique of the ‘governing without government’ thesis. 
What can be termed a ‘hierarchical network’ is evident, or what Scharpf (1994) would 
term governance “in the shadow of hierarchy”. The findings confirm the assertions of 
previous research that cross-sectoral governing institutions often more closely 
resemble hierarchies than networks (Skelcher et al., 2005; Wright et al., 2006; 
Entwistle et al., 2007). The research demonstrates that while a variety of different 
state and non-state actors are required to be involved (for example, in the LSP), the 
state in the form of central government dominates.
In Baltimore, what can be termed ‘local metagovemors’ are evident with regard to the 
governance of neighbourhood governance, in the form of city government, Johns 
Hopkins University and the Casey Foundation. The latter two actors can be regarded 
as private sector institutions which have combined with and influenced the state’s 
imperatives. These private interests have gained power in the network in the absence 
of powerful corporate interests in the city, therefore substituting for the corporate 
involvement which Stone (1989) predicts in regime theory. They are also involved in 
the neighbourhood policy subsystem (or “neighbourhood policy regime” as described 
by Martin, 2004) and are engaged in neighbourhood-specific detail. This also 
counters Stone’s regime model, which is envisaged as taking a broad policy overview 
at the urban level.
In considering the two interpretations of governance in the literature, the research has 
confirmed governance’s inherently political nature. It asserts the validity of regarding 
the shift from government to governance in political terms as an expression of the 
changes in the state’s form and function resulting from neo-liberalism, rather than as 
an empirical process (as posited by Geddes, 2006 and Whitehead, 2003). The shifts 
in policy orientation to deprived neighbourhoods signal the predominance of neo­
liberal approaches, which “believe markets provide the best solution to social 
problems” (Jones and Evans, 2008: 171). The neo-liberal imperatives which frame 
neighbourhood approaches in both cities echo Katz’s (2004: 26) view that
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neighbourhood change should be market-dri venrather than community-controlled. 
That state imperatives are subservient to those of the market is evident given that 
policies are predicated on the ability of the market to deliver change and resultant 
social as well as economic benefits, global recession notwithstanding.
The findings bear out Jessop’s (2002: 464) contention that neo-liberal strategies 
dominate at the city level. He adds that “neo-communitarian” strategies are 
emphasised at the deprived neighbourhood level (op cit). Emphasis on such 
“arrangements to encourage neighbourhood solutions” (Jessop, 2002: 464) is certainly 
clear in the research findings, which in turn indicates the rise of a neo-liberal 
discourse of self-help and community ownership (discussed in 7.4.2. below). 
However, the research refines Jessop’s assertion by making the links between these 
different strategies at different spatial scales more clear. Where neighbourhoods 
explicitly intersect with the growth strategies of city elites, such as EBDI in 
Baltimore, the neighbourhoods concerned are co-opted into the neo-liberal 
imperatives of growth. Where neighbourhoods do not intersect with these broader 
growth strategies, such as OROSW, “neo-communitarian” strategies are prevalent. 
The neighbourhood is thus a more contested domain than Jessop perhaps suggests, 
according to the extent to which it contains the opportunities sought by the city-level 
in pursuing its neo-liberal imperatives.
Therefore, overall the research findings emphasise how crucial the network within 
which neighbourhood governance bodies are embedded is to their existence and 
ongoing operations. This context structures “the possibilities and limitations of local 
empowerment and action” (Fagotto and Fung, 2006: 642). To sustain operations, a 
neighbourhood governance body should not solely “look internally... to set its agenda 
and implement its programmes” (Katz, 2004: 26). It is more likely to “foster co­
operation with the organisations and agencies from which it must draw its jurisdiction 
and funds” (Chaskin and Garg, 1997) if it operates in a way “that is at least 
superficially in harmony with dominant political and policy discourses” (Atkinson, 
2003: 118). The findings confirm Atkinson’s (2003: 118) contention that “in order to 
gain access to limited resources, communities are expected to internalise a series of 
policy narratives and demonstrate adherence to particular programmes of 
government”.
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This is evidenced in Baltimor&wfeere, though distressed neighbourhoods are 
empowered to a certain extent when they are selected as redevelopment targets, their 
concerns are secondary and they can only hope to negotiate benefits if they concur 
with the overall initiative and thus the network’s emphasis on development of the ‘ed 
and med’ sector. In Bristol this was particularly evident given the government 
programmatic nature of the initiatives and the subsequent need for entities to adapt in 
light of changing government policies. But in England in particular, the lack of what 
Katz (2004: 36) describes as “sustainable, dependable, and predictable policies”, 
which give neighbourhood bodies the “ability to reach a plateau of participation 
before encountering financial or political reversals” (Berry et al., 1993: 51) further 
complicates the ability of neighbourhood governance bodies to remain connected to 
the network which governs them.
The growth imperatives which frame efforts at the deprived neighbourhoods level in 
both cities reflect aspects of “the global common sense of neo-liberal 
competitiveness” (Cochrane, 2007: 136). These aspects, summarised by Peck and 
Tickell (2002: 394-5), include “a ‘growth first’ approach to urban development”, a 
“naturalisation” of the market as the model for decision-making; and an external focus 
orientated towards the identification of potential competitors rather than the welfare 
of residents. These aspects are extremely evident in Baltimore, and becoming 
increasingly evident in Bristol given its policy shifts regarding deprived 
neighbourhoods.
It is unsurprising that neo-liberal imperatives dominate in both cities given the 
“broadly shared global economic policy context” (Cochrane, 2007: 136). Indeed, 
within this shared neo-liberal context, policy shifts in Bristol can be taken as evidence 
that England continues to look to the US as a “source of policy lessons” (Cochrane, 
2007: 14), particularly given the rise of the ‘asset-based’ and ‘self-help’ discourses. 
Such policy lessons are attractive given their “limited inputs of state resources”
(Raco, 2003: 243).
Despite this tendency for urban policy transfer from the US, “the UK central state 
remains heavily involved in the details of local decision-making, to an extent that 
would be unthinkable in the US” (Hambleton and Sweeting, 2004: 474). This raises
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questions about tfee-value of England looking more broadly for approaches as there 
are other countries, not least in continental Europe, from which lessons can perhaps 
be as, if not more so, usefully learned. This harks back to Halsey’s (1978) assertion 
that “ideas drift casually across the Atlantic, soggy on arrival and of dubious utility”.
7.4 Future Lines of Enquiry
Avenues for further research derive both from a critique of the approach utilised and 
from the key themes which have emerged which are indicative of future policy 
direction. These will be taken in turn.
7.4.1. Further Development of the Frameworks
The frameworks developed and applied in the research have demonstrated the benefit 
of the case study approach in terms of allowing a considered exploration of the issues 
which can help to articulate hypotheses that may ultimately be tested more 
systematically (Yin, 2003: 10). While the framework of ‘ideal-type’ characteristics 
has provided a good basis to bring empirical rigour to considerations of the role of 
neighbourhood=based governance, it would benefit from further empirical grounding. 
In both cities all five of the functions set out in the theoretical framework are evident 
in the structure and operations of the case study entities. Further work would enable 
more definitive assertions and stronger conceptual conclusions about the functions 
posited. The value of further testing of the framework is also indicated in terms of 
understanding how the different functions combine and complement or conflict with 
each other, and which actors in the governance network are likely to champion and 
pursue which combinations of functions.
Also, each function posited reflects a different ideological interpretation and thus 
prescription about the value of neighbourhoods as a spatial scale for action. 
Depending on the functional assumption made, neighbourhood governance may be 
regarded as ‘working’. There is scope to develop the ‘ideal-type’ framework further 
to consider the transferability of different forms of neighbourhood governance. This 
research has not attempted to undertake a best practice assessment of such 
approaches. But it has established self-help and steering as being the principal 
interpretations of the role of neighbourhood governance in the US and England
211
a .respectively. This leads to questions about whether self-help can be realised in§r 
England unless the way in which initiatives are structured and operate are altered, 
which may be unlikely given the ways in which the broader governance context is 
steered in this centrist governmental system. Further consideration is needed of the 
extent to which the framework could be developed to develop more robust and 
applicable policy prescriptions, or more context-specific ‘success factors’ for 
neighbourhood-based governance.
In terms of the network governance context for neighbourhood governance, it would 
be useful to select a broader range of respondents to enable a thorough investigation 
of the city’s governance system, particularly regarding the development of economic 
strategies. This would extend understanding of the development of the imperatives 
which frame the functions of neighbourhood governance, as well as adding to 
comparative understanding of forms of urban governance. In turn, it would be of 
benefit to extend the research approach to other US cities to ascertain the applicability 
of network theories of governance in this localist governmental system.
'--•4 Also, while the city-level provided a useful bounding of the research approach which 
enabled ‘deliverability’, the location of neighbourhood governance in its multi-level 
governance context would benefit from further research entailing broader elite 
respondent selection from higher tiers of government and governance so that 
documentary review would be complemented by elite respondent perspectives.
7.4.2. Key Themes
Two key themes emerged from the research which relate to the current and seeming 
future policy emphases of relevance to neighbourhoods which thus constitute 
potentially rich avenues for further research. They also evidence that England 
continues to look to the US for policy direction, despite the difficulties of 
transplanting approaches to a different institutional and social context. These themes 
highlight the benefit of international comparative research in terms of what May 
(2001) terms the “foresight view”, whereby comparative work enables understanding 
of the potential for success of particular policies, systems or practices in a given 
society.
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Asset-based resource allocation ^  r
The research revealed that the resource allocation ethos of the Baltimore network is 
‘asset-based’, whether this be in terms of housing market conditions, non-profit 
organisations with capacity, or an anchor institution, particularly if it is seeking 
redevelopment of its adjacent neighbourhoods. While in Bristol this ethos has been 
needs-based, the rise of an asset-based sensibility is evident with a shift away from an 
area-based programmatic approach for deprived neighbourhoods to a rhetoric of 
harnessing the benefits of (housing and economic development) growth to these 
areas’ benefit. It is also evident in central government encouragement of community 
management and ownership of assets (investigated by the Quirk Review, 2007).
Self-help
The research also revealed the associated rise of a self-help ethos in Bristol, which in 
turn harks to the more long-established US discourse in this regard. Its rise is inherent 
in the sub-city neighbourhood management approach’s emphasis on communities 
becoming more demanding of statutory service providers. It is reflected in local 
government’s move from a grant-giving to service-commissioning model and greater 
emphasis on social enterprise approaches for the third sector. It is also evident in the 
case study entities’ emphasis on developing their asset base and social enterprise 
approaches to develop their own income sources to sustain their continued operation 
after their programme lifetimes.
The rise of a neo-liberal discourse of self-help and community ownership can be 
linked to a decline in specific resource for such communities combined with their 
“responsibilisation” (Cochrane, 2007: 52), particularly as they are now expected to 
link to the benefits of growth. This emphasis also indicates the continuing influence 
of “broader international, particularly US, discourses of communitarianism, capacity 
building and empowerment” (Raco, 2003: 245) on English policies. The tokenism of 
such approaches can be criticised, as the “political narrative o f community and 
individual responsibility is one that deliberately deflects attention from the causes of 
poverty” (Imrie and Raco, 2003: 30).
The rise of the ‘asset-based’ and ‘self-help’ discourses and approaches provides scope 
to deepen and extend the key findings o f the research. In particular, it would be
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useful to consider the rise of the ‘asset-based’ discourse and the implications of this 
for neighbourhood-based efforts to alleviate deprivation and inequality in England. It 
would also be of benefit to explore the rise of the ‘self-help’ discourse, the validity of 
this notion and the viability of communities’ ability to pursue such strategies in 
England, particularly given its centrist rather than localist form of government.
Overall, the research has emphasised the value of neighbourhoods as a site and scale 
for governance research. The neighbourhood and multi-neighbourhood scales 
continue to be used by others (particularly central and local government in England, 
and city government and private interests including philanthropic foundations in the 
US, as indicated by Baltimore). Associated governance forms continue to be created, 
reach the end of their lifetime or adapt into a different form. What is clear is that the 
neighbourhood and its governance continues to be a contested domain between 
different actors and as a scale for intervention it is subject to competing imperatives.
The potential of the research agenda is clear as it is an ever-changing and dynamic 
field of study and one which is likely to continue to be rich for both academic enquiry 
and of broader relevance, not leasthecause of the continued evolution of policy 
interventions and governance forms in a more austere climate for public sector and 
private philanthropic funding. The research has also emphasised the value of 
comparative research in this field, not least given the unsettling context of continual 
change in England which has been brought sharply into focus by the US comparison.
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:*v Appendix 1
SAMPLE CITY-LEVEL ELITE INTERVIEW GUIDE
Main question: why neighborhood governance?
Preamble
Ask about being taped.
I am looking at neighborhood governance structures - that is, bodies that are based in 
a neighborhood, and involve residents along with other stakeholders in decisions 
about the neighborhood. By doing case studies of neighborhood governance 
initiatives in deprived urban neighborhoods, I want to look at what is happening on 
the ground. What are these structures being used for? By whom? Why?
I am particularly interested in investigating the strengths of neighborhood 
governance, especially from the point of view of bodies that support such initiatives, 
such as non-profit organizations, philanthropic foundations, intermediaries and 
government. I am also focusing on how initiatives are designed, and why they are 
designed this way.
About you:
• Can you tell me how you came to be involved with the Goldseker Foundation? 
How long have you been involved?
About the Goldseker Foundation:
• Can you explain how the Goldseker Foundation works in Baltimore City? I 
am particularly interested in the Foundation’s community development 
priority grant area, including the priority neighborhoods and involvement in 
city-wide community development efforts such as the BNC and Healthy 
Neighborhoods.
• How are opportunities for Foundation involvement in neighborhood-based 
work in Baltimore identified?
• Can you explain when and how the Foundation works with other local and 
national foundations and intermediaries, public sector agencies, non-profits 
and neighborhood-based organizations in Baltimore?
Speaking generally:
• Why do things at the neighborhood level rather than at higher levels?
• Why do neighborhood governance structures exist?
• What role do neighborhood governance structures play? What is their unique 
selling point?
About particular initiatives: [the potential Baltimore case studies]:
• How is the Foundation involved in these initiatives?
• How did the Foundation get involved? How was it decided that these were 
targeted areas and appropriate approaches?
• Can you describe how the initiatives came about, why they were set up? What 
was hoped they would achieve?
• To who or what would you say that the initiatives are accountable, if anyone 
or anything?
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v¥ • Do the initiatives play any part in making services in the neighborhoods - 
responsive to the needs and priorities of residents?
• Would you say that the initiatives can do what they want?
• What can they not do? Why is this? Who or what sets the remit for what the 
initiatives can do? How is it set? Is the Foundation involved?
• Would you say that the initiatives are left to “get on with it”?
Structure
Talking about how the initiatives are designed and why this is so:
• What has determined how these initiatives are structured? Has the Foundation 
had any involvement in this?
• Do you think what the initiatives are trying to do is reflected in the way that 
they are structured?
• How are local partners engaged or represented within the initiative? Is the 
Foundation represented at the level of the initiative?
Process
Thinking about how things actually work at the initiatives:
• How is it decided what the initiative does? Who is involved in making these 
decisions? Does the Foundation have any involvement in this?
• Who is actually responsible for what happens? If there’s a problem, how is it 
resolved? By who? Is the Foundation involved?
• Do you think what the initiatives are trying to do is reflected in the way that 
they (or their stakeholders) operate day-to-day?
"""Overall
• Do you think these arrangements are delivering what the initiatives set out to 
deliver?
Frustrations/ Problems/ Challenges/ Obstacles
• Is there anything that has been particularly frustrating or problematic? 
Anything you see as a particular obstacle to these initiatives doing what they 
set out to do? What is the one thing you would change if you could?
Finally
• Could you recommend any contacts?
• Is there anything else you would like to add?
• Do you have any questions about the research/ next steps/ how the material 
will be used?
Thank you
Madeleine Pill, Resident Scholar 
John W Kluge Center, The Library of Congress 
mpil@loc.gov 
202-215-7159 
Until 26th February 2008 
Thereafter, nillmc@cardiff.ac.uk
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Appendix 2 <
SAMPLE ENTITY-LEVEL INTERVIEW GUIDE
Main question: why neighbourhood-based governance?
Preamble
Ask about being taped.
I am looking at neighbourhood governance structures - that is, bodies that are based in 
a neighbourhood, and involve residents along with other stakeholders, such as local 
government and other service providers, in decisions about the neighbourhood. By 
doing case studies of neighbourhood governance initiatives in deprived urban 
neighbourhoods, I want to look at what is happening on the ground. What are these 
structures being used for? By whom? Why? I am also interested in how and why 
these structures are designed and operate.
Questions
About you:
• Can you tell me how you came to be involved with HWCP?
About the initiative:
• Can you describe how HWCP came about, why it was set up?
• To who or what would you say that HWCP is accountable?
• Does HWCP play any part in making services in the neighborhoods responsive to 
the needs and priorities of residents?
• To what extent would you say that HWCP can do what it wants/ is left to “get on 
with it”?
Structure
Talking about how HWCP is structured and why this is so:
• Can you explain how things are organised? What is the structure?
• Who is involved? How are they involved? Is there a hierarchy?
• How has this changed over time (for example, managing the SRB scheme/ 
becoming a Neighbourhood Renewal area/ moving to transition funding)?
• Can you explain the division of labor between HWCP as an entity and its partners, 
such as the Council, PCT, and Hartcliffe and Withywood Ventures?
• Why is HWCP set up like this? What has determined how it is structured?
• Do you think what HWCP is trying to do is reflected in the way that it is 
structured?
Process
Thinking about how things actually work:
• How are neighbourhood needs and priorities identified? How are these taken into 
account when planning and implementing HWCP’s work?
• How is it decided what HWCP does/ what its remit is? Who is involved in making 
these decisions?
• Who is actually responsible for what happens? If there’s a problem, how is it 
resolved? By who?
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• How do different stakeholders worktogether? I am particularly interested in 
relationships with the Council (with regard to HWCP’s core work but also 
HWCP’s involvement in development of the neighbourhood partnership).
• Do the constituent neighbourhoods that make up the HWCP area vary in terms of 
their engagement? If so, why do you think this is the case?
• Do you think what HWCP is trying to do is reflected in the way that it (or its 
stakeholders) operate day-to-day?
Overall
• Do you think these arrangements -  structure and process - are delivering what 
HWCP set out to deliver?
• Have there been any changes? Why? What difference have they made?
• What are the plans for HWCP’s future?
Levels of Government and Governance
• In your opinion, how is HWCP influenced by the policies and programmes/ funds 
of the Bristol Partnership and of Bristol City Council?
• In turn, do you think that HWCP has affected Bristol Partnership or City Council 
policymaking and how things are done? If so, when, how, and at what level?
• Speaking generally, what, in your opinion, are the best ways to support and fund 
neighbourhood-based governance entities in deprived areas?
Frustrations/ Problems/ Challenges/ Obstacles
• Is there anything that you regard as a particular obstacle to HWCP’s work towards 
its vision? What is the one thing you would change if you could?
Finally
• Could you recommend any particular contacts involved in HWCP’s work?
• Are there any papers that you think may be useful (for example, the local action 
plan)?
• Is there anything else you would like to add?
• Do you have any questions about the research/ how the material will be used?
Thank you
Madeleine Pill 
PhD Researcher 
Centre for Local and Regional Government Research 
Cardiff University School of City and Regional Planning 
pillmc@cardiff.ac.uk 
07791-662140.
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